[CCWG-ACCT] the power to enforce AOC type (6.7) recommendations

Malcolm Hutty malcolm at linx.net
Tue Apr 28 18:59:13 UTC 2015

> On 27 Apr 2015, at 21:13, Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
> We don't need to distinguish in this way, because in either case the processes are available to force a reconsideration. The appetite to do so will be down to how well the Board has set out its logic. It's less likely to get forced into such in the second situation, since by definition that would be simpler to see being a helpful proposal (at least in the eyes of the community review team).

I support this view. If a Board refuses to accept a Review Team's considered recommendations, a Reconsideration Request is the appropriate next step for those who wish to push it further. 

As for Thomas' suggestion of a mandatory public comment period, I support that too, but not exceptionally for ATRT-type work. I hope that our core values will establish a strong norm that a public comment period, and usually one of a significant time (say, three months rather than three weeks), should be the usual requirement for any major piece of work. If it's worth establishing a task force to work on it for a year, it's certainly worth asking the community for a quarter. 

I would ask the CCWG this though: what if the Board persistently fails to hold public comment? What is the recourse? Do we believe the decision not to offer something for public comment is itself subject to RR and IRP? Do we consider community controls over appointment and recall of Directors sufficient -would they ever be used to recall a Board that wasn't interested in holding public comment? Is there anything else to motivate the Board to uphold this as a norm?

For myself, I think specific measures are inappropriate and cannot finely predict all the various failures to uphold the core values to which  some future Board might succumb. A better, and simpler idea would be that an arrogant and deaf Board be spilled; this would be a powerful motivator for its successors. But the prevailing view on CCWG seems to be against this, as we say we in the Frozen Draft that we prefers to make it as hard as possible to spill the Board without totally removing the power. So if a Board spill for not holding public comments is vanishingly unlikely, I ask: how are these norms incentivised?


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