[CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model

Wed Oct 7 14:31:33 UTC 2015

Hi Kieran,

in the interest of transparency here are some additional comments:

1. Kieran applied under the NomCom 2005 for the position of a board director. He made his application public and encouraged the NomCom to publish the names of all applicants. I was a voting member of the 2005 NomCom (nomintaed by ALAC) and George Sadowsky chaired the NomCom. The NomCom operates under the principle of confidentiality. This principle protects the candidate. It is not part of a conspiracy. It is, BTW, difficult to organize a conspiracy among 16 voting members coming from different constituencies of the community nominated by ACs and SOs within nine months. The principle of confidentiality guarantees that applicants who are not selected are not seen in the public as "loosers". This is the difference to an election where you have public campaigns which ends with winners and loosers. I explained this to Kieran in 2005 at length. We continue to disagree on this issue. However, when it came to the final selection, Kieran had no malus. He was treated equally to all the other good candidates. And we had a lot of good candidates. Kieran was not selected. I recommended Kieran to join ICANN Staff what he did. He has written extensively about his positive and negaitve experiences afterwards. No further comment needed.

2. The selection process in the NomCom follows different principles. The final list of candidates who meet all the high level criteria are mainly all excellent candidates. The final selection is made against a number of additional criteria which takes into consideration factors like geography, gender, skills etc. If you have five lawyers in the board there is no need to send an additional lawyer even if there is an excellent candidate. If you have five technical experts in the board but not managers it is better to send a manager and not another technical experts. With other words you will have always excellent candidates which are not selected because they do not fit into the specific constellation of the year (as Kieran in 2005). A candidate does not risk to be treated as a looser if he is not selected. He just can reapply and nobody will know that he was not selected the previous year. The final selection is indeed different from year to year because the board changes from year to year. And with this changes there are new needs for skill, gender and geography balances. We have elections for the Board: The SOs and the ALAC - which send 7 directors to the Board - have elections among their communities. So the final composition of the board comes from a mix of elections adn selections.

3. Kieran is right that the NomCom was established in the 2002 reform to substitute the elections. I was part of the election as adviser to the Membership Advisory Committtee (MAG) in 1999 and as member of the Membership Information Task Force (MITF) in 2000. I supported the election and was excited. But I learned also some lessons. In Asia it was the Japanese government which encouraged Japanese corporations to invite their employees to register as voters to get a Japanese director. When Taiwan and Korea realized the opportunity they started different campaigns but too late. Japan won. In Europe the German Magazine Der Spiegel announced the elections of the "World Government for the Internet". As a result 70 per cent of the registered voters in Europe came from Germany. No chance for somebody from Italy, the UK or Estonia to get elected. And in the final it was a German hacker which won against a German Telekom Manager. The plan, that the election will bring representatives of Internet users into the board, failed partly. In Asia we got a manager from Fuijutsi, in Latin America a banker form the Banco do Brazil. Good directors but not really representatives of civil society and individual Internet users. 

4. When Carl Bildt proposed a reformed election (Montevideao, September 2001) where not every all E-mail address holder should have the right to vote but only domain name holders there was a broad protest against this mechanism: Only landowners would then have right to vote. Students which use an e-mail address of their university would be excluded from the election. The plan was never excuted. With this experience I finally accepted the new mixed mechanism with a NomCom. However I could imagine that we have more election within the  SOs and ACs with public campaigns in the future. 

5. Nevertheless I would recommend to continue with the principle of confidentially in the NomCom. You will get a different set of candidates. If you invite candidates to start a public campaign you will get different people. It would need probably money for a campaign and you would politisize a more technical process which needs specific skills and broader understanding of the complexity of the multistakeholder community. The risk would be high to get candidates like Donald Trump or Sarah Palin. Not sure whether this would be good for ICANN and the community.
http://www.circleid.com/posts/removing_principle_of_confidentiality_in_icanns_nomcom_is_a_bad_idea/

6. A final point: Sometimes I am perplexed when you argue that the SOs and ACs make wrong decisions by sending bad people to the NomCom and bad people to the Board but you are sure that - if they form a sole Membership Organisation - everything will be ok. My experiences tell me that SOs and ACs send good people to the NomCom. Sometimes it could be better, but in general this is ok. I also experienced that SOs and ACs send good people to the board. Sometimes it could be better. But in general is is not bad. I trust the SOs and ACs and the community. But I know that many things has to be enhanced also within the ACs and SOs, including to make them more accountable to their constituencies, to do more outreach to underepresented groups, in particular from Africa, Asia and Latin America and to be more sensitive to the interests of individual Internet users and civil society interests, including human rights. 

7. And BTW - @ Eberhard: In the 13 years of the NomCom only George and I myself made its way as former NomCom Chairs into the Board. And I myself was only the substitute for a director who stepd down. I served two years in the board for two retired directors. The other way around - that former Board members became members of the NomCom - did happen. Hagen Hultzsch, Mike Robert, Michael Palage and others joined the NomCom and helped to find the right directors. Their contributions were helpful. My recommendation for Eberhard is: Please apply for the CNSO seat in the NomCom. It is always better to tell other people what the NomCom is and how it works if you know it from inside and not what you hear from rumor. I repeat what I did say in my previous e-Mail. The NomCom is probably the most democratic element in the ICANN ecosystem.

Wolfgang

Before everyone starts persuading themselves that the NomCom isn't all that
bad, please consider:

* The criteria for selection are secret

* The meetings are secret

* The NomCom views public disclosure of any candidates names, even by the
candidates themselves, as a bad thing

* A former chair-elect resigned because he was "sickened" by how it worked
(lobbying, abuse of travel support, insider culture, refusal to listen to
formal advice)

* It was set up to replace direct elections and is an active impediment to
discussions about how real elections might actually work

* It has been repeatedly criticized for poor working methods and failure to
communicate with candidates

* It is entirely self-contained. NomCom members often fail to turn up to
meetings but it is not reported back; NomCom members are not required to
explain their decisions.

