[CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
Mathieu Weill
mathieu.weill at afnic.fr
Fri Dec 19 17:24:48 UTC 2014
Dear Phil, Roelof, All,
It is great to see such a vigorous and creative thread on our list. It
is still too early in our work to assess solutions of course, but I
think we could really use your contributions (as well as the Op-Ed from
ITIF) to inform our current questions regarding the purpose of
accountability, and its characteristics.
So it would be greatly valuable if you could look back at your proposals
and expand on the following questions (currently being considered in WA1
about existing mechanisms) and mentioned in Thomas note after our latest
call
a) is the mechanism providing check and balance, review or redress (see
Netmundial definition of accountability in our Charter) ?
b) to whom does this mechanisms seek to make Icann accountable ?
c) for what purpose does this mechanism make Icann accountable ?
As mentioned in the note mentioned above, this would then be a great
starting point to assess which issues are most needed to be tackled.
Best regards,
Mathieu
Le 19/12/2014 17:52, Phil Buckingham a écrit :
>
> Dear All,
>
> May I start a new thread and suggest a complete restructuring/ break
> up of ICANN, with a new corporate, tax paying entity, established,
> accountable for all revenue generating activity, particularly from its
> management, facilitation and its on going responsibility,
> accountability, reporting of the whole gTLD programme, processes,
> procedures.
>
> Are you aware that ICANN's ( currently a 501 Californian not for
> profit - where no tax is payable) latest audited 2013 financial
> statements show a "surplus" of $83M ( with a further $32.4 M
> development cost write back ) on $359M revenue received from 1930
> applicants. It has also in addition, subsequently received
> https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus/auctionresults
> with another 100+ contention sets ( potentially )facing a last resort
> ICANN auction, where ICANN takes all the proceeds.
>
> Perhaps this outside the CCWG -Accountability remit.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Phil Buckingham
>
> *From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Roelof Meijer
> *Sent:* 19 December 2014 15:26
> *To:* Steve DelBianco; Accountability Cross Community
> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding
> permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
>
> Deal all,
>
> Steve wrote:
>
> "Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check
> on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of
> ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority
> could include removing board members, overturning board
> decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the
> chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and
> "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting
> Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the
> Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible
> for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure
> that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their
> actions could be limited to situations where there is a
> supermajority (i.e., consensus). "
>
> The possibility of introducing such a structure is certainly not
> limited to organizations operating under California State (or US
> Federal for that matter) Law.
>
> If the members of such a structure would be the (elected) chairs of
> the SO's and AC's and of a few other (e.g. IETF, IAB
> and --dare I suggest it- the SG of the ITU) to make it truly/fully
> multi-stakeholder, it could greatly enhance ICANN's accountability. As
> the structure itself would be very accountable.
>
> I would think that (indeed on the condition of a supermajority) this
> structure then could be given the power to (escalation with increase
> in number):
>
> 1. On the basis of "too much noise from the community", tell ICANN to
> redo a particular process;
> 2. If the above does not solve the situation, call for an independent
> review of the issue/process;
> 3. If the situation meets certain criteria, send the board (or part
> thereof) away;
> 4. If the situation meets even stricter criteria, transfer ICANN's
> role and/or the IANA function to another organization (Chris
> Disspain's "nuclear option")
>
> The nice thing about option 4 is that having it, will make it's actual
> use unnecessary and will make options 1 to 3 a given. By rattling the
> sable, as the NTIA occasionally did, for sure..
>
> Only a very rough sketch, lots of develish details to be worked out.
> But in my opinion worth reflecting on. Not because it, as Kavouss
> suggests, "[is limited] to merely existing practice and model". As it
> is not. But because it builds onto what had been realized over the
> years and works pretty well most of the time. And because it might be
> part of a solution to both issues: the IANA stewardship transition and
> the enhancement of ICANN's accountability.
>
> And, now that I am having a go at it anyway, if the above would be
> implemented, another increase in ICANN's accountability could be
> realized some time down the line. By replacing ICANN's present board
> by one of which none of the members are elected from an SO or AC , but
> all members are selected on the basis of their personal skills and
> expertise.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Roelof A. Meijer
>
> CEO
>
> SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE
> NETHERLANDS
> T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05
> roelof.meijer at sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer at sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl
> <http://www.sidn.nl/>
>
> *From: *Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco at netchoice.org
> <mailto:sdelbianco at netchoice.org>>
> *Date: *woensdag 17 december 2014 17:20
> *To: *Accountability Cross Community
> <accountability-cross-community at icann.org
> <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>>
> *Subject: *[CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent
> cross-community group as ultimate authority
>
> This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent,
> cross-community 'Membership' group to hold ICANN board and management
> accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3
> <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accountability%20suggestions%20%5Bdraft%203%5D.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1418610739000&api=v2>
> for work area 2:
>
> Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community
> representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with
> authority to:
>
> Appoint members of Affirmation review teams
>
> Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use
> independent panel)
>
> Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval
>
> Approve annual proposed ICANN budget
>
> Recall one or all ICANN Board members
>
> One of the groups proposing
> <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a
> community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant
> Op-Ed
> <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-plan-needs-new-ideas-to-ensure-accountability>
> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information
> Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
>
> California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit
> corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit
> organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that
> one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power
> is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority
> over the board. This authority could include removing board
> members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members
> would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting
> organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address
> Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy
> and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO)
> responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To
> ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their
> actions could be limited to situations where there is a
> supermajority (i.e., consensus).
>
> We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this
> modification to ICANN's bylaws in conformance with California law.
>
> Steve DelBianco
>
> Executive Director
>
> NetChoice
>
> http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and
> http://blog.netchoice.org <http://blog.netchoice.org/>
>
> +1.202.420.7482
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
--
*****************************
Mathieu WEILL
AFNIC - directeur général
Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06
mathieu.weill at afnic.fr
Twitter : @mathieuweill
*****************************
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/attachments/20141219/242e04cf/attachment.html>
More information about the Accountability-Cross-Community
mailing list