[CCWG-ACCT] RES: Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion

[Olga Cavalli]

Gracias Paul!

But you did not clarify your paragraph to me, so:

"it is time for the community to recognize that it may have to proceed
without the GAC’s agreement": what does "without GAC´s agreement" means for
you?  And why should the community recognize that this?

and:

"it is time for the GAC to recognize that this forum is not the place where
it is going to “win”": win what?

I will welcome any clarification that you can give me, in the spirit of a
open multistakeholder dialogue.

Regards form Joao Pessoa

Olga


2015-11-11 10:08 GMT-03:00 Paul Rosenzweig <
paul.rosenzweig at redbranchconsulting.com>:

> Dear Olga
>
>
>
> You are too humble.  Your English is excellent.  Usted entiende Inglés
> mucho mejor que yo entiendo español. Estoy seguro de que sabes lo que
> quiero decir. J
>
>
>
> Paul
>
>
>
> Paul Rosenzweig
>
> paul.rosenzweig at redbranchconsulting.com
> <paul.rosenzweigesq at redbranchconsulting.com>
>
> O: +1 (202) 547-0660
>
> M: +1 (202) 329-9650
>
> VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739
>
> Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066
>
> Link to my PGP Key
> <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19&Itemid=9>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Olga Cavalli [mailto:olgacavalli at gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 8:34 PM
> *To:* Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig at redbranchconsulting.com>
> *Cc:* Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo at itamaraty.gov.br>; Drazek,
> Keith <kdrazek at verisign.com>; Accountability Cross Community <
> accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion
>
>
>
> Dear Paul,
>
>
>
> could you please clarify to me this paragraph:
>
>
>
> "Perhaps it is time for the community to recognize that it may have to
> proceed without the GAC’s agreement.  Or perhaps it is time for the GAC to
> recognize that this forum is not the place where it is going to “win” the
> result that the Board and community already rejected less than a year ago"
>
>
>
> English is my second language and I have limitations.
>
>
>
> Best regards
>
>
>
> Olga
>
>
>
> 2015-11-10 14:58 GMT-03:00 Paul Rosenzweig <
> paul.rosenzweig at redbranchconsulting.com>:
>
> I am sure that many governments think that a 2/3rd rejection threshold is
> appropriate for GAC advice. Almost nobody else does.  Perhaps it is time
> for the community to recognize that it may have to proceed without the
> GAC’s agreement.  Or perhaps it is time for the GAC to recognize that this
> forum is not the place where it is going to “win” the result that the Board
> and community already rejected less than a year ago.
>
>
>
> Paul
>
>
>
> Paul Rosenzweig
>
> paul.rosenzweig at redbranchconsulting.com
> <paul.rosenzweigesq at redbranchconsulting.com>
>
> O: +1 (202) 547-0660
>
> M: +1 (202) 329-9650
>
> VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739
>
> Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066
>
> Link to my PGP Key
> <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19&Itemid=9>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva [mailto:pedro.ivo at itamaraty.gov.br]
> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 8:22 AM
> *To:* Drazek, Keith <kdrazek at verisign.com>;
> accountability-cross-community at icann.org
> *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion
>
>
>
> Dear Keith,
>
>
>
> Thank you for your comments. Here my responses:
>
>
>
> >>> The ICANN board would have to engage to find mutually acceptable
> alternatives to rejected advice no matter how GAC determines its own level
> of consensus – a major change from GAC Operating
>
> >>> Principle 47 and not the focus of the CCWG;
>
>
>
> The proposed bylaw amendment indicates that any AC "*has the right to
> determine its particular definition of consensus". * It is simply an
> expression of the principle that each stakeholder group should have the
> autonomy to determine its own working method, in this case how it reaches
> consensus. I don't see this as a "major change" nor that it would
> contradict Operating Principle 47. Quite the contrary: it reinforces the
> notion that the "operating principles" (or similar dispositions) is the
> appropriate place where consensus should be defined.
>
>
>
> >>> The board could no longer reject GAC advice by majority vote, another
> significant change from current, longstanding bylaw practice;
>
>
>
> During GAC discussions in Dublin many governments felt that preserving the
> advice rejection threshold as simple majority - in opposition to the two
> thirds threshold required to reject e.g. GNSO PDP recommendations - would
> represent mistrust towards the GAC. Hence, in suggesting that the given
> threshold be placed on equal terms with others - thereby following a
> recommendation that emanated from the BGRI WG-, there is by no means the
> intention to grant the GAC excepcional powers in relation to other SO/ACs.
