[CCWG-ACCT] member organization and single membership structure/ rights of inspection

Phil Buckingham phil at dotadvice.co.uk
Thu Jul 9 13:15:17 UTC 2015


Kieren, 

 

I could nt agree more with your comment. 


I think enabling that some entity gets this right would be one of the
most useful of all possible accountability improvements.

It would - perhaps over time - pull out any motivations that might exist
for ICANN to be misleading or less than truthful in its reporting. This
is going to be especially important as ICANN receives increasingly large
amounts of revenue and particularly given its current weak financial
controls.

 

Can I suggest to the CCWG that a subgroup be formed to look at the perceived  lack of accountability mechanisms within ICANN’s current  financial operations and reporting. It is absolutely critical that these are enhanced within a new membership model, especially  with the  huge increase in revenues from TLD Registries & Registrars.

 

I find the following http://www.ionmag.asia/2015/07/icann-finances-swallow-the-money/  very revealing and unacceptable.

 

Thanks, 

Phil

 

Phil Buckingham

CEO, Dot Advice Limited

 

 

 

 

 

From: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh
Sent: 09 July 2015 11:07
To: Roelof Meijer
Cc: accountability-cross-community at icann.org
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] member organization and single membership structure

 

Dear Roelof

Thank you for your useful thoughts and thoughts of those other colleagues in exercising the inspection rights and other rights as mentioned

I need some clarification on your message in saying

Quote

 

" But when it comes to recalling an individual board
    member or other powers to be exercised by a single member, the
    single member model raises substantial issues."

Unquote

What do you mean by other powers? Apart from recalling individual Board,s member what are those other powers from 7 powers that you categorized as raises substantial issues?

Regards

kavouss 

 

2015-07-09 11:00 GMT+03:00 Nigel Roberts <nigel at channelisles.net>:

+99

On 07/08/2015 11:37 PM, Kieren McCarthy wrote:

A quick view specifically on "rights of inspection".

I think enabling that some entity gets this right would be one of the
most useful of all possible accountability improvements.

It would - perhaps over time - pull out any motivations that might exist
for ICANN to be misleading or less than truthful in its reporting. This
is going to be especially important as ICANN receives increasingly large
amounts of revenue and particularly given its current weak financial
controls.

(See: http://www.ionmag.asia/2015/07/icann-finances-swallow-the-money/)

I predict that ICANN corporate will fight hard to prevent any entity
from gaining this right. And that it will continue to fight hard even
when someone has that right. That in itself should be a good indicator
for why it should be a redline for the accountability group.

To my mind, not allowing ICANN to hide information is the epitome of
actual accountability. If you can't hide it, then to save on
embarrassment you consider how best to share it. Over time, everyone gains.


Kieren



On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 9:51 AM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com
<mailto:gregshatanipc at gmail.com>> wrote:

    Roelof:

    Derivative rights and the right of inspection are statutory rights
    of members under California law.  Under a multiple member model,
    each member could choose to exercise these rights individually.
    Under a single member model, only the single statutory member would
    have these rights.  Maybe this could be "fixed" so that individual
    SOACs could exercise these rights in the name of the single member,
    but I don't know if that works.

    If we don't care to have those rights (or any of the rights that
    members have individually), then a single member set-up might work.
    I would note that the right to inspect ICANN documents (currently
    only available in a DIDP) has been an issue of concern.  I would
    also note that derivative rights are a powerful tool for enforcement
    against an entity.

    I agree that when it comes to spilling the whole board, or other
    powers intended to be exercised by the community as a whole,, the
    single member model has the least issues vis a vis the multiple
    member model.  But when it comes to recalling an individual board
    member or other powers to be exercised by a single member, the
    single member model raises substantial issues.

    Greg


    On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 11:28 AM, Roelof Meijer
    <Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl <mailto:Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl>> wrote:

        Hi Ed,

        Although I have no clue about what it actually means, I am quite
        positive that “components of the community” .. “be[ing] able to
        avail itself of derivative rights or the right of inspection” is
        not a requirement that we formulated as a power, nor a criterium
        we formulated for the selection of a mechanism. So I am at a bit
        of a loss where that comes from.

