[CCWG-ACCT] RES: Cochairs Statement - Istanbul (23-24 March 2015)

Phil Buckingham phil at dotadvice.co.uk
Thu Mar 26 16:35:43 UTC 2015


Steve,

 

I am sorry I’m playing catch up, having not been in Istanbul.

 

So what is the status on the AOC requirements, particular regarding 9.3 ( I think) – the review of Round 1 of the gTLD programme.

 

As I am sure you are aware, as a fellow partipicant on the Implementation Advisory Group , Consumer Choice , Consumer Trust and Competition ,  that yesterday  ICANN announced  that a company had been selected  to conduct (two) economic studies, to start immediately. 

The implications are huge for the new TLD Registries as they will have to disclose internal pricing of registrations and, quite frankly, most are not operationally ready. 

 

One assumes that 9.3 would be an automatic transfer into the expanded  ICANN bylaws.

 

Sorry, if I am going over old ground, already agreed in Istanbul.  

 

Regards,

 

Phil

 

Phil Buckingham

CEO, Dot Advice Limited 

 

 

From: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Steve DelBianco
Sent: 26 March 2015 15:13
To: Jordan Carter; Greg Shatan
Cc: Accountability Cross Community
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Cochairs Statement - Istanbul (23-24 March 2015)

 

Keep in mind that either ICANN or NTIA may cancel the AoC <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/affirmation-of-commitments-2009-09-30-en?routing_type=path>  with just 120 days notice.   That’s why we created Stress Test #14, which suggests the need to bring AoC commitments and Reviews into ICANN Bylaws.

 

Stress Test #14: ICANN or NTIA choose to terminate the Affirmation of Commitments.  (AoC)  ICANN would no longer be held to its Affirmation commitments, including the conduct of community reviews and required implementation of review team recommendations. 

 

Existing Accountability Measures:

The AoC can be terminated by either ICANN or NTIA with 120 days notice. 

As long as NTIA controls the IANA contract, ICANN feels pressure to maintain the AoC.

But as a result of IANA stewardship transition, ICANN would no longer have the IANA contract as external pressure from NTIA to maintain the AoC .

 

Proposed Accountability Measures:

One proposed mechanism is community challenge to a board decision, such as referral to an Independent Review Panel (IRP) with the power to issue a binding decision.    If ICANN canceled the AoC, the IRP mechanism could enable reversal of that decision.

 

Another proposed measure is to import AoC provisions into the ICANN bylaws, and dispense with the bilateral AoC with NTIA.  Bylaws would be amended to include AoC commitments 3, 4, 7, and 8, plus the 4 periodic reviews required in paragraph 9, or other provisions that are deemed essential by the community. 

 

If ICANN’s board proposed to amend the AoC provisions added to the bylaws, another proposed measure would empower the community to veto that proposed bylaws change.

 

See all stress tests here <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52232556/Applying%20Stress%20Tests%20%5BDraft%20v8%5D.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1426877855000&api=v2> .

 

 

—

Steve DelBianco

Executive Director

NetChoice

http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/>  and http://blog.netchoice.org <http://blog.netchoice.org/> 

+1.703.615.6206

 

 

 

From: Jordan Carter
Date: Thursday, March 26, 2015 at 10:37 AM
To: Greg Shatan
Cc: Accountability Cross Community
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Cochairs Statement - Istanbul (23-24 March 2015)

 

Thanks Greg, Phil. 

 

I am confident we are aware in the CCWG that we can't unilaterally amend the AOC. However, it is also clear that we can choose which bits we propose to incorporate in the ICANN Bylaws. Not incorporating some bits has no effect on the existing agreement between ICANN and the United States government.

 

I would note that in respect of the jurisdiction conversation, we have a multistakeholder process at work in designing this transition. 

 

If the question of a "sealed for all time" jurisdiction question derails the transition - either by meaning the community can't accept ICANN being locked in California forever and thus declines to agree a transition, or the United States not accepting a transition that doesn't include that lock - then that will be the outcome of the multistakeholder process. The NTIA did not define perpetual U.S. presence as a requirement for the transition, after all.

 

Certainly I hope that this dilemma does not prove to be a breakdown point.

 

I say all the above as an individual who thinks the California jurisdiction works just fine for everything we need to do now, and can foresee for the future.

 

best,

Jordan

 

 

On 26 March 2015 at 16:26, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:

I second Phil's email and hope that some clarity can be brought to those unable to participate in the entire CCWG meeting.