> It is rather an intent to equalize the threshold to what has been
> "longstanding bylaw practice" with regards to SOs. I understand that the
> nature and scope of GAC advices is not the same as of the PDPs, but I fail
> to see why a lower rejection barrier needs to be applied to advices that
> concern such an essential issue as public policies.
>
>
>
> >>> The board could only reject such advice by a vote of MORE than
> two-thirds, a supermajority threshold above and beyond even a two-thirds
> threshold, which itself would constitute a major bylaw change.
>
>
>
> The use of "more than two-thirds" is also present in the language related
> to GNSO PDP recommendation  (Annex A, Section 9): "*Any **PDP** Recommendations
> approved by a **GNSO** Supermajority Vote shall be adopted by the Board
> unless, by a vote of more than two-thirds (2/3) of the Board, the Board
> determines that such policy is not in the best interests of the **ICANN** community
> or **ICANN**.**"*
>
>
>
> >>> By use of the plural “advisory committees” it implies that the board
> will be required to engage all ACs in looking for mutually agreed solutions
> to rejected advice and ACs can determine consensus in any manner they
> choose.
>
>
>
> This is not what is written in the suggestion. The sentence "*Where the
> ICANN Board is obliged to pay due deference to advice from Advisory
> Committees and where that advice, if not followed, requires finding
> mutually agreed solutions for implementation of that advice*" is
> restrictive and clearly means that it applies only to the case where
> "finding mutually agreed solution" is necessary. Hence, it is by no means
> extending existing prerogatives or powers to ACs for which this requirement
> isn't there.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
>
> Pedro
> ------------------------------
>
> *De:* accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [
> accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] em nome de Drazek,
> Keith [kdrazek at verisign.com]
> *Enviado:* segunda-feira, 9 de novembro de 2015 18:29
> *Para:* accountability-cross-community at icann.org
> *Assunto:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion
>
> Thanks to Pedro for trying to help the CCWG reach closure on ST-18, but I
> have to respectfully disagree with this proposal.
>
>
>
> The proposed language constitutes substantial changes to the role and
> influence of the GAC, far exceeding what the CCWG is charged with doing --
> coming up with reasonable accountability checks on a post-transition ICANN
> and not materially recasting the GAC’s position in the community. The
> intent of ST-18, as part of the accountability discussion, is the
> preservation of the role and relative influence of governments within ICANN
> through a clear obligation for the board to give special deference to GAC
> advice only when there is no formal governmental objection to such advice.
> This proposal appears to do the opposite by materially recasting the GAC's
> position.
>
> Under the proposed language for Art. XI, Section 2, Item 1.j:
>
>
>
>    1. The ICANN board would have to engage to find mutually acceptable
>    alternatives to rejected advice no matter how GAC determines its own level
>    of consensus – a major change from GAC Operating Principle 47 and not the
>    focus of the CCWG;
>
>
>
>    1. The board could no longer reject GAC advice by majority vote,
>    another significant change from current, longstanding bylaw practice; and
>
>
>
>    1. The board could only reject such advice by a vote of MORE than
>    two-thirds, a supermajority threshold above and beyond even a two-thirds
>    threshold, which itself would constitute a major bylaw change.
>
>
>
> In addition, the proposed language regarding Art. XI, Section 1 would
> substantially enlarge by clear implication the role of all other ACs. By
> use of the plural “advisory committees” it implies that the board will be
> required to engage all ACs in looking for mutually agreed solutions to
> rejected advice and ACs can determine consensus in any manner they choose.
> This is far beyond anything the CCWG has discussed.  I believe the proposed
> text from Steve would give the GAC its desired change here, without
> implying that ICANN must seek a mutually acceptable solution on any
> Advisory Committee advice it declines to adopt.
>
>
>
> Also, importantly, Fadi told the U.S. Congress in February 2015 that any
> move to require a 2/3 Board majority to reject GAC advice was “off the
> table.”  Senator Fischer asked Fadi directly about a proposal to require a
> 2/3 vote to reject GAC advice. Fadi responded, “That would be incongruent
> with the stated goals. The board has looked at that matter and has pushed
> it back so it’s off the table.” Senator Fischer followed up and said, “It’s
> off the table,” and Fadi again said: “It’s off the table.” This started on
> the video at the 1:12:50 mark (on the counter on the right)
