[CCWG-ACCT] Legal question

Avri Doria avri at acm.org
Wed Apr 22 04:51:39 UTC 2015


While not arguing for the member model, as I have my own concerns with
the model ...

On 21-Apr-15 19:07, Chris Disspain wrote:
> The current recommended model does not provide any viable solution for
> dealing with the GAC. It seems obvious to me that the governments
> involved in the GAC are not going to agree to form an unincorporated
> association under Californian law. If I'm right then presumably the
> GAC would remain as an advisory committee and would not be able to
> have a vote in any of the escalation mechanisms. That may be fine as
> the GAC may not want to have a vote anyway. 

The GAC currently does not have a voting Board Director.  I have
understood that the reason is that they don't want one.  Becoming a
member is largely about (s)electing a Director.  While there are other
member oversight powers, the GAC has a special Bylaw status that gives
it a degree of ICANN oversight and takes it out of the standard AC
model; no other SOAC has the degree of control over the Board that the
GAC does.  I see no reason why difficulties they might have deciding to
become members would be a gating consideration on picking this model.  I
think that one of the points about their special advice status is that
they don't need to become ICANN members to influence the Board.

I have a viewpoint on the ccNSO and its ability to adequately represent
the interests of all ccTLDs, but figure the better part of valor
requires me to remain silent on that.

On the other hand,

As mentioned above, I have concerns with a member model as a WS1
solution, especially its implementation in the required time frame. I
also see the new accountability issues and capture scenarios of the
membership model  as something that would need to explored and
documented; all of the SOAC legal entitieis would be new structures and
we would need to provide the details - WS1 is part of the IANA
submission.  These days, the Board and its SIC (Structural Improvements
Committee) are the effective oversight for the SOAC (except the GAC). 
Would that still be the case when they were independent legal entities? 
If not, how would they prove accountability and non-capture to their
respective communities or to the other members?  I believe it could be
done, but it is not a quick job.  Or does the Board and its SIC remain
responsible as today - if so, how would that work?

Another question I have is on the member model as related to the ATRT. 
The ATRT can make recommendations regarding any part of ICANN, including
the SOAC structure, both internal and in their relationship to each
other.  As part of ATRT2, we made recommendations related to GNSO policy
development process, ATRT1 made recommendations about the relationship
between the Board and the GAC. Would that still be in scope when to the
SOAC became independent legal entities?  Would we need to modify the AOC
derivative bylaws to deal with that?

The more I think about the member model, the more questions I come up
Do we absolutely need this to achieve what we need for WS1? 
Or is it the 'Tesla' we wish we had.


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