[CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator

Sat Nov 14 14:57:44 UTC 2015

Happy to help as well!

Greg

On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Stephen Deerhake <sdeerhake at nic.as> wrote:

> Hi Jordan.
>
>
>
> Happy to help as well.
>
>
>
> Stephen Deerhake
>
>
>
> *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [mailto:
> accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Chris
> Disspain
> *Sent:* Saturday, November 14, 2015 2:29 AM
> *To:* Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz>
> *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community <
> accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>
>
>
> Hi Jordan,
>
>
>
> Happy to help.
>
> Cheers,
>
>
>
> Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
>
> .au Domain Administration Ltd
>
> T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
>
> E: ceo at auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au
>
>
>
> auDA - Australia's Domain Name Administrator
>
>
> On 14 Nov 2015, at 11:03, Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
>
> Thanks Greg.
>
>
>
> I've decided as WP1 rapporteur to start a piece of work to see if we can
> solve this. More details in around 48h.
>
>
>
>
>
> Jordan
>
> On Saturday, 14 November 2015, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> A very quick response:
>
>
>
> 1.  I only used the ccNSO in the example because Chris Disspain did.
> Clearly, that exposed this issue right over a major fault line. I don't
> know if that was Chris's intent, or if he was just speaking from his cc
> point of view, but no matter -- the elephant is where it is. As Becky
> indicates, GNSO would have similar concerns (though without quite the same
> ability to walk away from ICANN).  One could imagine similar concerns from
> at least some of the other SO/ACs as well (though without the same history,
> which can't be ignored).
>
>
>
> 2.  The completion deadline isn't *really* 48 hours from now.  That's only
> when the Formal Update (downgraded from an Executive Summary, and perhaps
> to be further downgraded to a Strong Breeze, or a Foul Wind) is being
> published.  The *real* proposal won't be published until November 30 (known
> to those in the US as "the Monday after Thanksgiving").
>
>
>
> 3.  This does expose issues, as you say:
>
>    - Should all Bylaw changes coming from any SO/AC be immune from
>    challenge by the Community?
>    - Or should this immunity be granted only to the ccNSO, given the
>    Great Schism of 2002 and the subsequent Great Re-Engagement of 2003, which
>    was predicated on specific understandings?
>    - How far would this immunity go?
>
>
>    - If such Bylaws were immune from veto, would a "spill the board" or
>       "IRP" action by the remaining Community members also be prohibited?
>
>
>    - How far does this "One Big Community" idea go?
>
>
>    - Does it go so far to say that each part of the Community must be
>       subservient to the Community as a whole? (Which sounds like another word
>       that begins with "Commun-" (not that there's anything wrong with that))
>       - If not, how do you balance autonomy and Community?
>       - And to what extent should these be general rules vs. specific
>       rules (or exceptions to the general rules)?
>
>
>    - Can there be a narrowly tailored solution to this particular issue,
>    so that we are dealing with an animal smaller than an elephant, and a
>    problem smaller than the essential underpinnings of "Community Powers"?
>    - Do the various escalation steps (especially the conference call and
>    the Community Forum) provide enough of an opportunity for an embattled
>    SO/AC to try to stop this from happening, rather than changing the rules at
>    all?
>
> Greg
>
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl>
> wrote:
>
> Chris, all,
>
>
>
> I am with Jordan on this.
>
>
>
> In the present situation, the board can reject the outcome of such a GNSO
> or ccNSO process with a 2/3 majority vote, right? Again in the present
> situation (and if all is well), the board would do so on the basis of
> comments from the community on the GNSO or ccNSO proposal. So, the
> community would kind of have the final say. Which is what we want, although
> it might sometimes be disappointing to a particular constituency.
>
>
>
> In the post-transition situation, with the new community powers in place,
> we want the community to be able to correct the board on important
> decisions that the large majority of the community does not agree with.
>
> Many of these important decisions will either be the outcome of a policy
> process of an SO or advice from an AC (think about the GAC and stress test
> 18 in this context). Some of those will require a bylaw change, quite a few
> not, I suspect.
>
> Furthermore, those “important decisions” will in most cases (bylaw change
> or not) have an impact on a wider group than the SO or AC members that
> propose it.
>
>
>
> So I think it’s completely justified that the community can eventually
> block an SO policy or AC advice (again, requiring a bylaw change or not)
> WITHOUT the consent of the “issuing” SO or AC. In fact, I think this this
> is one of the important pillars of the multi-stakeholder model.
>
>
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Roelof Meijer
>
>
>
> *From: *<accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of
> Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au>
> *Date: *donderdag 12 november 2015 10:50
> *To: *Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com>
> *Cc: *Jon Nevett <jon at donuts.email>, Accountability Cross Community <
> accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
> *Subject: *Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole
> Designator
>
>
>
> Thanks Greg.
>
>
>
> For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by
> the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw
> change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that
> not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change
> the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure?
>
>
>
> Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I
> believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my
> ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position?
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>
>
> Chris
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in
> Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite
> opposition from the rest of the community.
>
>
>
> I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions
> "yes."  These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite
> some time.
>
>
>
> On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of
> autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that
> it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
>
>
>
> Greg
>
> On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>
> All,
>
>
>
> Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me
> and a number of others).
>
>
>
> Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
>
>
>
> 1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and
> ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the
> relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO
> supporting such a block?
>
>
>
> 2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which
> are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw
> change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting
> such a block?
>
>
>
> This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including,
> importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on
> the NRO.
>
>
>
> It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that
> bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely
> scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>
>
> Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
>
> .au Domain Administration Ltd
>
> T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
>
> E: ceo at auda.org.au | W:www.auda.org.au
>
> auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
>
>
>
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>
>
> On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco at netchoice.org>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> "consent of the governed"?  I do not think it means what you think it
> means.
>
>
>
> A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by
> majority of all citizens.  A government that campaigned on raising taxes on
> the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted
> rich give their support.
>
>
>
> Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget
> veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the
> contract parties.   That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
>
>
>
>
>
> *From: * <wp1-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of Robin Gross <
> robin at ipjustice.org>
> *Date: *Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM
> *To: *Accountability Cross Community <
> accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
> *Cc: *"James M. Bladel" <jbladel at godaddy.com>, "wp1 at icann.org" <
> wp1 at icann.org>, Jon Nevett <jon at donuts.email>
> *Subject: *Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole
> Designator
>
>
>
> Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but
> not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
>
>
>
> Robin
>
>
>
> On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
>
>
>
> Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of
> community decision making.
>
>
>
> Thanks—
>
>
>
> J.
>
>
>
>
>
> *From: *<accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of
> Jon Nevett <jon at donuts.email>
> *Date: *Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51
> *To: *Accountability Cross Community <
> accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
> *Cc: *"<wp1 at icann.org>" <wp1 at icann.org>
> *Subject: *Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole
