[CCWG-ACCT] A modest proposal to start the week

[parminder]

On Monday 01 June 2015 08:15 PM, Avri Doria wrote:
>
> On 01-Jun-15 10:35, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
>> What is it you fear that these "unaccountable UA" might do? 
> That they not be accountable to the stakeholder they are allegedly
> accountable to. 

Avri/ All,

I am not sure if I am getting it right but how does this doubt that you
now express square with your earlier comment that "I believe that
community and the AC/SO community are nearly coincident..." (5th April,
this elist) . If AC/SOs are indeed more or less the same as the
community  - which I find as a most untenable proposition - then they
need not be accountable to anyone, community being the ultimate
legitimizer of everything.
>
> As has been brought up by more than one of our advisers, if they are the
> main point of ICANN accountability, it must be possible to guarantee
> their accountability as much as we need to guarantee the Board's
> accountability when it hold the token for ICANN accountability.

Since finally a whole public is never able to exercise direct
accountability, two institutional devices are normally employed in
democratic polities. (1) A body that is as representative as possible of
the larger public is the one that extracts accountability, and (2) there
is separation of powers whereby when one particular body (and groupings
around it) is to be held accountable, we seek another body which has the
least overlap with the first body in its constitution and interests and
make the first one accountable to the second one  - making the
arrangement in a manner - as is their between the executive and the
judiciary for instance - that both bodies have different kinds of power,
and therefore neither can independently become tyrannical, at least not
easily. At the same time, by the very separation of groups/ processes
involved in constitution of the two bodies, the very dangerous
possibility of collusion is minimised.

In the current case, in terms of the current proposals on the table,
neither of these key criteria and method-templates have been satisfied
or employed. There has been no effort made to explore some kind of
global structure that can be considered to have some kind of
representativity vis a vis the global public - however less than
perfect. Neither the lesser and easier criterion of seeking separation
of power by looking at a body/ system with a very different kind of
constitution than what makes the current power configuration in the
ICANN being fulfilled . What one sees is that the same groups and
systems that put the ICANN decision making structures in place in the
first instance are being given some recall and interim powers vis a vis
this power structure. Certainly an improvement as far as the ICANN's
organisational structure is concerned but it says nothing about ICANN's
accountability to the global public what this process was really
mandated to seek, and put in place ( NTIA asked for transfer of
oversight to global multistakeholder community not to ICANN's ACSOs).

In the circumstances, my apologies for this dismal conclusion, but I
must be honest, one sees this process as fast propelling itself towards
a conclusion that most matches those who already hold all the power in
the current configuration of technical management of the Internet - a
somewhat largish and diffuse set of ICANN insiders, variously
constituted in different but rather promiscuous groups, and the US
government, which continues to have full legal and public policy
oversight over this system through the continued application of its
jurisdiction. The proposals so fully match these dominant interests that
designed and conducted the process, that they almost look like a
retrofit. I wish not to propose any kind of bad faith but that is what
they fully look like from the outside.

parminder

>
> Having been a member or observer of many of these entities I have fond
> that they are often disorganized, ruled by a few strong personalities in
> a sea of apathy, and given to making up rules on the fly when needed. 
> They do not even necessarily follow the rules htey have agreed to in the
> charers, though some do, not all of them.  And for the most part, though
> they are supposed to transparent, most aren't.
>
> So what i fear is that they are accountable to none except the few
> strong personalities.
>
> So if we want to base our trust in ICANN on a membership model, we need
> to make sure it is at least as accountable as what we have now.
>
> avri
>
>
>
>
>
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