        Additionally, I do not see why stakeholders represented “in a
        single tent” requiring a specified majority among those
        representatives to execute a specific power (let’s say spilling
        the board) would have less vitality and more blob, than
        stakeholders in separate legal entities equally requiring the
        same specified majority among those entities to execute a
        specific power.

        Best,

        Roelof

        From: Edward Morris <egmorris1 at toast.net
        <mailto:egmorris1 at toast.net>>
        Date: woensdag 22 april 2015 16:24
        To: Matthew Shears <mshears at cdt.org <mailto:mshears at cdt.org>>
        Cc: Roelof Meijer <roelof.meijer at sidn.nl
        <mailto:roelof.meijer at sidn.nl>>, "avri at acm.org
        <mailto:avri at acm.org>" <avri at acm.org <mailto:avri at acm.org>>,
        "accountability-cross-community at icann.org
        <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>"
        <accountability-cross-community at icann.org
        <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>>

        Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] member organization and single
        membership structure

        I look forward to independent counsel's analysis of this proposal.

        Certainly my principle objection with this model is the
        nullification of many of the benefits membership would bring to
        components of the community. If the GNSO, for example, felt
        strongly about an issue it would not be able to avail itself of
        derivative rights or the right of inspection without the consent
        of the greater community. Diversity is the strength of the
        multistakeholder model and folding all rights into a single tent
        would dampen the vitality of the diverse bottom up process and
        instead submerge it into a giant blob like unit.

        I do remain open, though, to others thoughts on the matter and
        thank Roelof for bringing it up.

        Ed

        Sent from my iPad

        On Apr 22, 2015, at 3:02 PM, Matthew Shears <mshears at cdt.org
        <mailto:mshears at cdt.org>> wrote:


        If this would achieve the same result as the broader
        membership model and at the same time be simpler to implement
        shouldn't it be looked at again?  Was there a specific reason
        it was discounted?

        Matthew

        On 4/22/2015 2:56 PM, Roelof Meijer wrote:

        Hi Avri,

        The sole membership construction, is a possibility described
        in the legal document in several places: the comments by the
        legal experts on the PCCWG mechanism template (page 64) and
        the Community Council mechanism template (page 69). I sent
        several emails about it to the WP1 list, suggesting to look
        in the possibility as indeed it would not necessitate every
        SO and AC to become a legal entity. And, as you do,
        suggesting: "make the „Community Council” the sole member of
        ICANN (and thus a formal legal entity), consisting of either
        the SO and AC chairs or SO/AC elected representatives” (from
        an email of 14 April).

        And I would think it would enable the SO’s and AC’s
        themselves to continue appointing directors, as they do now.
        But that’s just guessing, based on the fact that the SO’s and
        AC’s themselves would not change status

        Best,

        Roelof

        From: Avri Doria <avri at acm.org <mailto:avri at acm.org>>
        Organization: Technicalities
        Reply-To: "avri at acm.org <mailto:avri at acm.org>" <avri at acm.org
        <mailto:avri at acm.org>>
        Date: woensdag 22 april 2015 15:09
        To: "accountability-cross-community at icann.org
        <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>"
        <accountability-cross-community at icann.org
        <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>>
        Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] member organization and single
        membership structure

        Hi,

        On 22-Apr-15 08:26, Roelof Meijer wrote:

        2)
        What I find quite frustrating is that I have raised the
        point of the possibility (or not) of a single membership
        structure – an option mentioned by Sidley and Adler &
        Colving in their legal advice – several times by now without
        getting any substantial reaction. I am not aware that any
        serious effort to investigate this has led to a formal
        write-off.


        In some way that might lessen the complexity of making most
        SOAC an individual legal entity.

        How would it work?  Would we continue to appoint Directors
        just as we do now?

        Or would there need to be some sort of Members Council that
        took actions, working simliarly to the the executive board or
        community council idea?

        thanks

        avri



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