> Designator
>
>
>
> Folks:
>
>
>
> I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
>
>
>
>
> In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a
> specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in
> order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is
> considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the
> ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a
> community action in order to move forward.
>
>
>
> In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount
> gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
>
>
>
>
> In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the
> community makes a decision binding.
>
>
>
> We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other
> SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community
> decision process is invoked.
>
>
>
> To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the
> group most impacted by a decision.
>
>
>
> Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at
> issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already
> have been discussing.
>
>
>
> We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is
> predominant.  Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that
> the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
>
>
>
> Thanks.
>
>
>
> Jon
>
>
>
>
>
> On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some
> AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
>
> Alan
>
> At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
>
>
> Alan,
>
> I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. Iâ€™m not talking about a
> participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is
> anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not
> considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the
> community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds
> either in support or against.
>
> Iâ€™m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to
> participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide
> not to participate.
>
> But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is
> why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the
> community mechanism.
>
> But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach
> consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or
> even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four
> community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the
> community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
>
> That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate –
> acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal –
> from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
>
> I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of
> participation for that reason.
>
> Best,
>
> Brett
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Brett Schaefer
> Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs
> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security
> and Foreign Policy
> The Heritage Foundation
> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
> Washington, DC 20002
> 202-608-6097
> heritage.org
>
> *From:* Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
> <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca>]
> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM
> *To:* Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett
> *Cc:* <wp1 at icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community
> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole
> Designator
>
> There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it
> will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on
> exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by
> neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE
> support, the action dies.
>
> In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its
> own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
>
> Alan
> --
> Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos.
> On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com
> <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com%20>> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we
> are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time.
> Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by
> consensus.
>
> Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to
> ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating
> SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no
> need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4
> may be in order.
> That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC
> or less.
>
> Regards
> Sent from my Asus Zenfone2
> Kindly excuse brevity and typos.
> On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer at heritage.org>
> wrote:
> Jordan,
>
> If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic
> eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
>
> In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds
> to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting
> minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75
> percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the
> splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
>
> Best,
>
> Brett
>
> *From:* Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz
> <jordan at internetnz.net.nz>]
> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM
> *To:* Schaefer, Brett
> *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1 at icann.org
> *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>
> hi Brett,
>
> Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend
> the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this
> through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating,
> to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
>
> Jordan
>
> On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett <
> Brett.Schaefer at heritage.org> wrote:
> Jordan,
>
> I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
>
> However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it
> requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The
> operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I
> believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with
> the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement
> of the CCWG proposal.
>
> Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible
> complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC
> either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate
> immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some
> future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
>
> In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to
> participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I
> donâ€™t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for
> exercise of the community powers.
>
> Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has
> explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating
> in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason,
> I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of
> participation.  Is this being drafted?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Brett
>
> *From:* wp1-bounces at icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces at icann.org
> <wp1-bounces at icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter
> *Sent:* Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM
> *To:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1 at icann.org
> *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>
> ... and in PDF
> J
>
> On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz
> <jordan at internetnz.net.nz%20>> wrote:
> Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
>
> Jordan
>
>
> *Brett* *Schaefer*
>
> *Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory
> AffairsMargaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National
> Security and Foreign Policy*
> The Heritage Foundation
> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
> Washington, DC 20002
> 202-608-6097
> heritage.org
>
> *Brett* *Schaefer*
>
> *Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory
> AffairsMargaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National
> Security and Foreign Policy*
> The Heritage Foundation
> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
> Washington, DC 20002
> 202-608-6097
> heritage.org
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: *Gregory, Holly* <holly.gregory at sidley.com
> <holly.gregory at sidley.com%20>>
> Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48
> Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
> Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
>
> Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how
> the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was
> sent to you last week.  The changes are largely in the nature of
> clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well.  We
> request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
>
> Please let us know if you have any questions.
>
> Kind regards,
> Holly and Rosemary
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Jordan Carter
>
> Chief Executive
>
> *InternetNZ*
> +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
> Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
> Skype: jordancarter
> Web: www.internetnz.nz
>
>
> *A better world through a better Internet *
>
>
>
> --
> Jordan Carter
>
> Chief Executive
>
> *InternetNZ*
> +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
> Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
> Skype: jordancarter
> Web: www.internetnz.nz
>
>
> *A better world through a better Internet *
>
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> --
> Jordan Carter
> Chief Executive, InternetNZ
>
> +64-21-442-649 | jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>
> Sent on the run, apologies for brevity
>
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