[CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism

Matthew Shears mshears at cdt.org
Thu Jul 30 09:05:42 UTC 2015


+ 1 Keith and the Co-Chairs on reverting to the 5x5 and 2x2 for the 
purposes of the public comment.

The current "final" text would have to be changed accordingly and it 
should still note the minority views as well as state that there is far 
from consensus on this matter.  I would recommend that specific 
attention be drawn to this issue in the public comment information note 
so that we elicit as much helpful feedback as possible.

Frankly, I am lukewarm on the 5x5 and 2x2 model.  I certainly do not 
support the 7x5 model.  I think we have to be very careful that in 
enhancing ICANN's accountability and empowering the community as a whole 
vis-a-vis ICANN we are not seen to be empowering some parts of the 
community vis-a-vis others.   This comment is not about the relative 
merits of the different parts of the community but a recognition of the 
primary purpose of this exercise: that we, _as a community_, can 
exercise powers that would, among other enhancements, result in greater  
accountability at ICANN .  This exercise should not be about - in 
reality or in terms of perception - changing the roles and 
responsibilities of different parts of the community (and we should 
refrain from unseemly discussions about the merits of this or that SO or 
AC).   Hopefully the public comment will help us in arriving at a model 
that we (and parties/persons outside this CCWG) can all live with.  My 
preference w/r/t voting would be to avoid reshuffling the deck so to 
speak and to look to representational models that have precedence and 
that have been acceptable for most for some time, such as, for example, 
the selection of Directors - 2 GNSO, 2 ccNSO, 2 ASO, 1 ALAC and liaison 
roles for the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC.

This is a difficult issue and it does not surprise me that we are having 
robust discussions on this in these final stages.   It is important that 
we have them and understand the implications of the voting 
configurations/permutations and the consequences thereof post transition 
and in the future.

Matthew

On 7/30/2015 12:10 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
> Thanks to the Co-Chairs for this message.
>
> I agree that the best approach at this time is to revert to the 5x5 and 2X2 reference model included in our first proposal. It received support and we obviously don't have consensus on a replacement model.  We'll continue to discuss and debate the issue of vote distribution, but I suggest we'd be better off doing so AFTER we receive community feedback from the upcoming public comment period.
>
> Regards,
> Keith
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Mathieu Weill
> Sent: Wednesday, July 29, 2015 9:37 PM
> To: accountability-cross-community at icann.org
> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism
>
> Dear Colleagues,
>
> You will remember that our Initial Report Reference Model on voting weights was 5 votes for ccNSO, gNSO, ASO, ALAC and GAC, 2 for SSAC and RSSAC. During the public comment period, we have received some comments (largely debated since on the list) with regards to the respective number of votes of gNSO and ALAC, and these are well noted.
>
> During our call on Tuesday we discussed the voting weight section of the community mechanism proposal and asked for WP1 to refine its proposal accordingly. The topic was then discussed again during the WP1 call that followed a few hours later. WP1 agreed to submit to our group a proposal with 5 votes for each SO or AC, pending intentions from GAC, SSAC and RSSAC to joint the mechanism as voting members. (see latest doc here :
> https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/5A2-Community-Mechanism-Voting-PenultimateDraft.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1438079125000&api=v2)
>
> A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest.
>
> We discussed this between co-chairs and with Jordan as WP1 rapporteurs, and as a consequence would like to suggest we go back to the initial Reference model (5x5 and 2x2 votes) as a basis for our public comment document.
>
> This proposal will be on our agenda for Thursday's calls but we wanted to provide this heads-up in advance in order to facilitate an informed discussion.
>
> Best regards,
> Thomas, Leon & Mathieu
> Co-chairs
>
> _______________________________________________
> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
> _______________________________________________
> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

-- 
Matthew Shears
Global Internet Policy and Human Rights
Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT)
+ 44 (0)771 247 2987

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/attachments/20150730/92420ead/attachment.html>


More information about the Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list