[CCWG-Accountability] [ccTLDcommunity] Alternative proposal to the CWG transition plan

[Seun Ojedeji]

Thanks for the share Dr Lisse

Regards

On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 7:06 AM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el at lisse.na> wrote:
>
> Please find enclosed a draft proposal from auDA forwarded with permission.
>
> greetings, el
>
> Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
>
> > On Dec 19, 2014, at 07:21, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
> >
> > Yes el, with pleasure
> >
> > Chris Disspain
> > CEO - auDA
> >
> >> On 19 Dec 2014, at 16:20, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el at lisse.na> wrote:
> >>
> >> Chris,
> >>
> >> can I forward to CCWG-Accountability?
> >>
> >> el
> >>
> >> Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
> >>
> >>> On Dec 19, 2014, at 04:58, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> All,
> >>>
> >>> Over the next couple of days auDA will be finalising its comments on
> the CWG proposal. As part of those we will be putting forward an
> alternative proposal. That proposal is below and also attached as a word
> document. I would welcome and very much appreciate input and feedback from
> ccTLD colleagues on our draft alternative. Like the CWG one, there is more
> work to do on it and detail to be filled in but I think it stands as a
> viable way forward that might, as a whole, be more palatable to some ccTLDs
> than the CWG proposal. Of course I could be wrong. I’ve been wrong before,
> once or twice.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> IMPORTANT - As you know, I’m on the ICANN Board. The below proposal
> and the comments auDA will make on the CWG proposal come from auDA. The
> proposal has nothing to do with the ICANN Board and has not been discussed
> with the ICANN Board.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Cheers,
> >>>
> >>> Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
> >>> .au Domain Administration Ltd
> >>> T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
> >>> E: ceo at auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au
> >>> auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> auDA’s Alternative Proposal to CWG Transition Plan
> >>>
> >>> Assumptions:
> >>>
> >>> 1. In a limited number of circumstances (such as 'gross incompetence'
> or ‘material breach’) there should be an option for the IANA function to be
> transferred from ICANN to another operator - The Nuclear Option.
> >>>
> >>> 2. There should be an enhancing of the current functional separation
> of the IANA function from the rest of ICANN - Functional Separation.
> >>>
> >>> 3. There should be a TLD registry operator centric standing committee
> to liaise with and oversee the IANA functions operator on administrative
> and service level functions - The Customer Standing Committee.
> >>>
> >>> 4. There should be an independent, binding arbitration mechanism to
> handle certain disputes - Appeals.
> >>>
> >>> 5. There should be a separate review body to review any ccTLD
> revocation and delegation (formally referred to as re-delegation) - The
> ccTLD Review Body
> >>>
> >>> Note - there is a further assumption that the ICANN Accountability
> working group will deal with ICANN wide accountability recommendations (for
> example a Board spill mechanism) and that such matters are best dealt with
> there. It is clear that any fully formed transition proposal from the CWG
> has to be inextricably linked to the work of that Accountability WG and
> therefore the timing of the work of the groups needs to become aligned.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Proposal:
> >>>
> >>> 1. The Nuclear Option - Where the IANA functions operator is grossly
> negligent or incompetent or in material breach of its obligations under
> agreed service level commitments or performance indicators, it needs to be
> possible for the IANA function to be moved to a new operator.
> >>>
> >>> This could be achieved by the creation of a ‘Golden Bylaw’, similar to
> the corporate concept of a golden share (
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_share). The Golden Bylaw would give
> the TLD registry operators the right, in certain circumstances, to require
> ICANN to put the IANA function out to re-bid. The Golden Bylaw would set
> out at least:
> >>>
> >>> a) the requirements to trigger the re-bid process - FOR EXAMPLE a vote
> of over 75% of ccTLD registry operators and 75% of gTLD registry operators
> >>>
> >>> b) what would need to happen to trigger the TLD registry operator’s
> vote - FOR EXAMPLE a petition by more than 15% of TLD registry operators
> >>>
> >>> c) the composition of a Re-Bid Committee that would oversee the vote
> and the subsequent re-bid and decide who the successful bidder was. The
> Re-Bid Committee could, FOR EXAMPLE, comprise of 20 registry operators
> (split between ccTLDs and gTLDS) plus a representative from each of the
> GAC, ALAC, SSAC and RSSAC
> >>>
> >>> d) the basis upon which the Golden Bylaw itself could be changed - FOR
> EXAMPLE only by a vote of over 75% of ccTLD registry operators and 75% of
> gTLD registry operators
> >>>
> >>> e) the other aspects of this proposal set out below.
> >>>
> >>> 2. Functional Separation - The current levels of functional separation
> of the IANA function from the rest of ICANN can be enhanced as part of the
> transition in a number of ways including:
> >>>
> >>> a) the IANA department having its own discrete budget
> >>>
> >>> b) the IANA department having its own legal advisors and independent
> legal advice.
> >>>
> >>> 3. Customer Standing Committee - This committee would provide the
> day-to-day liaison between the IANA functions operator and the TLD registry
> operators. It could be made up of an equal number of ccTLD and gTLD
> registry operators plus a representative from each of the GAC, ALAC, SSAC
> and RSSAC. It would perform, at least, the following tasks:
> >>>
> >>> a) work with the IANA functions operator to agree service levels and
> performance indicators
> >>>
> >>> b) review and re-negotiate the service levels and performance
> indicators at agreed intervals
> >>>
> >>> c) receive reports on and monitor the IANA functions operator’s
> performance with respect to the service levels and the performance
> indicators
> >>>
> >>> d) conduct a regular IANA functions operator budget review.
> >>>
> >>> 4. Appeals - To deal with disputes that arise in respect to matters
> covered by 3 above there should be a binding arbitration mechanism
> utilising the services of an independent arbitration organisation.
> >>>
> >>> 5. The ccTLD Review Body - The ccTLD community needs to work to come
> to consensus on the review body contemplated by the Framework of
> Interpretation WG. Whilst it may not be essential that this work is done by
> the time of the transition, it is essential that the appeals mechanism set
> out in 4 above is clearly understood to not be that ccTLD Review Body.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> ccTLDcommunity mailing list
> >>> ccTLDcommunity at cctld-managers.org
> >>> http://www.lists.cctld-managers.org/mailman/listinfo/cctldcommunity
> >>>
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*Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb:      http://www.fuoye.edu.ng
<http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email:
<http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng
<seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng>*

The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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