[CCWG-ACCT] Update on Board discussions on the CCWG Update

Bruce Tonkin Bruce.Tonkin at melbourneit.com.au
Wed Nov 25 10:03:20 UTC 2015


Hello Jordan,


>>  Incorporating the right, and developing the approach to using it, is not in conflict with the admirable transparency vision that you have suggested. The CCWG's deliberations in Dublin were very clear - as one of the people who reluctantly moved to a Designator model on the basis it could meet the group's requirements, this was one of the components of meeting those requirements. It is not beyond ICANN's ability to make this workable, and putting the framework in the bylaws is essential to that. 

I agree that it is certainly possible to make it workable and put it in the bylaws.



>>  .       Sole Designator Model (page 11) 
The Board supports the Sole Designator model with the understanding that limited powers of appointment, removal and enforcement are maintained as the guiding principles for this model.

>>  This may cause problems. As noted above, the transparency and inspection rights aren't negotiable. The bylaws change powers are also clearly a part of this model in the sense of legal enforceability of the Empowered Community's decision rights. It's the Budget power which isn't. 

>>  Can you confirm by the above observation the Board isn't seeking changes to the community powers per se?

Confirmed.   The community powers should be encapsulated in the  bylaws.    

The “sole designator” in addition to the powers in the bylaws, separately will have powers under California law with respect to the appointment and removal of Board directors.   These are not limited to needing to show cause as has already been noted.




>>  It would be helpful if you could advise in more depth what it is that drives the Board to make this comment - that is, what are you worried about as a group "appearing" here?

General fear and uncertainty on how it all fits together, and in particular a fear that the designator could act outside of the rules in the bylaws if the language is not clear.
 

>>  .       AoC Reviews and Implementation Factors (page 31)

>>  The Board appreciates the work to incorporate the AOC reviews into the Bylaws and reiterates as a principle that operational/administrative details not be inserted into the Bylaws, in favor of defined standards for such reviews that can be changed (with community participation) through processes that do not require Bylaws changes.

>>  If this is a "no" to the carefully considered changes to the AOC specified reviews, then it is a problem.

It means that we should give consideration to what needs to be in the bylaws, and what can sit in operational procedures documents.   It was a general principle.   For example the GNSO, GAC and the nominating committee all have separate operational procedures documents that don’t sit within the bylaws, and these can be altered without board approval.  E.g. see https://gacweb.icann.org/display/gacweb/GAC+Operating+Principles.   Some of the text developed by the CCWG may be better placed in such a document.
 

>>  .       Community Decision-Making Power (page 12)

>>  The Board believes it is important that the Community Decision Making Power has appropriate thresholds that are defined in ways that reflect a community decision, and are flexible enough to allow entrance (or exit) of existing or new SOs or ACs.

>>  I'm at a loss to understand precisely what this means.....

It would be useful to state thresholds as both a number and also as a percentage if the number of SOs or ACs changes in future.

Regards,
Bruce Tonkin



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