[CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Jon Nevett
jon at donuts.email
Thu Nov 12 14:52:51 UTC 2015
Chris is absolutely correct. What the community powers should protect against is the ccNSO going through a two-year Policy Development Process, reaching consensus, and approving a ccTLD policy recommendation, but the Board in approving the policy change alters the Bylaws in a way that changes the intent of the policy and refuses to change it. In that case, the ccNSO should be able to utilize the community powers and rally the rest of the community around it to block the Bylaw change as written.
What the community powers should not be used for is to undermine the PDP process. In the same scenario as above, the ccNSO spends 2 years on ccTLD policy reaching consensus and the Board approves it and implements the requisite Bylaw change. Even though such Bylaw change only alters Article IX of the Bylaws (CCNSO), the GNSO and others in the community do not like the change and try to block it. This scenario seems highly inappropriate. If Nigel is correct and we already protect against this, that is great. The extra protection by baking into the voting structure, however, wouldn't hurt.
Another example is that the ICANN budget process sets a fee on all gTLD registrations. It has been US$.18 cents per transaction for a while, but it has been as high as US$.25. Some gTLD registrars pass the fee on directly to registrants with a line item fee, while others bake the fee into their cost structure. If the ICANN Board decided unilaterally to increase the fee back to US$.25 one year to pay for some initiatives that the community felt were extravagant and unnecessary, then it appropriately could use the community powers to block said budget. The fee increase would impact the entire GNSO community and they rightly would be able to take action.
On the other hand, let's look at an example where the ICANN Board approved the budget with the longstanding US$.18 cent fee on gTLD registrations. The community in that case -- other than the GNSO community that pays the fees -- however, got together to block the budget to get the Board to increase the fees that they don't pay to raise money for their pet projects. I agree with the various objectors that such a scenario would be an inappropriate use of the community powers.
The bottom line is that we should save the pitchforks and torches for only those instances when we have the support of the actual community members whose houses are at risk of being burned.
Best,
Jon
> On Nov 12, 2015, at 8:50 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>
> Thanks Greg.
>
> For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure?
>
> Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position?
>
>
> Cheers,
>
> Chris
>
>
>
>> On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com <mailto:gregshatanipc at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>> I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
>>
>> I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time.
>>
>> On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
>>
>> Greg
>>
>> On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au <mailto:ceo at auda.org.au>> wrote:
>> All,
>>
>> Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
>>
>> Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
>>
>> 1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
>>
>> 2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
>>
>> This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
>>
>> It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
>>
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>>
>>
>> Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
>>
>> .au Domain Administration Ltd
>>
>> T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
>>
>> E: ceo at auda.org.au <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo at auda.org.au');> | W: www.auda.org.au <http://www.auda.org.au/>
>>
>> auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
>>
>>
>>
>> Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
>>
>>
>>> On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco at netchoice.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','sdelbianco at netchoice.org');>> wrote:
>>>
>>> "consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
>>>
>>> A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
>>>
>>> Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
>>>
>>>
>>> From: <wp1-bounces at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces at icann.org');>> on behalf of Robin Gross <robin at ipjustice.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','robin at ipjustice.org');>>
>>> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM
>>> To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community at icann.org');>>
>>> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel at godaddy.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jbladel at godaddy.com');>>, "wp1 at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1 at icann.org');>" <wp1 at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1 at icann.org');>>, Jon Nevett <jon at donuts.email <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon at donuts.email');>>
>>> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>>>
>>> Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
>>>
>>> Robin
>>>
>>> On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
>>>
>>>> Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks—
>>>>
>>>> J.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org');>> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon at donuts.email <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon at donuts.email');>>
>>>> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51
>>>> To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community at icann.org');>>
>>>> Cc: "<wp1 at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1 at icann.org');>>" <wp1 at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1 at icann.org');>>
>>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>>>>
>>>> Folks:
>>>>
>>>> I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
>>>>
>>>> In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
>>>>
>>>> In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
>>>>
>>>> In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
>>>>
>>>> We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
>>>>
>>>> To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
>>>>
>>>> Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
>>>>
>>>> We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks.
>>>>
>>>> Jon
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca');>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
>>>>>
>>>>> Alan
>>>>>
>>>>> At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Alan,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brett
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brett Schaefer
>>>>>> Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs
>>>>>> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy
>>>>>> The Heritage Foundation
>>>>>> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
>>>>>> Washington, DC 20002
>>>>>> 202-608-6097
>>>>>> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca');>]
>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM
>>>>>> To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett
>>>>>> Cc: <wp1 at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1 at icann.org');>>; Accountability Cross Community
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Alan
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos.
>>>>>> On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','seun.ojedeji at gmail.com');> > wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order.
>>>>>> That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards
>>>>>> Sent from my Asus Zenfone2
>>>>>> Kindly excuse brevity and typos.
>>>>>> On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer at heritage.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Brett.Schaefer at heritage.org');>> wrote:
>>>>>> Jordan,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brett
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan at internetnz.net.nz');>]
>>>>>> Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM
>>>>>> To: Schaefer, Brett
>>>>>> Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1 at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1 at icann.org');>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>>>>>>
>>>>>> hi Brett,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jordan
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer at heritage.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Brett.Schaefer at heritage.org');>> wrote:
>>>>>> Jordan,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brett
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: wp1-bounces at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces at icann.org');> [ mailto:wp1-bounces at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces at icann.org');>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter
>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM
>>>>>> To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1 at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1 at icann.org');>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ... and in PDF
>>>>>> J
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan at internetnz.net.nz');> > wrote:
>>>>>> Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jordan
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brett Schaefer
>>>>>> Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs
>>>>>> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy
>>>>>> The Heritage Foundation
>>>>>> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
>>>>>> Washington, DC 20002
>>>>>> 202-608-6097
>>>>>> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brett Schaefer
>>>>>> Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs
>>>>>> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy
>>>>>> The Heritage Foundation
>>>>>> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
>>>>>> Washington, DC 20002
>>>>>> 202-608-6097
>>>>>> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
>>>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>>>> From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory at sidley.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','holly.gregory at sidley.com');> >
>>>>>> Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48
>>>>>> Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>>>>>> Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Please let us know if you have any questions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>> Holly and Rosemary
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Jordan Carter
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chief Executive
>>>>>> InternetNZ
>>>>>>
>>>>>> +64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob)
>>>>>> Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan at internetnz.net.nz');>
>>>>>> Skype: jordancarter
>>>>>> Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A better world through a better Internet
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Jordan Carter
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chief Executive
>>>>>> InternetNZ
>>>>>>
>>>>>> +64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob)
>>>>>> Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan at internetnz.net.nz');>
>>>>>> Skype: jordancarter
>>>>>> Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A better world through a better Internet
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org');>
>>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org');>
>>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>_______________________________________________
>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org');>
>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org');>
>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> WP1 mailing list
>>> WP1 at icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','WP1 at icann.org');>
>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1 <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1>
>>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/attachments/20151112/d127f0d2/attachment-0001.html>
More information about the Accountability-Cross-Community
mailing list