[CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Nigel Roberts
nigel at channelisles.net
Thu Nov 12 14:25:32 UTC 2015
Wait a minute, I actually don't understand the below formulation.
Is the CCWG really likely to undo the compromises of 2003-2005 that saw
the ccTLDs return to ICANN after leaving.
Or have I COMPLETELY misunderstood.
Nigel (ccNSO Council Member, for the record)
On 11/12/2015 01:17 PM, Greg Shatan wrote:
> I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in
> Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite
> opposition from the rest of the community.
>
> I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's
> questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our
> work for quite some time.
>
> On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of
> autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that
> it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
>
> Greg
>
> On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au
> <mailto:ceo at auda.org.au>> wrote:
>
> All,
>
> Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO
> (by me and a number of others).
>
> Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
>
> 1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process
> and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a
> change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable'
> without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
>
> 2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board
> which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require
> a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without
> the ccNSO supporting such a block?
>
> This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including,
> importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on
> behalf on the NRO.
>
> It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely
> that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC
> review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions
> that need to be answered.
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>
> Chris Disspain|Chief Executive Officer
>
> .au Domain Administration Ltd
>
> T: +61 3 8341 4111|F: +61 3 8341 4112
>
> E:ceo at auda.org.au <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo at auda.org.au');>
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>
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>> On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco
>> <sdelbianco at netchoice.org
>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','sdelbianco at netchoice.org');>> wrote:
>>
>> "consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think
>> it means.
>>
>> A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured
>> by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on
>> raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT
>> requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
>>
>> Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a
>> budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration
>> fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC
>> support would be required, too.
>>
>> From: <wp1-bounces at icann.org
>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces at icann.org');>> on behalf
>> of Robin Gross <robin at ipjustice.org
>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','robin at ipjustice.org');>>
>> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM
>> To: Accountability Cross Community
>> <accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community at icann.org');>>
>> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel at godaddy.com
>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jbladel at godaddy.com');>>,
>> "wp1 at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1 at icann.org');>"
>> <wp1 at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1 at icann.org');>>,
>> Jon Nevett <jon at donuts.email
>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon at donuts.email');>>
>> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole
>> Designator
>>
>> Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised
>> before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
>>
>> Robin
>>
>> On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
>>
>>> Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary
>>> component of community decision making.
>>>
>>> Thanks—
>>>
>>> J.
>>>
>>>
>>> From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org');>>
>>> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon at donuts.email
>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon at donuts.email');>>
>>> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51
>>> To: Accountability Cross Community
>>> <accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community at icann.org');>>
>>> Cc: "<wp1 at icann.org
>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1 at icann.org');>>" <wp1 at icann.org
>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1 at icann.org');>>
>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole
>>> Designator
>>>
>>> Folks:
>>>
>>> I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making
>>> Process.
>>>
>>> In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates
>>> to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support
>>> of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example,
>>> if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard
>>> Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should
>>> ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order
>>> to move forward.
>>>
>>> In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the
>>> specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support
>>> using that community process.
>>>
>>> In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support
>>> before the community makes a decision binding.
>>>
>>> We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of
>>> the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for
>>> the community decision process is invoked.
>>>
>>> To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used
>>> against the group most impacted by a decision.
>>>
>>> Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly
>>> at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that
>>> we already have been discussing.
>>>
>>> We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which
>>> SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we
>>> should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community
>>> powers are in support.
>>>
>>> Thanks.
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>>
>>>> On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg
>>>> <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
>>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca');>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case
>>>> of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
>>>>
>>>> Alan
>>>>
>>>> At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Alan,
>>>>>
>>>>> I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking
>>>>> about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no
>>>>> decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far
>>>>> as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or
>>>>> support for the purposes of exercising the community powers –
>>>>> in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in
>>>>> support or against.
>>>>>
>>>>> I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides
>>>>> not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will
>>>>> likewise decide not to participate.
>>>>>
>>>>> But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC
>>>>> will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5
>>>>> participating entities in the community mechanism.
>>>>>
>>>>> But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple
>>>>> cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of
>>>>> time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating
>>>>> entities. In the first situation, using those four community
>>>>> powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the
>>>>> community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
>>>>>
>>>>> That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to
>>>>> participate – acknowledging that this would not be an
>>>>> endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so
>>>>> that we can accurately project for the model.
>>>>>
>>>>> I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various
>>>>> levels of participation for that reason.
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>>
>>>>> Brett
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> Brett Schaefer
>>>>> Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory
>>>>> Affairs
>>>>> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for
>>>>> National Security and Foreign Policy
>>>>> The Heritage Foundation
>>>>> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
>>>>> Washington, DC 20002
>>>>> 202-608-6097
>>>>> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:* Alan Greenberg [mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
>>>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca');>]
>>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM
>>>>> *To:* Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett
>>>>> *Cc:* <wp1 at icann.org
>>>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1 at icann.org');>>;
>>>>> Accountability Cross Community
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on
>>>>> Sole Designator
>>>>>
>>>>> There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly
>>>>> said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not
>>>>> state a position on exercising a power in a particular
>>>>> instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor
>>>>> opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the
>>>>> action dies.
