[CCWG-ACCT] Fwd: [Acct-Legal] Proposed agenda for tomorrow's call

Chris Disspain ceo at auda.org.au
Wed Apr 22 18:26:04 UTC 2015


Thanks León. Those are really helpful responses. Please pass on my thanks to Josh.


Cheers,

Chris

On 22 Apr 2015, at 16:07 , León Felipe Sánchez Ambía <leonfelipe at sanchez.mx> wrote:

> Dear all,
> 
> I am forwarding the answers provided by counsel to the questions raised by Chris Disspain. 
> 
> Interesting situations. 
> 
> Best regards 
> 
> León 
> 
> Enviado desde mi iPhone
> 
> Inicio del mensaje reenviado:
> 
>> De: List for the work of CCWG-Accountability Legal SubTeam <ccwg-accountability5 at icann.org>
>> Fecha: 21 de abril de 2015, 10:59:52 PM CDT
>> Para: "ccwg-accountability5 at icann.org" <ccwg-accountability5 at icann.org>
>> Cc: ACCT-Staff <acct-staff at icann.org>
>> Asunto: Re: [Acct-Legal] Proposed agenda for tomorrow's call
>> Responder a: ccwg-accountability5 at icann.org
>> 
>> 
>> Thank you Leon for sharing the agenda for the Legal Sub-Team call tomorrow.  Below you will find responses to the four questions posed by Chris Disspain.  For convenience, we have interlineated our responses following each question, and although the email comes from Sidley we have reviewed with Adler & Colvin as well.
>>  
>>  =====================================================================
>>  
>> Under the current structure of ICANN and its SOs and ACs 
>> 
>> 1. Is it correct that a bylaw saying that a combination of those SOs and ACs can veto the budget or veto a bylaw change can be drafted and put in to the bylaws?
>> 
>> Under the current structure of ICANN and its SOs and ACs, no, not in a way that is enforceable.  However:
>> 
>> As to the budget, in a membership model, a bylaw could be drafted granting SOs and ACs the ability to veto the budget.  In a designator model, this ability is unclear as there is not an established corporate law basis for it.  These issues are addressed in (1) the Sidley Austin and Adler & Colvin April 10, 2015 memo (Link) and the “Legal Analysis and Viability” sections of templates WP1-C and WP-1F attached thereto, and (2) Sections 5 and 6 of the Sidley Austin and Adler & Colvin April 17, 2015 Revised Governance Chart (Link).
>> As to a bylaw change, under both a membership model and a designator model, a bylaw could be drafted granting SOs and ACs  the right to veto bylaw changes.  This is addressed in (1) the Sidley Austin and Adler & Colvin April 10, 2015 memo (Link) and the “Legal Analysis and Viability” sections of templates WP-1A and WP1-5B-2 attached thereto, and (2) Sections 3 and 4 of the Sidley Austin and Adler & Colvin April 17, 2015 Revised Governance Chart (Link).
>> 2. Is it correct that were there to be such a bylaw and the SOs and ACs were to veto the budget or a bylaw change pursuant to that bylaw then the Board of ICANN could ignore that veto and that the SOs and ACs could not enforce the veto?
>> 
>> First, for an SO or an AC to be able to enforce any right vis-a-vis ICANN, it would need to be organized as a legal person (such as an unincorporated association).  Thus, under the current structure of ICANN and its SOs and ACs, the SOs or ACs could not enforce the veto right as they are not currently legal persons.  However, in a membership model, a bylaw granting the SOs and ACs a right to veto the budget would generally be enforceable.  In a designator model, this enforceability is unclear as there is not an established corporate law basis for it. These issues are addressed in (1) the Sidley Austin and Adler & Colvin April 10, 2015 memo (Link) and the “Legal Analysis and Viability” sections of templates WP1-C and WP-1F attached thereto, and (2) Sections 5 and 6 of the Sidley Austin and Adler & Colvin April 17, 2015 Revised Governance Chart (Link).
>> A right provided by a bylaw to the SOs and ACs to veto a bylaw change would (subject to the legal personhood requirement stated above) generally be enforceable.  These issues are addressed in (1) the Sidley Austin and Adler & Colvin April 10, 2015 memo (Link) and the “Legal Analysis and Viability” sections of templates WP-1A and WP1-5B-2 attached thereto, and (2) Sections 3 and 4 of the Sidley Austin and Adler & Colvin April 17, 2015 Revised Governance Chart (Link).
