[CCWG-ACCT] Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for Intensive Meeting Day 1 - Session 2 - 23 April
brenda.brewer at icann.org
Thu Apr 23 15:20:07 UTC 2015
The notes, recordings and transcripts for the CCWG ACCT Intensive Meeting Day 1 Session 2 - 23 April
will be available here: https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Day+1+-+Session+2
A copy of the notes and a summary of the session may be found below.
CCWG Intensive Meeting -
Day 1 - 23 April - Session 2
This session is being recorded.
Intensive Meeting Program: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=52897568
Draft Report Dedicated Webpage: https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Draft+Report
1. Recap of session 1 (5')
2. Section 6.6.5 - Power: Recalling individual ICANN Directors (25')
3. Section 6.6.6 - Recall the entire Board (25')
4. Recap and next steps (5')
These high-level notes are designed to help you navigate through content of the call and do not
substitute in any way the transcript.
Recap: discussed the two options around the mechanisms, agreement the on the structure an
composition of the mechanisms. Also discussed the reconsideration and rejection of the budget and
strategic plan and reopen discussion this later today. An agreement on WP1 decision threshold.
Agreement on rejection and changes of ICANN bylaws and after first reading agreed on the text as
Section 6.6.5 - Power: Recalling individual ICANN Directors
** Recall of individual directors selected by SO/AC, Noncom appointment members, and thresholds to
be considered. Based in WP1.
Recall of individual directors relatively straight forward. More complex is recall of NomCom
No agreement on the level of support needed to remove a director. [66%] [75%] Not to make it
unattainable and also not too easy
Also positioning thresholds to start the consideration of removing a director
Begin with SO/AC directors. Is it WS1 issues?
Should there be common requirements for removal of SO/AC removal, or should SO/AC set their own
Response: Consider it is a WS1 issue. Agree that recall should not be done by the sending
constituency alone. Suggest it will be had to set common rules as the selection process are
Legal counsel. under CA laws, generally the appointer has the power to remove a director. Approval
at the very least. Under designator or member model.
Given that there us a public interest element to directors service, it should not be the only the
appointing organization that is involved in removal. But also recall that under CA law only the
selector could remove. But if this not the case then only a constituency process.
Comment: believes this was for a long time WS2. Note that the Board can already remove an Director,
so how can the community move the Board to act and remove a director when necessary.
Legal advice: under CA law, it will be the appointer, designator or member who removes the director
they appointed. Their approval at the very least to do that.
This would be the most straightforward way.
If a director looses the confidence of the sending group then it is reasonable that the group should
be able to remove that director
At the very least the removal should be the sending organization. What is the situation under a
single member model or a multi member model?
Principle: the appointing entity should ultimately be the one to say remove that person. This is
for removal without cause
Currently appointed by SO/AC, but can be removed without cause by the Board. Need to consider this
Summary: safe mode that the removal process should be decided by the specific SO/AC. Discussion if
WS1 or WS2. With these tentative conclusions, in the pubic comment report , but we find more
complicated than expected then can reconsider. If we decide WS1 then this is the way forward
suggested. Objections? Provisional. electors make the removal.
In favor of selector as doing the recall, but need a solution for NomCom appointees at the same
** Removal of NomCom appointees
More complex from legal and political considerations.
Could this be a WS2 item?
Suggest not moving to WS2 unless the SO/AC also WS2. Suggest carrying the same approach, that a
NomCom Selects, then a NomCom recalls. And that a NomCom recall procedure has been proposed.
To ensure a comprehensive approach use the same approach, that a NomCom Selects, then a NomCom
recalls. And a NomCom recall procedure proposed. Suggested that this approach might be considered
in public comment. [audio lost, WS1 or WS2?]
Hard for the current NomCom to also handle a removal process. These processes are essentially not
compatible, and operationally difficult. But there could be community measure, preheat with a
threshold similar to removal of the entire board or a little lower, to remove.
Legal advice has suggested that a pre-service letter signed by directors on appointment saying they
would resign under certain conditions: condition such as a super majority of the designator or
members or a [community vote] calls for their resignation would be viable.
A new removal NomCom would be hard to create, aware based on the IETF model, but IETF very
different. Proposal to use the NomCom as is when the problem arises.
Should be WS1. Stick to principle the appointee removes: the regular NomCom should be the body to
remove. Assume the ICANN Board also have the right to remove a director. And will have new
mechanisms to pressure the Board and NomCom to take actions, so may use that pressure to encourage
them to remove a NomCom appointed director.
NomCom suggestion is similar to IETF NomCom process, but adapted to fit the ICANN model. Suggested
2 different processes because of the two very different purposes of the processes. The removal of 1,
when the other process is about finding and selecting a larger group. That the NomCom might feel
they have people in their pool who would be better than the person being considered for removal, and
that may influence their decision to remove.
Sufficient support to include proposals on this issues in the PC report. Hear traction around the
new "recall NewCom" proposal would be put forward in the report as a central option, as a proposal
under consideration. And outline that other options are being considered and should be explained.
And note the consideration of the consistency with the removal of individual directors.
6.6.6 Power: Recalling the entire ICANN Board
Extensive discussion in Istanbul. We know the power to recall the entire board is feasible.
Consideration of the voting thresholds and parameters for this community power. See the righthand
column of community powers document.
What's proposed is a legally viable approach. Consideration has been to make a high threshold. This
should not be a trivial matter.
A petition of 2/3 of the SO/AC (7 in total) and at least 1 SO and 1 AC supporting the petition.
Suggesting that it should be a directed vote (para c). Threshold of the total possible total votes
available, and not having abstentions reduce this, and not having a single SO/AC from blocking the
process. Leading to threshold pointing to 75% rather than the 85% also suggested in the document.
Could the SO/AC split their vote? This is a decision to be made once the mechanism is known, some
would allow and some do not. Perhaps the same basis as other decisions, and the same should apply
for all. An issue that requires clarification.
After a board removal there is need to ensure continuity of operations of ICANN. This should be
flagged in the report.
A suggestion that 3/4 is too low. 4/5 (80%) recommended and ask that both thresholds are put for
public comment as an option and seek community input.
In favor of not allowing any any individual SO/AC blocking the process by itself, and 4/5 would be
acceptable for this, but the voting powers ratio also needs to be considered.
There will be clarification on the ability to split the directed vote, and the different threshold
proposals will be in the report.
review the board sections.
* a set of proposal for WS1, based on each SO/AC being able to remove their own appointees.
* proposal of a new NomCom process to remove NomCom appointees, noting in the report the other
legally viable options and why they are less favored.
* recall of entire board: further investigate the caretaker option as a replacement if a board is
removed. Action: Legal group to ensure consistent. Petition levels no objections. And threshold
coalescing around the 4/5 80% solution of the vote to remove. But be aware of not setting threshold
so high that they make the mechanism unworkable. And noting the already high petition threshold.
Suggest revisiting the vote threshold during the 2nd reading, will be easier when we know the voting
Reconvene at 19:00 UTC. To address WP2 items.
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