> http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/2/preserving-the-multistakeholder-model-of-internet-governance
> I expect any change on this point might raise some serious and difficult
> questions.
>
>
>
> Accordingly, I support the earlier responses from Steve and Phil.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Keith
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [
> mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
> <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Kavouss
> Arasteh
> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 2:55 PM
> *To:* Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva
> *Cc:* accountability-cross-community at icann.org
> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion
>
>
>
> Dear Pedro
>
> Yes but the GAC should implement the last part of that consensus text,i.e.
> To modify ST 18 as soon as possible and submit that to CCWG during the 30
> days public comments. The GAC Chair nerds to take immediate action in that
> regard
>
> Regards
>
> Kavouss
>
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
>
> On 9 Nov 2015, at 15:28, Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <
> pedro.ivo at itamaraty.gov.br> wrote:
>
> Dear CCWG colleagues,
>
>
>
> As you are aware, in Dublin the GAC has provided a consensus input with
> regards to the bylaw amendments derived from ST18. The GAC input was the
> following:
>
>
>
> "*The discussions on Stress Test 18 have helped the GAC to have a better
> understanding of the different views on the issue. In assessing the
> different rationales presented so far related to Stress Test 18, the GAC
> considered: *
>
> ·         *The need that each and every Advisory Committee ensures that
> the advice provided is clear and reflects the consensus view of the
> Committee; *
>
> ·         *The need that each and every Advisory Committee should
> preserve its own autonomy in its definition of consensus; *
>
> ·         *The value the Board attributes to receiving consensus advice; *
>
> ·         *The recommendation of the BGRI WG, as reiterated by the ATRT2,
> to set the threshold *
>
> *for the ICANN Board to reject GAC advice to a 2/3 majority voting,
> consistent with the threshold established for rejection of ccNSO and GNSO
> PDP recommendations.*
>
> *In view of the above, having considered concerns expressed by various
> parties, the GAC agreed to further work on the issue of Stress Test 18, and
> to submit any further input to the CCWG taking into account the timelines
> of the CCWG. GAC Members will continue to work within the CCWG to finalise
> the proposal for enhancing ICANN accountability.*"
>
>
>
> With the aim of addressing the input given by the GAC in its ICANN 54
> communiqué and the original concerns expressed by the ST18 proponents, I
> present for your consideration the following alternative amendments (
> *underlined*) in ICANN bylaws.
>
>
>
> *ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES*
>
> *Section 1. GENERAL*
>
> *“The Board may create one or more Advisory Committees in addition to
> those set forth in this Article. Advisory Committee membership may consist
> of Directors only, Directors and non-directors, or non-directors only, and
> may also include non-voting or alternate members. Advisory Committees shall
> have no legal authority to act for ICANN, but shall report their findings
> and recommendations to the Board.*
>
> *Where the ICANN Board is obliged to pay due deference to advice from
> Advisory Committees and where that advice, if not followed, requires
> finding mutually agreed solutions for implementation of that advice, the
> Advisory Committee will make every effort to ensure that the advice
> provided is clear and reflects the consensus view of the committee. In this
> context, each Advisory Committee has the right to determine its particular
> definition of consensus.**” *
>
>
>
> *ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES*
>
> *Section 2. SPECIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES*
>
> *Item 1.j*
>
> *“The advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy
> matters shall be duly taken into account, both in the formulation and
> adoption of policies. In the event that the ICANN Board determines to take
> an action that is not consistent with the Governmental Advisory Committee
> advice, it shall so inform the Committee and state the reasons why it
> decided not to follow that advice. Any GAC Advice approved by a GAC
> consensus may only be rejected by a vote of more than two-thirds (2/3) of
> the Board. The Governmental Advisory Committee and the ICANN Board will
> then try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a
> mutually acceptable solution.”*
>
>
>
> Kind regards,
>
>
>
> Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva
>
> Divisão da Sociedade da Informação
>
> Ministério das Relações Exteriores
>
> T: +55 61 2030-6609
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/attachments/20151111/00418806/attachment-0001.html>