[CCWG-ACCT] Unintended Consequences of the CCWG proposal
alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
Tue Jul 7 13:46:29 UTC 2015
Cherine, My understanding is that the designator
model does not allow for budget approval, and if
I am correct, #2 only applies to membership.
At 07/07/2015 02:45 AM, Cherine Chalaby wrote:
>Dear Mathieu and the CCWG group,
>In Buenos Aires, I attended most of the sessions
>on the CCWG proposal and made several
>comments. I wish to share these comments in
>writing with you and the
>accountability-cross-community group as you
>prepare for the F2F meeting in Paris. As I
>said in Buenos Aires, please do not take my
>comments as fierce criticism but more as constructive suggestions.
>Let me start by saying that as a Director of the
>Board, I believe in (a) appropriate empowerment
>of the community within the multi-stakeholder
>model, (b) strengthening of the the bottom-up
>process, and (c) enhancing accountability
>without destabilising the security and stability
>of ICANN or introducing opportunities for capture.
>In my personal capacity as a member of the
>community, I support the CWG proposal, but I
>have concerns that the CCWG draft proposal,
>discussed in Buenos Aires, could lead to three
>unintended consequences that could seriously
>damage ICANN in the long run. These unintended
>consequences apply to both the Membership model
>as well as the Designator (Hybrid) model.
>Unintended Consequence 1: Weakening ICANN's Governance model
>The CCWG has asserted that the âempowered
>communityâ will have control over the Board in
>the following areas: Strategic Plan, Operating
>Plan, Budget and Bylaws changes, fundamental or
>not. As a consequence, there will be no
>decision that the Board can make in those core
>fiduciary responsibilities that cannot be
>rejected or stopped by the proposed new community-empowerment mechanism.
>The CCWG draft proposal indicates that the Board
>would always have the ability to exercise its
>own judgment after the community-empowerment
>mechanism makes its decisions. But the proposal
>also states that if the community-empowrment
>mechanism does not like what the Board has done,
>it can remove the Board individually or
>collectively. Hence, the new
>community-empowerment mechanism in fact has the
>ultimate power to control the activities of
>ICANN. While as a community member who
>believes in the bottom-up model, I support the
>principles behind this objective, I believe it
>is vitally important that these newly
>transferred powers are paired with the transfer
>of corresponding accountability. The CCWG
>proposal in effect creates two bodies one that
>is empowered (the community) and a separaate one
>that is accountable (the Board). This, in my
>view, breaches a fundamental principle of
>governance, weakens the overall structure of ICANN, and is not sustainable.
>Unintended Consequence 2: Threatening ICANN's financial stability
>The CCWG draft proposal gives the community the
>right to reject the Board approved budget. I
>have not yet seen proposed mechanisms to prevent the following from happening:
>(a) Budget paralysis, whereby members of the
>community will vote against each other rather
>than be accountable to each other. For example,
>given budget limitations, what will stop members
>from voting against funding projects that do not
>facilitate their personal interest. This could
>lead to a situation where the budget is never
>adopted or takes too long to adopt, therefore
>jeopardising ICANNâs ability to deliver on key
>commitments such as contractual compliance
>enforcement , including issues relating to
>enhanced consumer protections and enhanced IP
>and rights protections, and other initiatives
>important to the community. This budget
>paralysis could also risk the stable and
>continued funding of the IANA functions. That
>is why I suggested in Buenos Aires that a
>commitment to fund the IANA functions should be
>separated from this budgetary process and embodied in the ICANN Bylaws.
>(b) Threat to the stability of the business
>environment in which many have invested and rely
>on ICANNâs ability to maintain, as under the
>new proposal, members of the community will have
>the right to reject the budget, but not a single
>member of the community will be accountable for the budget bottom line.
>(c) Unfairness, where the financial needs of the
>minority will seldom be fulfilled because final
>budget decisions will be made as a result of a
>majority voting by members of the community who
>do not have an obligation to act in the
>collective interest of all stakeholders.
>it is worth noting that the current budget
>process is robust and transparent and ensures
>that none of the above consequences can occur.
>It also ensures community participation and it can always be improved.
>Unintended Consequence 3: Dysfunctional Board
>The CCWG draft proposal gives the community the
>right to remove an individual board
>member. The CCWG proposed mechanism for
>implementing this right will in my view lead to
>the creation of two classes of board
>members. Those that will act in sole the
>interest of the SO/AC that has elected them, and
>the others who will be free to act in the
>collective interest of all stakeholders. The
>threat of removal without significant
>justification runs the risk of having individual
>Board members fear the loss of their seats if
>they do not adhere to the wishes of the
>constituency from which they come. This could
>turn the Board into a representative body, or a
>parliament, i.e. a place where opposing
>interests clash and are reconciled, rather than
>the present situation in which all Board members
>are obligated to act as a body in the best
>interests of the overall organization.
>Furthermore, Board deliberations and decisions
>would be at risk of being driven to a large
>extent by subjective goals and personal compromise.
>I do not have concrete suggestions to prevent
>these unintended consequences from happening,
>but I sincerely hope that the CCWG takes my
>concerns into account when it prepares its 2nd
>draft proposal at its F2F meeting in Paris.
>Thank you for listening.
>>On 6 Jul 2015, at 22:10, Mathieu Weill
>><<mailto:mathieu.weill at afnic.fr>mathieu.weill at afnic.fr> wrote:
>>In anticipation of our call tomorrow, here are
>>a few points outlining the current thinking about the face to face in Paris.
>>Goal of the meeting :
>>2 weeks before the publication of our second
>>(and hopefully last) WS1 public comment the
>>overarching goal will be to find the common
>>views that will be detailed in our 2nd draft
>>proposals. The expected outcome of the meeting
>>is that we find common ground on most of, if not all the open discussions.
>>Agenda of the meeting :
>>Our plans are to work 8.30-18.00 local time
>>(CEST, UTC+2), with lunch break from 12.00 to 13.00.
>>Our plan is to define a topic based agenda, including :
>>- WP3 proposals (emerging issues)
>>- Community mechanism model (including thorough Q&A with lawyers)
>>- modalities of of community mechanisms
>>- Removal / recall Board members refinements
>>- Government input related discussions (the BA
>>GAC communiquÃ© announced upcoming contributions before Paris)
>>- IRP refinements
>>We might have to plan sessions on the most
>>difficult topics on day 1 and on day 2 to enable consensus building.
>>Please let us know either on list or during the
>>call tomorrow if you have specific suggestions
>>or feedbacks regarding this plan for the meeting.
>>AFNIC - directeur gÃ©nÃ©ral
>>TÃ©l: +33 1 39 30 83 06
>><mailto:mathieu.weill at afnic.fr>mathieu.weill at afnic.fr
>>Twitter : @mathieuweill
>>Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>>Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the Accountability-Cross-Community