[CCWG-ACCT] Does the proposed change to the GAC Bylaw create a new "mandatory voting requirement" for the ICANN Board?

Alan Greenberg alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
Fri Dec 18 18:28:19 UTC 2015


We have th3e exact same situation with the Board 
accepting GNSO PDP recommendations. It takes 
supermajority to reject. But we still say that 
the GNSO "recommends" policy and it is adopted - 
or not - by the Board. Saying that it takes a 
supermajority to reject is identical to saying 
that acceptance only requires 1/3. There is no 
presumption. It is simply a different threshold.

Alan

At 18/12/2015 01:11 PM, Robin Gross wrote:
>Greg raises an interesting point about the 
>status of GAC advice in the absence of a 2/3 
>vote to reject it below.  I recall our lawyers 
>telling us early on (and often) that board 
>members are not allowed to “off-load" key 
>decisions of the organization’s management to 
>others as it would be a breach of their 
>fiduciary duty.  But it seems like that is what 
>we may have done (intentionally or not) by 
>presumptively accepting GAC advice and putting 
>the burden on the board to reject and undo the 
>effect of that decision.  This may be an issue 
>we need to further explore with our lawyers.
>
>Robin
>
>
>>On Dec 17, 2015, at 9:51 PM, Greg Shatan 
>><<mailto:gregshatanipc at gmail.com>gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>[
]
>>
>>There is another issue raised by this new 
>>language.  With this revision, it is far from 
>>clear what the status of GAC Advice that not 
>>been rejected by a 2/3 vote?  If the Board 
>>takes a vote, but the rejection fails to pass, 
>>is the GAC Advice now "accepted" (possibly by a 
>>vote of 1/3+1) and binding on ICANN?  What 
>>about GAC Advice on which no vote has been 
>>taken -- is that Advice "accepted" and binding 
>>on ICANN and, if so, when?  [Compare this to 
>>the Community's right to reject a standard 
>>bylaws change -- if the community does not 
>>elect to do so, or attempts to do so and fails, 
>>that bylaw clearly become binding upon ICANN.]
>>
>>The combination of a 2/3 threshold and a 
>>mandatory vote to reject GAC Advice creates a 
>>presumption that GAC advice will be 
>>accepted.  This presumption is novel and 
>>clearly elevates GAC Advice to a new level of 
>>deference within the ICANN process.
>>
>>Although none of this is explicitly stated in 
>>the detailed explanation in Annex 11, the more 
>>I consider this and the more people I talk to, 
>>the more convinced I am that what I've laid out 
>>above is exactly what was intended by some of 
>>those involved in the drafting process for the 
>>Bylaw revision, and the rest of us just didn't 
>>see it at the time.  Since it's not brought out 
>>in the CCWG's explanation, this fundamental 
>>change can "fly under the radar" until the Proposal is approved.
>>
>>I don't believe that this was the intention of 
>>the CCWG.  If it's not the intention of the 
>>CCWG, then my alternative wording would remove 
>>this concern.  If this is in fact the intention 
>>of the CCWG then I think it needs to be part of 
>>the explanation set forth in the proposal, so 
>>that the intent and effect are clear, and any 
>>reader can clearly understand what we have wrought.
>>
>>Finally, I have to say that this is not an 
>>"implementation level" concern.  This is, if 
>>you will, a "policy level" concern.  If this 
>>gets baked into the accepted proposal, then the 
>>implementers will essentially be bound to carry 
>>this out in the implementation (i.e., the 
>>drafting of the "real" Bylaw language).  Any 
>>later attempt to change a concept stated in the 
>>accepted and transmitted final proposal will 
>>face a very high set of hurdles, at best.  Now is the time to deal with this.
>>
>>Greg
>>
>>
>>
>>On Thu, Dec 17, 2015 at 3:22 PM, Alan Greenberg 
>><<mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca>alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca> wrote:
>>Greg, you say that the current Bylaws do not 
>>reference voting. The current wording ( 
>>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en/#XI-2.1j) 
>>is "In the event that the ICANN Board 
>>determines to take an action that is not 
>>consistent with the Governmental Advisory Committee advice..."
>>
>>How else is the Board able to formally decide 
>>on anything other than by voting?
>>
>>Alan
>>
