[CCWG-ACCT] Paper for discussion/decision - Community Decision-Making: Thresholds Consideration

Tue Dec 1 03:27:03 UTC 2015

hi Tijani, all

Sorry about the slow reply - some thoughts in-line below:

On 28 November 2015 at 03:07, Tijani BENJEMAA <tijani.benjemaa at fmai.org.tn>
wrote:

> Jordan and all,
>
> First of all, I apologize for reacting too late; particular circonstances
> are behind it.
>
> I read carefully the proposal of Jordan to reduce the threshold from 4
> supports to 3 only in case only 4 SOs/ACs participate in the decision
> making process, and would like to make the following remarks:
>
>
>    - in the scenario he is giving, there are 5 SOs/ACs participating in
>    the process (ALAC, GNSO, GAC, ASO and ccNSO). Only SSAC and RSSAC don’t
>    participate as per their declaration. The ASO didn’t ask to be out of the
>    process; it only said it will not participate in this very case, means it
>    is abstaining. In fact, not participating means announcing that the
>    considered SO or AC wouldn’t be part of the decision making process at all
>    as did the SSAC. Deciding not giving an opinion in a particular case means
>    simply that it doesn’t have an opinion, or abstains.
>
> We clarified this on the call, I thought? This is only about the
Decisional Participants (the five SOs and ACs that could make decisions in
the Third Draft Proposal), and the case is the case where one decides to
abstain, leaving only four possible votes.

>
>    - If I follow his reasoning, we may also have a case where 2 or 3 SOs
>    and/or ACs deciding not taking part in a specific case of decision making;
>    Shall we reduce more and more the threshold????
>
> No. The threshold decided on only deals with the one-abstention situation.
The whole case came about because of the difficulties in particular that
SOs or ACs might face given the tight timeframes of these processes.

>
>    - In my opinion, the definition of the participation should be clearly
>    detailed as declaring that they will not participate in the decision making
>    process to exercise any of the community powers at all.
>
>
Those aren't what this situation is about. It is about an SO or AC that
*is* one of the five Decisional Participants listed in the bylaws.