>>>>>
>>>>> In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a
>>>>> power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
>>>>>
>>>>> Alan
>>>>> --
>>>>> Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos.
>>>>> On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji
>>>>> <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com
>>>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','seun.ojedeji at gmail.com');> > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>
>>>>> I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock
>>>>> since we are not always certain whether all will participate at
>>>>> any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of
>>>>> discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
>>>>>
>>>>> Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in
>>>>> order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total
>>>>> number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum
>>>>> is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support
>>>>> or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order.
>>>>> That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3
>>>>> participating SO/AC or less.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards
>>>>> Sent from my Asus Zenfone2
>>>>> Kindly excuse brevity and typos.
>>>>> On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett"
>>>>> <Brett.Schaefer at heritage.org
>>>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Brett.Schaefer at heritage.org');>>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> Jordan,
>>>>>
>>>>> If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a
>>>>> fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
>>>>>
>>>>> In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the
>>>>> thresholds to three if there are only four participating
>>>>> entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in
>>>>> support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating
>>>>> entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to
>>>>> surmount existing thresholds.
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>>
>>>>> Brett
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:* Jordan Carter [mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>>>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan at internetnz.net.nz');>]
>>>>> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM
>>>>> *To:* Schaefer, Brett
>>>>> *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1 at icann.org
>>>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1 at icann.org');>
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>>>>>
>>>>> hi Brett,
>>>>>
>>>>> Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are
>>>>> able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would
>>>>> be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are
>>>>> down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small
>>>>> an orbit to use the current model.
>>>>>
>>>>> Jordan
>>>>>
>>>>> On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett
>>>>> <Brett.Schaefer at heritage.org
>>>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Brett.Schaefer at heritage.org');>>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> Jordan,
>>>>>
>>>>> I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
>>>>>
>>>>> However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in
>>>>> that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1,
>>>>> 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO,
>>>>> and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it
>>>>> would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that
>>>>> such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the
>>>>> CCWG proposal.
>>>>>
>>>>> Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a
>>>>> possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to
>>>>> participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2)
>>>>> decides not to participate immediately, but announces its
>>>>> desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3)
>>>>> cannot reach a consensus position.
>>>>>
>>>>> In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above
>>>>> to participate would be required in order to exercise powers
>>>>> 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was
>>>>> supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
>>>>>
>>>>> Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than
>>>>> SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to
>>>>> participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to
>>>>> plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need
>>>>> to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of
>>>>> participation. Is this being drafted?
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>
>>>>> Brett
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:* wp1-bounces at icann.org
>>>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces at icann.org');>
>>>>> [mailto:wp1-bounces at icann.org
>>>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces at icann.org');>] *On
>>>>> Behalf Of *Jordan Carter
>>>>> *Sent:* Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM
>>>>> *To:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1 at icann.org
>>>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1 at icann.org');>
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>>>>>
>>>>> ... and in PDF
>>>>> J
>>>>>
>>>>> On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter
>>>>> <jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>>>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan at internetnz.net.nz');> > wrote:
>>>>> Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
>>>>>
>>>>> Jordan
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *Brett* *Schaefer*/
>>>>> Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory
>>>>> Affairs
>>>>> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for
>>>>> National Security and Foreign Policy/
>>>>> The Heritage Foundation
>>>>> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
>>>>> Washington, DC 20002
>>>>> 202-608-6097
>>>>> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
>>>>>
>>>>> *Brett* *Schaefer*/
>>>>> Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory
>>>>> Affairs
>>>>> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for
>>>>> National Security and Foreign Policy/
>>>>> The Heritage Foundation
>>>>> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
>>>>> Washington, DC 20002
>>>>> 202-608-6097
>>>>> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
>>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>>> From: *Gregory, Holly* <holly.gregory at sidley.com
>>>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','holly.gregory at sidley.com');> >
>>>>> Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48
>>>>> Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>>>>> Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
>>>>>
>>>>> Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised
>>>>> memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to
>>>>> replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes
>>>>> are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have
>>>>> addressed the point requested below as well. We request that
>>>>> this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
>>>>>
>>>>> Please let us know if you have any questions.
>>>>>
>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>> Holly and Rosemary
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Jordan Carter
>>>>>
>>>>> Chief Executive
>>>>> *InternetNZ
>>>>> *
>>>>> +64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649
>>>>> <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob)
>>>>> Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>>>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan at internetnz.net.nz');>
>>>>> Skype: jordancarter
>>>>> Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
>>>>>
>>>>> /A better world through a better Internet
>>>>> /
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Jordan Carter
>>>>>
>>>>> Chief Executive
>>>>> *InternetNZ
>>>>> *
>>>>> +64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649
>>>>> <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob)
>>>>> Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>>>>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan at internetnz.net.nz');>
>>>>> Skype: jordancarter
>>>>> Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
>>>>>
>>>>> /A better world through a better Internet
>>>>> /
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>>
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