>>At 16/12/2015 03:09 AM, Greg Shatan wrote:
>>>All,
>>>
>>>In reviewing the Third Draft Proposal, 
>>>concerns have been raised within my 
>>>constituency that the proposed Bylaw does more 
>>>than replace an existing "majority" threshold 
>>>with a new "2/3" threshold.  The concern is 
>>>that the proposed Bylaw introduces a 
>>>"mandatory vote" by the Board in order to 
>>>reject GAC Advice where the Bylaws do not 
>>>currently require a Board vote.  Further, 
>>>there appears to be a concern that, if the 
>>>Board does not take a vote and affirmatively 
>>>reject a piece of GAC advice, then that GAC advice becomes binding on ICANN.
>>>
>>>These concerns stem from a reading of the draft Bylaw (new language in red):
>>>
>>>The advice of the Governmental Advisory 
>>>Committee on public policy matters shall be 
>>>duly taken into account, both in the 
>>>formulation and adoption of policies. In the 
>>>event that the ICANN Board determines to take 
>>>an action that is not consistent with the 
>>>Governmental Advisory Committee advice, it 
>>>shall so inform the Committee and state the 
>>>reasons why it decided not to follow that 
>>>advice. Any Governmental Advisory Committee 
>>>advice approved by a full Governmental 
>>>Advisory Committee consensus, understood to 
>>>mean the practice of adopting decisions by 
>>>general agreement in the absence of any formal 
>>>objection, may only be rejected by a vote of 
>>>two-thirds of the Board, and tThe Governmental 
>>>Advisory Committee and the ICANN Board will 
>>>then try, in good faith and in a timely and 
>>>efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
>>>
>>>
>>>â€â€¹The ccurrent language of the Bylaw makes 
>>>no reference to voting, only to the far more 
>>>ambiguous "determines to take an action."  As 
>>>such, adding a reference to a vote can be seen 
>>>to add a new element (aside from the 
>>>introduction of a 2/3 threshold): the element 
>>>of a bylaws-mandated vote.  Similarly, the 
>>>statement that GAC Advice can only be rejected 
>>>by a vote of the Board can be read to state 
>>>that if no such vote is taken (or if such vote 
>>>is taken and fails) that the GAC Advice is 
>>>then something ICANN is bound to follow.
>>>
>>>I don't think either of these things were 
>>>intended by the CCWG.  Whether they are 
>>>misreadings of our draft language or 
>>>unintended consequences of the drafting, this 
>>>concern is troubling.  If it is the intent of 
>>>some of those drafting this language to force 
>>>a vote where none is currently required, then that is even more troubling.
>>>
>>>I would appreciate some clarification on these 
>>>matters that I can bring back to my group.
>>>
>>>I would also appreciate the CCWG considering a 
>>>change in language to remove this ambiguity 
>>>which is currently causing great consternation in my group.
>>>
>>>I suggest the language below.  This m
>>>ore closely track
>>>â€â€¹sâ€â€¹
>>>the language of the existing bylaw and avoid 
>>>the use of the term "vote," with its potential unintended consequences:
>>>The advice of the Governmental Advisory 
>>>Committee on public policy matters shall be 
>>>duly taken into account, both in the 
>>>formulation and adoption of policies. In the 
>>>event that the ICANN Board determines to take 
>>>an action that is not consistent with the 
>>>Governmental Advisory Committee advice, it 
>>>shall so inform the Committee and state the 
>>>reasons why it decided not to follow that advice.
>>>â€â€¹
>>>If the Board
>>>​
>>>determines to take an action that is not consistent with
>>>Governmental Advisory Committee advice 
>>>approved by a full Governmental Advisory 
>>>Committee consensus, understood to mean the 
>>>practice of adopting decisions by general 
>>>agreement in the absence of any formal objection,
>>>â€â€¹
>>>â€â‹such determination must be supported by
>>>two-thirds of the Board, and the Governmental 
>>>Advisory Committee and the ICANN Board will 
>>>then try, in good faith and in a timely and 
>>>efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
>>>â€â€¹
>>>
>>>I would appreciate your thoughts on this point 
>>>and the revised language.  Thank you.
>>>
>>>Greg
>>>_______________________________________________
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>>>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>>
>>
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