 

I also want to remind the CCWG that ICANN cannot unilaterally amend the Affirmation of Commitments.  The AoC can only be amended by mutual consent of the parties.  The U.S. jurisdictional requirement will be there until amended by the parties, or the AoC is terminated.  If we want to get into discussing terminating the AoC, that is a whole other discussion, and an immense step to consider.

 

Greg Shatan

 

On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 10:08 AM, Phil Corwin <psc at vlaw-dc.com> wrote:

I see from the post below  that this issue of ICANN’s future jurisdiction has become “a most delicate matter” and remains unresolved and subject to further discussion within the CCWG. 

 

This is a pivotal and very important issue, as the accountability mechanisms are being designed (with the assistance of two outside law firms) to be consistent with California law and may not operate effectively within another legal jurisdiction context. Further, if there is not a commitment to remain within US jurisdiction for the foreseeable future (as CEO Chehade pledged in Congressional testimony last month) it will raise significant political barriers to NTIA approval of and Congressional acquiescence to a final transition and accountability package.

 

For those of us unable to participate remotely in all the CCWG discussions earlier this week, it would be most appreciated if more specificity could be provided as soon as possible as to what the various perspectives are on this matter and how it is proposed to resolve them, since the final determination would seem to be a rather binary decision – either the AOC provision committing to US jurisdiction is incorporated within the Bylaws, or it is not.

 

 

Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal

Virtualaw LLC

1155 F Street, NW

Suite 1050

Washington, DC 20004

202-559-8597/Direct

202-559-8750/Fax

202-255-6172/cell

 

Twitter: @VlawDC

 

"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey

 

From: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org>  [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Thomas Rickert
Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2015 6:22 AM
To: Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva
Cc: Accountability Cross Community
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Cochairs Statement - Istanbul (23-24 March 2015)

 

Dear Pedro,

you are correct. We should have mentioned that we discussed it. As this is a most delicate matter and since we agree we would suggest language to frame the next steps (you will remember we had not agreed on concrete language), I suggest we use the next upcoming opportunity to share the progress with the community when we have an agreed language on the matter.

 

Thanks for your understanding and for your thoughtful contributions during the meeting.

 

Best,

Thomas

 

Am 26.03.2015 um 11:17 schrieb Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo at itamaraty.gov.br>:

 

Dear Alice, CCWG-colleagues,

 

Thanks for the links. I just regret the fact that the CoChairs have missed to refer to the important debate the CCWG has held with respect to the way moving forward on the issue of jurisdiction. As Mathieu Weill mentioned during the second day, this is one of the main issues of concern of individuals outside this group and I believe the community deserved at least to be briefly informed about this subject.

 

Regards,

 

Pedro

 


  _____  


De: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] em nome de Alice Jansen [alice.jansen at icann.org]
Enviado: quarta-feira, 25 de março de 2015 12:13
Para: accountability-cross-community at icann.org
Assunto: [CCWG-ACCT] Cochairs Statement - Istanbul (23-24 March 2015)


Dear all,


 


This is to inform you that the CoChairs statement (pasted below) may be found at: https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2015-03-25-en 


 


A video interview with CoChair Thomas Rickert is also available - see:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVof6v0MguE


 


These links will be added to your wiki pages.


 


Thanks,


 


Best regards


 


Alice 


 


CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs Statement Istanbul, 25 March 2015 | Thomas Rickert, León Sánchez & Mathieu Weill


Members and participants of the  <https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/CCWG+on+Enhancing+ICANN+Accountability> Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) met in Istanbul, Turkey, on 23-24 March 2015.

The  <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=52890276> meeting was attended in-person by 42 members and participants. A number of participants and observers joined the meeting remotely using the virtual meeting room. Three  <https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Advisors> Advisors also participated.

Guided by the four basic  <https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Building+Blocks> building blocks identified at ICANN 52 in Singapore, the group further discussed and refined accountability mechanisms that need to be either implemented or, at least, committed to before the transition of the IANA stewardship can take place. 

The meeting made progress on three main areas:

·         Enhancing ICANN's Mission and Core Values;

·         Strengthening the existing independent review process;

·         Mechanisms for community empowerment.

Specifically, the group discussed changes that should be made to the Mission and Core Values inICANN's Bylaws. For example, the group discussed how key provisions of the  <https://www.icann.org/en/about/agreements/aoc/affirmation-of-commitments-30sep09-en.htm> Affirmation of Commitments (AoC) could be reflected into the Bylaws.

