[CCWG-ACCT] Is it reasonable to avoid new mechanisms?

Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig at redbranchconsulting.com
Mon Oct 5 14:44:09 UTC 2015


With respect, it is not the "few" who have agreed.  As I read the history, the overwhelming majority support the SMM.  There are some questions (per your "b" bullet below) about the precise structure of the SMM, but a mere review of the last 300 (!) messages on the chat and the transcripts from Paris, LA and the Board calls suggests that the if it were put to a straight vote the SMM would win by a large margin.
This is not an argument that the SMM must win.  But it is a counter to the argument that the dissent of a small, but vocal, minority should be able to exercise a heckler's veto over a proposal that the majority of the community supports.  If the multi-stakeholder model means anything, it means compromise in t he first instance, and respect for everyone's views.  But it does not mean regression to the least common denominator or that the community's broader needs must yield to an intransigent minority.
Paul
--
Sent from myMail app for Android Monday, 05 October 2015, 10:31AM -04:00 from Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com> :

>Jordan,
>We should not pusjh to a particular model SMM  while we have disagreement a) from the Board and b) from people among CCWG ,in partzicular, if the voting arrangements are maintained and if most of the ACs refrain to pop in/ or opt for voting and c) indication from others that with such voting by the ACs the balance between the private sectors and others, on the one hand, and governments on the other hand is c ompromised,
>We need to listen to each others and not to few that have already agreed to SMM.
>Pls kindly understand that there is diverghence of views .$
>Let us find out a consensus along the line that was proposed by Stev and amended by me
>Tks 
>Kavouss  
>
>2015-10-05 16:25 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh  < kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com > :
>>
>>
>>2015-10-05 15:38 GMT+02:00 Matthew Shears  < mshears at cdt.org > :
>>>+ 1 also 
>>>
>>>On 05/10/2015 13:54, James M. Bladel
      wrote:
>>>>+1. 
>>>>
>>>>Any claims that we must abbreviate
        accountability reforms in order to fit the IANA transition
        timeline has those two priorities reversed. 
>>>>
>>>>Sent via iPhone. Blame Siri. 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>On Oct 2, 2015, at 19:44, Jordan Carter < jordan at internetnz.net.nz >
        wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>Thanks Avri for this nice statement of one of
            the key dilemmas facing this group.
>>>>>
>>>>>The divergence between:
>>>>>
>>>>>- the transition can't happen until accountability is
              sustainable, and so that requires the member model as a
              foundation
>>>>>
>>>>>and
>>>>>
>>>>>- the transition can't happen if there is a significant
              change such as that to a member model, and so that
              requires ruling out the member model
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>is quite stark.
>>>>>
>>>>>FWIW my instincts are in line with Avri's. If ICANN's
              current level of accountability was acceptable, the
              community would not have demanded an accountability
              process alongside the transition process, and NTIA would
              not have agreed the two had to be intertwined and
              interrelated.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>cheers
>>>>>Jordan
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>On 1 October 2015 at 10:38, Avri
              Doria  < avri at acm.org > wrote:
>>>>>>Hi,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>The  Board's critique rests on a notion that the
                introduction of
>>>>>>anything new in the ICANN system will be a destabilizing
                factor and most
>>>>>>be avoided.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>This ignores the fact that by removing the NTIA backstop
                we destabilize
>>>>>>the current system. It might have been possible to find
                a new balance
>>>>>>(not that the old worked that well given the amount of
                discontent that
>>>>>>existed prior to the CCWG process) by tweaking the
                system.  The early
>>>>>>work of the CCWG, however, showed that this was not
                enough.  So we
>>>>>>decided to bring back a notion that existed in the early
                ICANN design,
>>>>>>the idea of membership.  Membership has always been part
                of the kit that
>>>>>>was available to ICANN in the multistakeholder model. 
                An initial
>>>>>>experiment met with some issues and instead of fixing
                that then, they
>>>>>>threw the notion away without exploring possible tweaks
                to the system.
>>>>>>As a result we are living in ICANN 2.0, a system that
                was  imposed in a
>>>>>>top down manner and one that was never fully accepted by
                those at the
>>>>>>bottom.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Now, albeit in a very different configuration, the CCWG
                is proposing to
>>>>>>establish a community consensus based idea of
                membership. I believe that
>>>>>>this should be given a fair analysis before rejecting
                it.  It is also
>>>>>>important to remember that the NTIA requirements were
                not a prohibition
>>>>>>of new mechanisms or structures, but rather evidence
                that these
>>>>>>structure did not increase the current risk, or fact, of
                capture and
>>>>>>that they could be held to account.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>The Board criticism is important to look at for
                arguments that show the
>>>>>>areas in which the CCWG plan either does not explain its
                protections
>>>>>>against capture and its accountability checks and
                balances or may have
>>>>>>gaps in these areas. If we cannot explain what we
                propose, or cannot
>>>>>>close the gaps, then it becomes time to consider
                variations on the model
>>>>>>or another model altogether. In my opinion, we are not
                there.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>avri
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>---
>>>>>>This email has been checked for viruses by Avast
                antivirus software.
>>>>>>https://www.avast.com/antivirus
>>>>>>
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>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>-- 
>>>>>Jordan
                              Carter
>>>>>
>>>>>Chief Executive 
>>>>>InternetNZ
>>>>>
>>>>>+64-4-495-2118 (office) |  +64-21-442-649 (mob)
>>>>>Email:  jordan at internetnz.net.nz  
>>>>>Skype: jordancarter
>>>>>Web:  www.internetnz.nz  
>>>>>
>>>>>A better world through a better
                                Internet 
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>>_______________________________________________
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
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>>>
>>>-- 

Matthew Shears
Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights
Center for Democracy & Technology 
>>>mshears at cdt.org
>>>+ 44 771 247 2987 
>>>
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>>
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