[CCWG-ACCT] Plan B

Alan Greenberg alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
Fri Jun 19 12:23:55 UTC 2015


No, I don't think that is correct.

This model does provide enforceability. It is not direct on a 
power-by-power case. As in political governance, this is not a case 
where there is a plebiscite on and item-by-item basis, but the threat 
of removal based on overall community satisfaction (or 
non-satisfaction) DOES provide a strong enforcement mechanism.

Alan

At 19/06/2015 07:37 AM, Jordan Carter wrote:
>Hi all, hi Alan
>
>This reads as if it is an explanation of whatever we are labelling 
>the "not-enforceable" model, alongside the membership and designator 
>based approaches - is that fair?
>
>cheers
>Jordan
>
>On 18 June 2015 at 22:17, Alan Greenberg 
><<mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca>alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca> wrote:
>Given the spread between those who believe that we need ultimate 
>accountability, and those who are willing to trust that the 
>community wishes will be honoured, allow me to put a new variation 
>on the table. We have talked about all of the parts before, but 
>perhaps the combination is new.
>
>This proposal involves no Unincorporated Associates, no Designators 
>and no Members.
>
>Up to now, we have been working with Bylaws that we are now told 
>have no real basis in law, but which so far, have worked. I 
>specifically refer to things like the SOs, ALAC and the NomCom 
>appointing Board members, powers that under California law are only 
>given to Members or Designators, but our less formal entities are 
>granted these powers under the ICANN Bylaws and for whatever reasons, it works.
>
>I propose that we do the same with all of the community powers that 
>we want (including the requirement that Bylaws and certainly 
>fundamental Bylaws be approved), with the exception of formal budget 
>approval (which impinges on Board fiduciary responsibility). In lieu 
>of the latter, we could have a process by which and AC/SO lodges a 
>formal objection to a budget or budget item, and the Board has an 
>obligation to follow-up (I am not going to go into any further details here).
>
>Every Director, as a requirement of being seated signs an 
>irrevocable letter saying that if by specified procedure, they are 
>requested to step down, they will. The procedure might include the 
>formal action of the AC/SO that appointed them, or a more widespread 
>community request passing a specified level of AC/SO support - the 
>details would need to be defined, but do not alter this proposal. 
>The letter would also make reference to an enforcement mechanism 
>that could be invoked. The enforcement mechanism might be to give 
>the ICANN Ombudsman (or some other trustworthy and trusted 
>individual) the right to take court action to require the requested 
>resignation be honoured, or could give that right to the people 
>occupying the AC/SO Chairs. Any such action would be funded by ICANN 
>and funds held in escrow to ensure that this can be carried out.
>
>In unlikely event that a removal included the entire Board, or some 
>number such that the remaining Board members do not meet minimum 
>quorum requirements, the AC/SO Chairs will on an interim basis be 
>added to the Board on an interim basis. This augmented interim Board 
>would have caretaker responsibilities and have only limited rights 
>(to be specified).
>
>Board member removals would be unconditional and not appealable.
>
>I believe that the threat of invoking removal will likely be 
>sufficient to ensure that the community is given good control. And 
>should that fail, the actual removal of the Board member(s) who do 
>not support the community position can actually be removed.
>
>There are many details to be determined but I believe that this is 
>workable. It allows for the most of the powers that have been 
>requested with a minimum number of changes and does not create 
>significant new potential vulnerabilities.
>
>Alan
>
>
>
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>
>
>--
>Jordan Carter
>
>Chief Executive
>InternetNZ
>
>04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
><mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz>jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>Skype: jordancarter
>
>A better world through a better Internet
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