Additionally, the group worked on strengthening the existing independent review process suggesting improvements to its accessibility and affordability, and discussed process design including establishment of a standing panel with binding outcomes and panel composition (diversity etc.). The IRP panel decisions would be guided by ICANN's Mission and Core Values.

With regards to mechanisms for community empowerment, the group identified powers and associated mechanisms including the ability to:

·         recall the ICANN Board of Directors;

·         approve or prevent changes to the ICANN Bylaws, Mission and Core Values;

·         reject Board decisions on Strategic Plan and budget, where the Board has failed to appropriately consider community input.

The CCWG-Accountability supported the concept of a Fundamental Bylaw that would provide additional robustness to key provisions. The Fundamental Bylaw would apply to:

·         the mission;

·         the independent review process;

·         the power to veto Bylaw changes;

·         new community powers such as recall of the Board and the right of the community to veto certain Board actions.

Changes to the Fundamental Bylaws would require high standards for approval by the community.

The notion of an empowered community involved discussion of community representation, i.e. who constitutes the community.  The CCWG-Accountability is also aware that to wield these new powers, the community, however it is constituted, must itself meet high standards of accountability. ICANN's accountability would also be enhanced by ensuring its operations and processes are more globally inclusive. 

The group has engaged two law firms to provide independent legal advice and confirm feasibility of the suggested frameworks. The firms are Adler & Colvin and Sidley & Austin.

As work progresses, all recommendations will be subject to the stress tests against contingencies already identified. The stress test methodology has been successfully tested against the draft accountability mechanisms.

The CCWG-Accountability is confident that their proposed mechanisms will satisfy the needs of the CWG-Stewardship <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2015-03-25-en#_ftn1> 1 as they look to stronger accountability protections. The CCWG-Accountability and CWG-Stewardship Co-Chairs met to update and fully brief each other on the progress made so far. They outlined key areas of accountability that the CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs considered are most relevant for the current and ongoing work of the CWG-Stewardship. The CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs will brief the CWG-Stewardship in the opening part of their face-to-face meeting on Thursday, 26 March.

Next Steps:

The CCWG-Accountability will continue refining its recommendations. The community is expected to provide feedback during a public comment period to be held before ICANN 53, Buenos Aires meeting.  The results of the public comment period will inform further deliberations during that meeting.

The group is developing an engagement plan to ensure its proposals are widely known and understood, and to encourage comprehensive response to proposals during the public comment period.

The CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs recognize the outstanding volunteer work that has produced these substantive proposals in a very short period of time.  The community's effort has been exceptional.

About the CCWG-Accountability

The CCWG-Accountability was established to ensure that ICANN's accountability and transparency commitments to the global Internet community are maintained and enhanced in the absence of the historical relationship with the U.S. Government.

The group has divided its work into two work streams (WS):

·         WS1 is focused on identifying mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the timeframe of the IANA Stewardship Transition;

·         WS2 is focused on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition.

The CCWG-Accountability consists of 177  <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=50823970> people, organized as 26  <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=50823968> members, appointed by and accountable to chartering organizations, 151  <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=50823968> participants, who participate as individuals, and 46  <https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Mailing+List+Observers> mailing list observers. The group also includes one ICANN Board liaison, one ICANN staff representative, and one former ATRT member who serves as a liaison. In addition, there are 4 ICG members who participate in the CCWG-Accountability, including two who serve as liaisons between the two groups.
Seven  <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2014-12-17-en> Advisors have also been appointed to contribute research and advice, and to bring perspectives on global best practices to enrich the CCWG-Accountability discussion. 
The CCWG-Accountability is an open group: anyone interested in the work of the CCWG-Accountability, can join as a participant or observers. Participants or observers may be from a chartering organization, from a stakeholder group or organization not represented in the CCWG-Accountability or currently active within ICANN, or self-appointed.

For more information on the CCWG-Accountability or to view meeting archives and draft documents, please refer to their  <https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/CCWG+on+Enhancing+ICANN+Accountability> dedicated wiki.

A video interview with CCWG-Accountability Co-Chair Thomas Rickert can be seen  <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVof6v0MguE> here.


  _____  


 <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2015-03-25-en#_ftnref1> 1 Cross Community Working Group (CWG) to Develop an IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal on Naming Related Functions

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-- 

Jordan Carter

Chief Executive 
InternetNZ

04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
jordan at internetnz.net.nz
Skype: jordancarter

A better world through a better Internet 

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