>> 3. Is it correct that the veto bylaw could be drafted to require binding arbitration in the event that the Board refused to follow the SO/AC veto and if so would the Board be bound by the arbitration finding?
>> 
>> Under the current structure of ICANN and its SOs and ACs, no, not in a way that is enforceable.  However:
>> 
>> In a membership model, binding arbitration could be implemented in the bylaws or by agreements with the members, and the Board would generally be bound by the finding, provided the right to veto was reserved to the members in the articles or bylaws. 
>> In a designator model, binding arbitration could be implemented for bylaw changes where approval was reserved to the designators, but the enforceability of a right to veto the budget would be questionable and the arbitration finding would generally be considered advisory rather than binding.  These issues are addressed in Annex A to the Sidley Austin and Adler & Colvin April 20, 2015 memorandum (Link) and in the “Legal Analysis and Viability” section of the Independent Review Panel template included in Annex B thereto.
>> 4. Is it correct that a Board spill bylaw could be inserted in to the bylaws and if triggered would be enforceable?
>> 
>> Under the current structure of ICANN and its SOs and ACs, no, not in a way that is enforceable.  However, under either a member or a designator model, a procedure could be inserted into the bylaws to provide for a no-confidence vote.  The members or designators would then enter into a contract whereby the members or designators agree to remove their respective directors upon the occurrence of the no-confidence vote.  Another mechanism could be a “springing resignation” signed by each director on assuming office that automatically takes effect upon a no-confidence vote.  These issues are addressed in (1) the Sidley Austin and Adler & Colvin April 10, 2015 memo (Link) and the “Legal Analysis and Viability” section of template WP1-7A attached thereto, and (2) Section 1 of the Sidley Austin and Adler & Colvin April 17, 2015 Revised Governance Chart (Link).
>>  
>> Cheers,
>> Josh
>> JOSHUA HOFHEIMER
>> Partner
>> Sidley Austin LLP
>> +1.213.896.6061 (LA direct)
>> +1.650.565.7561 (PA direct)
>> +1.323.708.2405 (cell)
>> jhofheimer at sidley.com
>> www.sidley.com
>>  SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
>>  
>>  
>> From: ccwg-accountability5-bounces at icann.org [mailto:ccwg-accountability5-bounces at icann.org]On Behalf Of List for the work of CCWG-Accountability Legal SubTeam
>> Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2015 8:35 PM
>> To: ccwg-accountability5 at icann.org
>> Cc: ACCT-Staff
>> Subject: [Acct-Legal] Proposed agenda for tomorrow's call
>>  
>> Dear team,
>>  
>> Attached you will find the proposed agenda for our tomorrow’s call. As usual, this is just a proposal that welcomes any addition or modification you consider pertinent.
>>  
>> Attached also the documents for discussion. As for the questions raised by Chris Disspain, I paste them here:
>>  
>> Under the current structure of ICANN and its SOs and ACs 
>>  
>> 1. Is it correct that a bylaw saying that a combination of those SOs and ACs can veto the budget or veto a bylaw change can be drafted and put in to the bylaws?
>>  
>> 2. Is it correct that were there to be such a bylaw and the SOs and ACs were to veto the budget or a bylaw change pursuant to that bylaw then the Board of ICANN could ignore that veto and that the SOs and ACs could not enforce the veto?
>>  
>> 3. Is it correct that the veto bylaw could be drafted to require binding arbitration in the event that the Board refused to follow the SO/AC veto and if so would the Board be bound by the arbitration finding?
>>  
>> 4. Is it correct that a Board spill bylaw could be inserted in to the bylaws and if triggered would be enforceable?
>>  
>> Staff, I kindly ask you to please have the documents ready for display in the AC room.
>>  
>> Looking forward to our call tomorrow.
>>  
>> Best regards,
>>  
>>  
>> Best regards,
>>  
>>  
>> León
>>  
>> 
>>  
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