[CCWG-ACCT] ST-18 and 2/3 Threshold Proposal

Wed Nov 18 05:57:43 UTC 2015

Hi all.

I think the GAC is mindful of the need of a very high degree of consensus - that is why it always has voluntarily committed to this rule.

At the same time, I feel we all are also mindful of the GAC's merely advisory nature where decisions are taken by a private-led body in a very fastly evolving environment - i.e. far away from deciding on international law or treaties as Milton seems to suggest. After all we are not in the UN system...

However, I would kindly suggest not to open parallel tracks and to take part in the discussions in the subgroup.

regards

Jorge

Von meinem iPhone gesendet

> Am 18.11.2015 um 00:09 schrieb Avri Doria <avri at acm.org>:
> 
> Hi,
> 
> This makes sense, but isn't it up to the GAC to realize this?
> 
> avri
> 
> 
> 
>> On 17-Nov-15 17:24, Mueller, Milton L wrote:
>> 
>> I completely agree with Keith’s statement below.
>> 
>> But there is another element to the ST18 discussion that has been
>> overlooked. Under customary and formal international law, states are
>> all sovereign and equal. That is why it is standard procedure for the
>> UN to rely on full consensus (no objection from any member). A
>> majority of states, for example, cannot require any other state to
>> sign a treaty. Any other arrangement would effectively erode state
>> sovereignty, making states unequal because a majority of some states
>> could impose obligations or commitments on another state or states.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Any deviation from full consensus by GAC would have substantially the
>> same effect. It could allow one group of states to impose their will
>> on other states regarding what advice should be given to the board. In
>> deciding whether to follow the Advice, it would also force ICANN to
>> choose between following the advice of some states and following the
>> preferences of other states. Since ICANN’s policies are effective
>> globally, it is only appropriate for GAC advice to be based on a
>> global consensus of _/all/_ states. Redefining GAC consensus as
>> anything other  than full consensus is inconsistent with sovereignty.
>> Further, it dramatically reduces a healthy political constraint on GAC
>> advice, opening the door to political conflict, and games of
>> dominance, among states over GAC advice.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> --MM
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf
>> Of *Drazek, Keith
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 17, 2015 2:41 PM
>> *To:* accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>> *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] ST-18 and 2/3 Threshold Proposal
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> All,
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Here are my current thoughts on our ongoing discussions around ST-18,
>> the 2/3 threshold issue, and the GAC’s participation in the community
>> mechanism:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The CCWG’s mandate is to empower the community _as a whole_ to better
>> hold ICANN and its Board accountable. Our mission is not to modify the
>> influence of one SO or AC relative to the Board, or to one another,
>> nor to enable or encourage such change in the future. This process
>> should not be used by individual groups to seek increased influence
>> relative to others. That’s why we are proposing a unified community as
>> the sole Designator, and set thresholds for decisions supported by
>> multiple ACs and SOs.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Under the current discussions, it appears that a subset of GAC members
>> want three new “powers” that do not exist today: (1) the right to hold
>> a decisional role in the community mechanism, (2) a 2/3 threshold for
>> Board rejection of consensus advice, and (3) the ability to adjust the
>> definition of consensus that would trigger the Board’s special
>> obligations.  Why is the CCWG now focusing on the 11th-hour
>> introduction of the 2/3 board threshold along with flexibility to
>> change current practice on the definition of consensus? Both of those
>> stand to increase the influence of the GAC alone over the Board and
>> other community groups.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> No one is trying to tell the GAC how to define consensus for its
>> internal deliberations or advice. Rather, ST-18 simply reinforces the
>> current practice that the Board’s obligations kick in only when the
>> GAC’s consensus is consistent with current practice – reflecting the
>> UN definition/absence of formal objection. Any change to this practice
>> must be viewed as empowering the GAC alone over the Board and
>> potentially in a disproportionate way relative to others. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> By participating in the community mechanism as a co-equal, the GAC
>> will be able to contribute to this joint community empowerment in a
>> decisional way, if it chooses to do so. This is already a big change
>> (that some are uncomfortable with) but it shows that the rest of the
>> community respects the important role of governments and the GAC in
>> our community processes. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> In my view, the CCWG should resist pressure to intentionally or
>> inadvertently increase the relative influence of any one group, and
>> stay focused on the joint community empowerment envisioned in our
>> charter. This should not be an opportunity for any group to secure
>> individual benefits they have previously been denied.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Thanks and regards,
>> 
>> Keith
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
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>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
> 
> 
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