best
Jordan

>
>    -
>
>
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> *Tijani BEN JEMAA*
>
> Executive Director
>
> Mediterranean Federation of Internet Association (*FMAI*)
>
> *Phone: *+216 98 330 114
>
> *Fax*:       +216 70 853 376
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Le 24 nov. 2015 à 08:00, Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz> a écrit
> :
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz>
> Date: 19 November 2015 at 10:04
> Subject: Paper for discussion/decision - Community Decision-Making:
> Thresholds Consideration
> To: Accountability Cross Community <
> accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>
>
> Dear all
> As promised on our call, I have prepared a paper on the decision-making
> thresholds matter for CCWG consideration.
>
> The paper itself is pasted below, and the attached versions in .docx and
> .pdf also include the decision table with thresholds etc. It is unchanged.
>
> Look forward to comments and discussion...
>
> best
> Jordan
>
>
> Community Decision-Making: Thresholds Consideration
>
> 18 November 2015
> Introduction
>
> During its call #68 on 17 November, the CCWG discussed a scenario related
> to decision thresholds in the Community Mechanism that has been raised by
> participants on the email list. This discussion has happened a couple of
> times since it became clear at / after Dublin that the RSSAC and SSAC would
> not be decisional participants in the Community Mechanism.
>
>
> With these two groups excluded, it is likely the Third Draft Proposal will
> specify the three SOs, ALAC and GAC as the five “decisional participants” –
> groups that can express support for or objection to the use of a community
> power & the engagement process, or choose to express no view at all.
> The scenario
>
> A version of this scenario is as follows (this is entirely hypothetical):
>
>
> *A proposed Annual Operating Plan and Budget is approved by the Board even
> though substantial community concerns about a particular project (Project
> X) related to generic top level domains have not been taken into account.*
>
>
>
> *The ALAC and the GNSO follow the escalation path and convene a Conference
> call to discuss exercising the Budget veto. Opposition continues to
> register.*
>
>
>
> *The GAC joins the group in favour of vetoing the Budget to call a
> Community Forum. Opposition continues to register.*
>
>
>
> *The ASO makes it clear it has no interest in the level of funding for
> Project X, which is the core of the dispute between Board and Community,
> and will not participate in the decision. This means only four SOs and ACs
> are left to make decisions.*
>
>
>
> *The ccNSO is split on whether it is appropriate to make a decision on a
> gTLD names matter, and proves unable to reach a decision by the end of the
> time allowed. This is even though many ccTLD managers are opposed to
> Project X, and only a few support it.*
>
>
>
> *The use of the community power lapses with only three SOs supporting its
> use, none objecting, and one not offering a decision (effectively,
> abstaining), so the Annual Operating Plan and Budget go into effect. The
> community remains upset and considers other options.*
>
> The problem
>
> The concern raised by this scenario is as follows:
>
>
> *By reducing the number of decisional participants from seven groups to
> five groups, a threshold of four SOs and ACs expressing support to exercise
> a power is too high (if one of them is unable to participate). It is too
> high because it requires complete unanimity among the rest, a threshold
> that is inconsistent with the CCWG’s desire to avoid unanimity being
> required for the use of any of the powers.*
> Solving the problem
>
> The approach I raised for dealing with this issue proposed on the CCWG
> call on 17 November was as follows:
>
> For community powers that require consensus support from four SOs or ACs
> to exercise the power (powers on Budget, Fundamental bylaws change, Board
> recall and IANA Names functions separation), an exception should be added
> as follows:
>
> *Where only four SOs and ACs are participating in the decision to exercise
> the power (through supporting it or objecting to it), the threshold
> required is only three (3) SOs/ACs in favour, and no more than one
> objection.*
>
>
> In essence, adding this exception is a possible way to deal with the
> reduced number of decision-makers (from seven to five), and reduce the
> likely number of cases where unanimity might be required to use the
> relevant community powers. This would in turn make sure the powers could be
> used, and so the incentive effects they are designed to have on Board /
> Community cooperation would remain strong.
>
> This approach develops what was in our Second Draft Proposal, where we
> suggested only counting affirmative votes to hit support thresholds.
> Non-participation in that system could also have led to unanimity among
> participants being a practical requirement.
>
>
> Adopting this solution would be a *change* to our decision-making
> approach and would be noted as such (compared with Dublin, as this whole
> Dublin-based approach is new compared with the Second Draft Proposal).
> The counter-argument & approach
>
> A counter-argument to this can be expressed as follows:
>
> *Regardless of the reduced number of participants, the threshold should
> stay the same, because only the strongest and broadest possible community
> support should allow the exercise of the Community Powers for which a
> threshold of four SOs/ACs in favour has been proposed.*
>
> To give effect to this approach, no changes need to be made to what we
> decided a week or two ago.
> Discussion
>
> My view as rapporteur is that this question is finely balanced. There are
> two competing principles:
>
> ·       Making sure community powers can be used without setting a
> threshold that practically requires unanimity
>
> ·       Making sure community powers are only used with widespread
> community consensus
>
>
> As a CCWG participant, I haven’t come to a firm conclusion. It seems like
> the proposed approach steps back a little bit from high degrees of
> consensus (though they remain quite high); on the other hand, not modifying
> in line with the proposed approach risks leaving some of the powers
> practically un-useable, and that is not desirable.
>
>
> Jordan Carter, WP1 Rapporteur, CCWG
>
> --
> Jordan Carter
>
> Chief Executive
> *InternetNZ*
>
> +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
> Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
> Skype: jordancarter
> Web: www.internetnz.nz
>
> *A better world through a better Internet *
>
>
>
>
> --
> Jordan Carter
>
> Chief Executive
> *InternetNZ*
>
> +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
> Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
> Skype: jordancarter
> Web: www.internetnz.nz
>
> *A better world through a better Internet *
>
> <2015-11-18-Decision-Making-Thresholds.pdf>
> <2015-11-18-Decision-Making-Thresholds.docx>
>
>
>

-- 
Jordan Carter

Chief Executive
*InternetNZ*

+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz

*A better world through a better Internet *
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