[CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials

Greg Shatan gregshatanipc at gmail.com
Wed Oct 7 12:45:53 UTC 2015


Malcolm and Avri,

Both very concise and right on target. Sadly.

Greg

On Wednesday, October 7, 2015, Matthew Shears <mshears at cdt.org> wrote:

> + 1 Avri.
>
> On 07/10/2015 12:29, Avri Doria wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG
>> proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the
>> schedule.  If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way
>> and stands in opposition to the community, we may not.    We need to
>> complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in
>> the Board's hands.  We have already lost several weeks because of the
>> spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for
>> accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met
>> with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of
>> against it.
>>
>> I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated.  We have
>> to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman.  And if the Protocols and
>> Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is
>> before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those
>> intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of
>> continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with
>> point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder
>> process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a
>> workable modality for decision making.
>>
>> avri
>>
>>
>> On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
>>
>>> On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
>>>
>>>> You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN
>>>> and presented during the calls.
>>>>
>>> Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship
>>> Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if
>>> ever I saw one!
>>>
>>> Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions
>>> on  The Road to Transition") is interesting.
>>>
>>> Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only
>>> gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't
>>> currently point to swift completion either.
>>>
>>> Here is my assessment.
>>>
>>> Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG
>>> Dependencies?"
>>>
>>> A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes.
>>> Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really.
>>> There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget
>>> and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of
>>> the SMM,
>>> which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in
>>> their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own.
>>> And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
>>>
>>> Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of
>>> the five community powers?"
>>>
>>> A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes.
>>> Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The
>>> enforceability
>>> of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a
>>> significant area
>>> of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an
>>> effective
>>> alternative means to ensure enforceability.
>>>
>>> Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA
>>> criteria and do
>>> they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S.
>>> Government stewardship?"
>>>
>>> A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this.
>>> Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's
>>> proposal would
>>> achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose
>>> a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal
>>> of NTIA
>>> oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it
>>> agrees
>>> to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of
>>> like kind. Moreover,
>>> the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG
>>> thought
>>> necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA
>>> requirement.
>>>
>>>     [* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue
>>> that it
>>>        offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have
>>> arrived at
>>>        a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up
>>> their minds.
>>>        What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has
>>> not yet
>>>        accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this
>>> particular
>>>        NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to
>>> the "safe and
>>>        secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a
>>> systematic
>>>        re-evaluation.]
>>>
>>> Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously
>>> improve ICANN’s
>>> accountability and evolve its governance structure?
>>>
>>> A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only
>>> those items that
>>> must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave
>>> everything else to a
>>> WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes
>>> closing down CCWG upon
>>> transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those
>>> issues to be
>>> addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not
>>> clear that the
>>> SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues).
>>> So there is
>>> no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous
>>> improvement
>>> either.
>>>
>>> Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the
>>> pace actually
>>> shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade
>>> the Board to
>>> rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked
>>> on by this
>>> group so intensively for almost a year.
>>>
>>> One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing
>>> to abandon its
>>> proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to
>>> do so, CCWG
>>> would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and
>>> stress tests
>>> to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal
>>> satisfies the stress tests
>>> is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
>>>
>>> Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the
>>> cross-community proposal,
>>> this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather
>>> than "racing
>>> to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
>>>
>>> That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the
>>> scaremongering
>>> on page 4.
>>>
>>> Malcolm.
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>
> --
>
> Matthew Shears
> Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights
> Center for Democracy & Technology
> mshears at cdt.org
> + 44 771 247 2987
>
>
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