[CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed

Kavouss Arasteh kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com
Sun Jul 12 06:22:17 UTC 2015

Dear All,
This type of exchanged of views and conversation was suitable for Jan 2015
Period after our first f2f meeting in FFM
It is too late to go back and start from square1 .

2015-07-12 5:40 GMT+02:00 Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz>:

> Thank you George, interesting post - a couple of thoughts in line below:
> On 11 July 2015 at 05:13, George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> <snip>
>> Here's the question: Does the CCWG believe that the global public
>> interest is _always_ defined by "community" consensus or "community"
>> dictates?    Yes or no?  I believe that the great majority of the time the
>> two are consistent, but I believe that there are cases in which they
>> diverge.   Is there any disagreement among us that this could happen?  In
>> that case, what should a Board member do?  Which is the higher authority
>> according to the CCWG's thinking?
> I think there will always be occasions when there is a divergence between
> interpretations of the global public interest on the part of different
> stakeholders. The ICANN Board will remain charged, I think, with bringing
> that global perspective to bear. But this decision is made easier by
> ICANN's very limited role, and by the identify of interests in its
> performance of that role between what the Internet and its users need, and
> what core operational ICANN stakeholders want: completely reliable
> operation of the IANA functions, and an open and accountable, bottom up,
> consensus driven policy process - with the Board generally validating the
> outcomes of consensus policy processes.
> To put it another way, the global public interest is always served by
> ICANN focusing on doing its core operational jobs well. Beyond that, it
> becomes very subjective, as you note.
> <snip>
>> This implies to me that the test for removal of a Director must rest upon
>> a process that is broadly distributed in the community and must recognize
>> the different organizations to which such a member is accountable as an
>> important factor in the process.
>> What are the opinions of members of the CCWG on this point?
> I am personally quite comfortable with the logic of the appointing body
> being the removing body for individual directors (recognising there is work
> to be done in respect of NomCom appointees).
> One of the concerns that comes up in thinking about this is probably well
> represented by this hypothetical & fictional scenario:
> *The GNSO demands that the proceeds of the new gTLD programme be returned
> to the registries pro rata depending on the number of registrations. The
> Board does not agree, including the GNSO appointed directors on the Board.
> The GNSO removes its directors and appoints different ones who say they
> will support this proposal.*
> I think this scenario would never play out in practice.
> Why not?
>    - two out of sixteen directors would never be credibly enough to
>    completely change the Board's position on a matter involving significant
>    resources and impact on the public.
>    - the new directors would face the same obligations the old directors
>    faced to act in the public interest
> The removal of individual directors is possible in very many organisations
> and it is only when they are dysfunctional that these sorts of games start
> being played.
> I think in any situation where an SO/AC or the NomCom was contemplating
> removing a director, they'd be carefully considering what they could really
> achieve. And they'd be unlikely to do it for reasons of rent-seeking or
> other self-interested things.
> The whole rationale behind the power, in my view, is that it simply
> tightens the link between directors and their appointing bodies. It isn't
> and should not be a backdoor way to change directors from directors into
> mere avatars for the specific interests of their appointing groups.
> George, I hope this is constructive.
> A last question...
> Do you have a concrete suggestion as to how you would see the exercise of
> such a power being done by "a process that is broadly distributed in the
> community" as an alternative for us to consider, and seek legal advice on?
> The advice we've had so far suggests that it's simple to have the
> appointment and removal function with the same group, but more complicated
> (though not, if memory serves, impossible) for removers to be different to
> appointers.
> cheers
> Jordan
> --
> Jordan Carter
> Chief Executive
> *InternetNZ*
> 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
> jordan at internetnz.net.nz
> Skype: jordancarter
> *A better world through a better Internet *
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