[CCWG-ACCT] member organization and single membership structure
Avri Doria
avri at acm.org
Wed Jul 8 22:47:40 UTC 2015
+1
On 08-Jul-15 18:37, Kieren McCarthy wrote:
> A quick view specifically on "rights of inspection".
>
> I think enabling that some entity gets this right would be one of the
> most useful of all possible accountability improvements.
>
> It would - perhaps over time - pull out any motivations that might
> exist for ICANN to be misleading or less than truthful in its
> reporting. This is going to be especially important as ICANN receives
> increasingly large amounts of revenue and particularly given its
> current weak financial controls.
>
> (See: http://www.ionmag.asia/2015/07/icann-finances-swallow-the-money/)
>
> I predict that ICANN corporate will fight hard to prevent any entity
> from gaining this right. And that it will continue to fight hard even
> when someone has that right. That in itself should be a good indicator
> for why it should be a redline for the accountability group.
>
> To my mind, not allowing ICANN to hide information is the epitome of
> actual accountability. If you can't hide it, then to save on
> embarrassment you consider how best to share it. Over time, everyone
> gains.
>
>
> Kieren
>
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 9:51 AM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com
> <mailto:gregshatanipc at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> Roelof:
>
> Derivative rights and the right of inspection are statutory rights
> of members under California law. Under a multiple member model,
> each member could choose to exercise these rights individually.
> Under a single member model, only the single statutory member
> would have these rights. Maybe this could be "fixed" so that
> individual SOACs could exercise these rights in the name of the
> single member, but I don't know if that works.
>
> If we don't care to have those rights (or any of the rights that
> members have individually), then a single member set-up might
> work. I would note that the right to inspect ICANN documents
> (currently only available in a DIDP) has been an issue of
> concern. I would also note that derivative rights are a powerful
> tool for enforcement against an entity.
>
> I agree that when it comes to spilling the whole board, or other
> powers intended to be exercised by the community as a whole,, the
> single member model has the least issues vis a vis the multiple
> member model. But when it comes to recalling an individual board
> member or other powers to be exercised by a single member, the
> single member model raises substantial issues.
>
> Greg
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 11:28 AM, Roelof Meijer
> <Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl <mailto:Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl>> wrote:
>
> Hi Ed,
>
> Although I have no clue about what it actually means, I am
> quite positive that “components of the community” .. “be[ing]
> able to avail itself of derivative rights or the right of
> inspection” is not a requirement that we formulated as a
> power, nor a criterium we formulated for the selection of a
> mechanism. So I am at a bit of a loss where that comes from.
>
> Additionally, I do not see why stakeholders represented “in a
> single tent” requiring a specified majority among those
> representatives to execute a specific power (let’s say
> spilling the board) would have less vitality and more blob,
> than stakeholders in separate legal entities equally requiring
> the same specified majority among those entities to execute a
> specific power.
>
> Best,
>
> Roelof
>
> From: Edward Morris <egmorris1 at toast.net
> <mailto:egmorris1 at toast.net>>
> Date: woensdag 22 april 2015 16:24
> To: Matthew Shears <mshears at cdt.org <mailto:mshears at cdt.org>>
> Cc: Roelof Meijer <roelof.meijer at sidn.nl
> <mailto:roelof.meijer at sidn.nl>>, "avri at acm.org
> <mailto:avri at acm.org>" <avri at acm.org <mailto:avri at acm.org>>,
> "accountability-cross-community at icann.org
> <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>"
> <accountability-cross-community at icann.org
> <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>>
>
> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] member organization and single
> membership structure
>
> I look forward to independent counsel's analysis of this proposal.
>
> Certainly my principle objection with this model is the
> nullification of many of the benefits membership would bring
> to components of the community. If the GNSO, for example, felt
> strongly about an issue it would not be able to avail itself
> of derivative rights or the right of inspection without the
> consent of the greater community. Diversity is the strength of
> the multistakeholder model and folding all rights into a
> single tent would dampen the vitality of the diverse bottom up
> process and instead submerge it into a giant blob like unit.
>
> I do remain open, though, to others thoughts on the matter and
> thank Roelof for bringing it up.
>
> Ed
>
> Sent from my iPad
>
> On Apr 22, 2015, at 3:02 PM, Matthew Shears <mshears at cdt.org
> <mailto:mshears at cdt.org>> wrote:
>
>>
>> If this would achieve the same result as the broader
>> membership model and at the same time be simpler to implement
>> shouldn't it be looked at again? Was there a specific reason
>> it was discounted?
>>
>> Matthew
>>
>> On 4/22/2015 2:56 PM, Roelof Meijer wrote:
>>> Hi Avri,
>>>
>>> The sole membership construction, is a possibility described
>>> in the legal document in several places: the comments by the
>>> legal experts on the PCCWG mechanism template (page 64) and
>>> the Community Council mechanism template (page 69). I
>>> sent several emails about it to the WP1 list, suggesting to
>>> look in the possibility as indeed it would not necessitate
>>> every SO and AC to become a legal entity. And, as you do,
>>> suggesting: "make the „Community Council” the sole member of
>>> ICANN (and thus a formal legal entity), consisting of either
>>> the SO and AC chairs or SO/AC elected representatives” (from
>>> an email of 14 April).
>>>
>>> And I would think it would enable the SO’s and AC’s
>>> themselves to continue appointing directors, as they do now.
>>> But that’s just guessing, based on the fact that the SO’s
>>> and AC’s themselves would not change status
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Roelof
>>>
>>> From: Avri Doria <avri at acm.org <mailto:avri at acm.org>>
>>> Organization: Technicalities
>>> Reply-To: "avri at acm.org <mailto:avri at acm.org>" <avri at acm.org
>>> <mailto:avri at acm.org>>
>>> Date: woensdag 22 april 2015 15:09
>>> To: "accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>"
>>> <accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>>
>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] member organization and single
>>> membership structure
>>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> On 22-Apr-15 08:26, Roelof Meijer wrote:
>>>> 2)
>>>> What I find quite frustrating is that I have raised the
>>>> point of the possibility (or not) of a single membership
>>>> structure – an option mentioned by Sidley and Adler &
>>>> Colving in their legal advice – several times by now
>>>> without getting any substantial reaction. I am not aware
>>>> that any serious effort to investigate this has led to a
>>>> formal write-off.
>>>
>>> In some way that might lessen the complexity of making most
>>> SOAC an individual legal entity.
>>>
>>> How would it work? Would we continue to appoint Directors
>>> just as we do now?
>>>
>>> Or would there need to be some sort of Members Council that
>>> took actions, working simliarly to the the executive board
>>> or community council idea?
>>>
>>> thanks
>>>
>>> avri
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
>> --
>> Matthew Shears
>> Global Internet Policy and Human Rights
>> Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT)
>> + 44 (0)771 247 2987 <tel:%2B%2044%20%280%29771%20247%202987>
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