[CCWG-ACCT] Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for WP1 Meeting #19 (13 July)
kimberly.carlson at icann.org
Tue Jul 14 11:02:50 UTC 2015
The notes, recordings and transcripts for the WP1 Meeting #19 - 13 July will be available here:
A copy of the notes and action items may be found below.
Action item 2 for WP1, our work syncs with the reference model
Issues for today, with the standard bylaws, removal of individual directors. Overall 4 pieces for work. The work to be completed for the document freeze which is UTC 23:59 July 14.
Izumi: Standard bylaws paper. Aren't many changes in the document. Change on the period of time for making the change, selecting from the options. Also, instead of 3Ž4 ratio, various comments suggested a lower ratio, suggesting 2/3, which is the same as the board's threshold for changing the bylaws.
Added a limited to the number of times the community can change the bylaws, to two times.
Steve: last change, what public comment support was there for this two-times? Just one suggestion, and no contradictions. But the rest were in favor.
We need consistency throughout the document as to "reaching" the fraction or "greater than" - just consistency check during overall final editing of the proposal.
Where does the number two come from? Prefer the original paragraph without limit.
Izumi: Point taken: and revert to the original text.
Change to the two-week text: suggest keeping this text as we discuss in Paris. Note the standard bylaw change will go through at least a 40-day public comment, and the following 2 weeks is not disruptive. But something to discuss and to make the overall process of the timing clear.
No mandate for the 2 times limit.
Izumi: revert to the original text as supported by most in the group.
Greg: A little uneasy about the move from 3/4 to 2/3, but not enough to change it back.
Suggestion, to be more specific: 2 weeks following the announcement of Board approval.
Editing suggestion. Use calendar days, not weeks. Suggest 15 calendar days / 30 calendar days following board approval. And decide in Paris.
Greg: indicative in the drafting of the formal bylaws. Look to the bylaws and how they count units of time. But follow the lead of the bylaws.
Kavouss: agree with the change from 3/4 to 2/3 - it is consistent.
(Note Izumi's email as forwarded by Jordan)
Options for the Board's approval. 30 days. 60 days. Not later than 30 days after the end of the next ICANN meeting?
CCWG with continue to explore and explain the membership structure. How can membership be maintained without due cost, complexity and liability?
CCWG will consider mechanisms for considering impasse and possible delays. Especially if there is no limit on the number of times the community can limit the bylaws.
Increase the participation on the SO/AC other than ccNSO and GAC? Kavouss. Hard to agree ccNSO is influenced and controlled by govt.
Time frame, 15/30 Calendar days as Kavouss suggested. Some aspects will be dictated by the model.
3rd bullet, on considering procedural impasse: instead of considering as already solved, it will be considered later? It will be addresses as part of the time frame discussion in Paris.
* Removal of individual directors
Little basis on which to revise text. Mix of comments:
Be removed by those who appointed, and equally strong comments that it should be a community mechanism.
In whatever the model, recall that the designators had to support removal.
If a single member issues, treat differently. The removal of director by one constituency seems unconstitutional. Once designated, they serve the whole community. Should not be removed because one community is not happy.
ALAC is divided. The argument against the single SO/AC removing is to prevent capricious actions by the SO/AC, and concern expressed by ALAC and others it will encourage the Director to be overly representative. And don't want a situation where the rest of the SO/AC remove "my" director. Should only be removed with the approval of the appointing SO/AC.
Public comments - 25 comments 23 agreements, 6 concerns and 2 divergent. Concern of the NomCom. What happens to a removed Director? Jordan, suggest that keep the status quo. Alan: fair number said community removal but may have been an unclear use of the term community
The proposal was removal of the NomCom appointees should be a community process. Then the Lawyers suggested the NomCom as the appointers must be removers. But there are problems with the NomCom in terms of timing, in terms of process (being inherently closed, when transparency is necessary) Let the community council be designated as the NomCom sub-committee for removal.
Agree with Alan's suggestion to have the community create a sub-committee which deals with the removal of the noncom designated directors.
CA law suggests it must be the NomCom, but can be creative in saying it comes from the NomCom as sub-committee.
A third option: Current NomCom, a new sub-committee of the NomCom, or the community council.
Brand new committee: could be comprised of a rump group of prior NomCom.
Original proposal was to use the NomCom through some process, but only through a petition step. Need to avoid creating a capture point. The community council as the removal agent.
Avri: problem with the community council is that the designator approach is important.
a. recall noncom with community petition
b. community council as the recall noncom
c. current noncom
a = 4
b = 7
c = 0 (remove as an option)
* Community mechanism.
Difficult part is the number of votes. We defined two things are the reference mechanism. Difficulty over RSAC and SSAC. Go with the original and leave the other, which is equal votes for all.
So long as we have fractional voting, it does offer an alternative between the more vote and less vote groups. Note, the AC only 2 votes. Withdraw comment.
Comments on this new text, para 194 and 195, and discuss in email.
Fractional voting. The granularity of each vote should be left to each group,
Under the new proposal, abstentions raise the threshold.
The intent was that there would be a threshold of 2/3, then anyone opting out would disappear from the count.
Alan: will re-word this section.
Wait for GAC comments. And GAC's public policy advice to the board.
* Recall of ICANN Board:
Strong support for this power.
Clarify about the 2/3 or the SO/AC, unclear if it was the sum of or the individual. Agreed it was the sum of. The comments identify our action items. The first is working with legal counsel on implementation, Selected 30 calendar days as bracketed language for discussion,
Action item 2 for WP1, our work syncs with the reference model
Removed 245, which was the 80% threshold, and 75% is what we move forward with.
246 - removes members, and stated it is the community process. Engage with legal advisors on caretaker board. And WP1 will work on a caretaker board process, minimizing instability etc.
CWG dependency noted.
The community mechanism is the voting model Alan just described, not the enforcement model
Implementation discussed in 246, says we must come up with a process that minimizes risk. Suggested language for 243 or 246. Mechanism for SO and AC to exorcise the community power.
Community power, suggested drafting approach: as referred to in para... and cross reference to the para.
The caretaker board has the same powers a traditional board? This is a topic open for discussion.
5.5 on removing directors. A petition on at least 2 SO or AC, or the SG from the GNSO. An alternative to a SO or and AC? Just highlight and fix later.
SG having the same weight is that NSCG represents all of CS and CSG which represents all of business, and they are reduced to a sliver in this model.
* Fundamental Bylaws
Read through WP2 and WP1 work on fundamental bylaws. Support for this power. Need to provide an explanation as to why it would strengthen accountability. And note that CWG dependencies need to be fundamental.
Minor changes. Added the IANA functions review to the list of bylaws that would be fundamental. A comment about location as fundamental, rejecting this noting that it would be addressed in WS2.
Won't be an emergency to change, negation of concerns about operational impact .
The potential controversial issue is whether the HQ bylaws should be fundamental.
Note, not all of the AoC reviews are fundamental, only the IANA functions review at the request of the CWG fundamental. So no consistency requirement for 8b to be fundamental if Article 18 is not.
(Agree about the SG issue above).
Seemed a pretty even split between those who wanted article 18 fundamental or not.
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