[CCWG-ACCT] Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for ST18 Meeting #3 - 20 November

Brenda Brewer brenda.brewer at icann.org
Mon Nov 23 17:23:00 UTC 2015


Hello all,

 

The notes, recordings and transcripts for the ST18 Meeting #3 -  20 November will be available here:
https://community.icann.org/x/Fb9YAw

 

A copy of the notes may be found below.

 

Thank you.

 

Kind regards,

Brenda

 


Notes


These high-level notes are designed to help you navigate through content of the call and do not
substitute in any way the transcript.

 

Recap of last call: discussions regarding the potential for a definition of consensus which would
include percentages or accounts within the GAC

Paper from Denmark was recirculated with comments, one being on rejection threshold for Board in
case it acts in a manner that is inconsistent with GAC advice. Initial proposed approach was 2;3.
Variant of a staggered approach was suggested: GAC advice would be supported by a consensus as
currently defined in the Operating Principle 47, and could only be rejected by a 2/3 majority of the
Board if it was consensus advice. If not according to that definition, a simple majority would be
required from the Board.

Discussion: 

*        Sentence in the original proposal from Denmark after the end of this first paragraph in
red, which stated that in this context each advisory committee has a right to determine its
particular definition of consensus, is missing. After this sentence, we would include the text that
appears in the second red paragraph which indicates borders, limits to that definition of consensus.

--> No intent to contradict the statement that each advisory committee has the right to determine
definition of consensus

*        Footnote does not clarify what consensus is. Preference for keeping existing text in Bylaws
and focus on changes, if any are adopted.

*        Do not give narrow definitions of consensus. If we fix it in Bylaws, it will be difficult
to change it after that.

*        Consider minimum conditions for considering anything greater than a majority vote by the
Board in considering GAC advice: 1) It would have to be what we termed GAC consensus advice; 2) It
would have to be consistent with ICANN's accountability and transparency; ) There would need to be a
written rationale for advice. Statements of requirement of rationale would be necessary; 4) Would
need certification that the GAC advice does not contravene any national or international law or
treaty. In terms of the IPC's concerns about moving upward from the majority approval in exchange
for basically a commitment to the status quo these would be as the minimum conditions at this point
ICG would be  prepared to accept. Moving above the majority for any reason still raises great
concern, the commitment to the status quo on one side should require nothing more than commitment to
the status quo on the other side.

*        It is hard to endorse a compromise without knowing if GAC is going to or is not going to
participate in the community mechanism or not. GAC would have an unacceptable increase in it
authority if it votes to participate in the community mechanism and has the ability to offer advice
in a preferential fashion to the Board. Co-Chairs should reach out to the various constituencies to
identify whether they are going to fully participate or not. The only recourse for the community to
oppose GAC advice and oppose by a majority of the Board is to exercise community powers. If the GAC
is going to be participating in the community mechanism that makes reaching various thresholds to
exercise those powers much, much more difficult. It is a critical part of our equation.

*        Against general premise of considering the GAC as a danger or as a sort of problem for the
community. Change the approach. The 2/3 rule is linked to a commitment of consensus. All the points
that Greg made in his email and which stem from the IPR constituency back in 2014 are being
addressed.

*        There is a distance between the definition of consensus that is highlighted - that was
highlighted by Greg as the current definition of Operating Principles 47 and the definition that was
provided in the footnote by Julia and Denmark. 

*        We need language that is stronger - Denmark language is ambiguous. If you want to raise the
ante to 2/3, something more has to be required of the GAC in reaching advice that merits a 2/3
consideration

*        We can't move forward on a proposal until we agree that consensus is absence of formal
objection.

*        A 2/3 majority might have a very high symbolic impact on the GAC's role. But if the 2/3 is
important to bridge the gap why not keep it for the instances where GAC advice is unanimous. We need
to find a solution for that.

*        It would be important to accept that without any kind of consultation process or a majority
plus one is opposed seems like that advice has been somewhat forced on the Board in such a way
rejection is not rejection but only a due deference process.  If a super majority, but not 2/3, of
the board wished to reject the GAC advice, it would not be rejected but it would be accepted without
any consultation process even though most of the Board was against it. 

*        We could reestablish the balance. For instance: if 1/3 of Board is against following GAC
advice, the Board can request a consultation. 

*        The mutually agreeable solution process is triggered when the GAC advice is supported by
consensus but without mentioning anything about how this consensus is assessed.

Finn Petersen's proposed language:

"The advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy matters shall be duly taken into
account, both in the formulation and adoption of policies. In the event that the ICANN Board
determines to take an action that is not consistent with the Governmental Advisory Committee advice,
it shall so inform the Committee and state the reasons why it decided not to follow that advice. Any
GAC advice approved by a GAC consensus, understood to mean  the practice of adopting decisions by
general agreement in the absence of any formal objection, may only be rejected by a vote of
two-thirds (2/3) of the Board. Any advice approved by the GAC with objections from a very small
minority of GAC members, but falling short of consensus, may be rejected by a majority vote of the
Board. In both instances, the Governmental Advisory Committee and the ICANN Board will try, in good
faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution. Governmental
Advisory Committee should ensure that THE REST advice to the Board is clear."

Discussion:

*        This goes in the right direction.

*        The Board would require to meet a higher threshold to reject GAC advice given that the
current thresholds of consensus and the Board's current threshold to reject GAC advice would be
applied to GAC advice with a lower threshold of consensus.

*        We would need to know what is the timeframe in order to be able to look into this very
carefully because after all as you all know the GAC called for flexibility, for autonomy of advisory
committees in refining their definition of consensus. 

*        Approach is promising but needs wordsmithing. Suggestion to drop the very small minority
language and go to any non-consensus advice approved by the GAC or something similar. Concerned that
in the future a GAC might decide to initiate its own advice independent of any ongoing ICANN process
on -- regarding a public policy matter and that would have the potential to what the GAC in effect
initiate a form of a policy development process outside of the normal GNSO process. This language
has elements of compromise. 

*        Concern that the obligation of the board, to try and reach out to the GAC and trying to
(face) in a timely efficient manner to find a mutually acceptable solution should only be the case
on consensus device and not on non-consensus device and that if the Board rejects non-consensus
devices up to the GAC to negotiate amongst itself its own members and then trying to reach a
resolution to find a consensus and only in that case would the GAC have to negotiate with the Board
if the advice is rejected.

*        We have agreement on each and every advisory committee ensures that the advice provided is
clear and reflects the consensus view of the committee.

*        Second threshold  is the same threshold as what's included in Denmark's original proposal.
That threshold was intended to trigger two-thirds of the Board and the mutually accepted solution.

*        Important for members to go back to their constituencies and weigh the support with this
new text before we move forward. The Board should be put in a position of negotiating between
various GAC members. It should be up to the GAC to negotiate internally, find a consensus position
and if the Board still had an objection to that advice then it would enter into negotiations with
the GAC to try and find a mutually acceptable solution.

Follow-up call to held on Monday at 14:00 UTC

 

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