[CCWG-ACCT] Fwd: Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials

Malcolm Hutty malcolm at linx.net
Wed Oct 7 10:11:26 UTC 2015


On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
> You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN
> and presented during the calls.

Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship
Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if
ever I saw one!

Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining 
Questions
on  The Road to Transition") is interesting.

Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only
gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't
currently point to swift completion either.

Here is my assessment.

Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG 
Dependencies?"

A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes.
Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really.
There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget
and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the 
SMM,
which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in
their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own.
And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.

Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of
the five community powers?"

A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes.
Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The 
enforceability
of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant 
area
of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an 
effective
alternative means to ensure enforceability.

Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria 
and do
they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. 
Government stewardship?"

A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this.
Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal 
would
achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms 
pose
a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of 
NTIA
oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it 
agrees
to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like 
kind. Moreover,
the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG 
thought
necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA 
requirement.

    [* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue 
that it
       offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have 
arrived at
       a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up 
their minds.
       What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has 
not yet
       accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this 
particular
       NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to 
the "safe and
       secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a 
systematic
       re-evaluation.]

Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously 
improve ICANN’s
accountability and evolve its governance structure?

A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those 
items that
must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything 
else to a
WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes 
closing down CCWG upon
transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues 
to be
addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear 
that the
SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So 
there is
no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous 
improvement
either.

Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace 
actually
shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade 
the Board to
rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked 
on by this
group so intensively for almost a year.

One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing 
to abandon its
proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do 
so, CCWG
would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and 
stress tests
to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies 
the stress tests
is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.

Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the 
cross-community proposal,
this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than 
"racing
to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.

That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the 
scaremongering
on page 4.

Malcolm.


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