* It gets the same number of people applying each year - 80-90 - and each
year says that is a great number with no explanation or analysis

* It measures its own success. And agrees each year that it has done a
terrific job

The fact that the NomCom exists at all is a sign that ICANN has not matured
to the point where it can do what thousands of other organizations achieve
every year: open elections with selections made by the whole community
rather than a secretive subset of community members who lobby extremely
hard to be selected.

Kieren

On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 3:18 PM, Phil Corwin <psc at vlaw-dc.com> wrote:

> Hello George.
>
> I have no quarrel with the fine and dedicated work of the NomCom.
>
> I do have a quarrel with the notion that the Board is significantly more
> representative and protective of the global Internet community and its
> interests than the members of the ICANN community, who contribute tens of
> millions of dollars' worth of unpaid labor on behalf of ICANN and its
> objectives each and every year.
>
> Best regards, Philip
>
> Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
> Virtualaw LLC
> 1155 F Street, NW
> Suite 1050
> Washington, DC 20004
> 202-559-8597/Direct
> 202-559-8750/Fax
> 202-255-6172/cell
>
> Twitter: @VlawDC
>
> "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: George Sadowsky [mailto:george.sadowsky at gmail.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 5:10 PM
> To: Kleinwachter Wolfgang
> Cc: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya; CCWG Accountability
> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
>
> Hi, Phil,
>
> I want to align myself 100% with Wolfgang's comments below.  I chaired the
> NomCom for three successive years, in 2005-2007, and my experience agrees
> with Wolfgang's completely.
>
> I cannot duplicate Wolfgang's extensive discussion of how it works and why
> it works, but I don't have to.  He has already made the case, and
> eloquently.
>
> Regards,
>
> George
>
>
> > On Oct 6, 2015, at 3:14 PM, Kleinwächter, Wolfgang <
> wolfgang.kleinwaechter at medienkomm.uni-halle.de> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> >
> > thanks for your understanding. Unfortunately we have been pulled into a
> "we vs. they" constellation which is grotesk.
> >
> > I served five years in the NomCom, one year as its chair. We had endless
> discussion how to send the best people for ICANN and the broader ICANN and
> Internet community to the Board. The people who made it to the board are -
> in my understanding - the best people you can get in a given year. They are
> not hand picked by an outside power which wants to manipulate the
> community. The NomCom itself is populated by representatives from the
> community. All SOs, ACs and the constituencies are represented with voting
> members in the NomCom. I trusted the community that they did send the right
> people to the NomCom. In my reports to the ICANN Public Forum - when I
> chaired the NomCom - I always presented the NomCom as the most democratic
> element in the whole ICANN ecosystem. The community itself selects its
> representatives (and should have also the right to spill them if they do
> not meet the expected standards, here I agree with the proposed
> enhancements). No CEO, no ICANN chair, no ICANN Board member can tell the
> NomCom whom to select. The same is true for the seven directors
> selected/elected by the SOs and ALAC. Do you know how many interviews and
> discussions take place before the 15 ALAC members vote in favor of one
> director which goes to the Board? Did you see the debate on the GNSO Seat?
> >
> > This are very democratic bottom up transparent, diversified and open
> processes. If you compare this with the population of other for profit or
> non-for profit boards in the world, this is unique. Do you know how FIFA
> selects its Executive Committee? Do you know how to become a member of the
> IOC ExCom? Do you know how Green Peace selects its Board? There are endless
> back-door meetings (in closeed circles) which produce bodies which are
> indeed - sometimes - not accountable to the broader public and it is
> difficult to remove them.
> >
> > The procedure how to get a seat in the ICANN Board is - as said above -
> one of the most impressive achievements we have in the ICANN family. And we
> should be proud to have such good mechanisms. Additionally the principle of
> rotation is an extra block against misuse and capture of the board
> function. The term is just three years for a director. If he did not
> deliver what was expected, the ACs, SOs and the NomCom has no duty to
> re-elect/select the candidate. The maximum is three terms (nine years). It
> was two terms (six years). The extension was made to have a right mix
> between continuation and presence of history knowledge and innovative
> newcomers. There is also the democratic element of geographical diversity..
> BTW, this is one point I miss in the CCWG discussion. How seriously CCWG
> members take arguments from participants from Africa, Latin America and
> Asia?
> >
> > I bring this facts not to undermine the proposed community power of
> spilling of the board. I was always behind this extra power for the
> community to enhance the inner democratic processes. In my eyes there is no
> need to create a new burocracy to achieve this aim. It can be done on the
> basis of the tested and workable model. Under the circumstances of the
> discussion we have today I have my doubt whether we can introduce the same
> high standard for representatives in a new legal entity in the short time
> we have (Sole Membership Model). We were fighting over many years to errect
> barriers aganist caputre in the board. And I am not ready to open now a
> backdoor for capture in a new entity which has not yet clear rules of
> procedure how voting and other important elements (including
> accountability) can be introduced in a way which does not undermine the
> functioning, stability, security and prosperity of ICANN. I am in favor of
> power sharing. But I am against power shifting.
> >
> > As you know I am leaving the board and I will repeat my arguments after
> Dublin as a member of the commmunity. I hope that we have more or less
> finished the discussion at the end of the Dublin Meeting. But there will be
> a lot of things that we have to do beyond Dublin.
> >
> > Wolfgang
> >
> >
> >
> > I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have
> made clear that I do not agree with that POV.
> >
> >
> >
> > However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel's 29
> > September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG's
> > Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would
> > place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and
> > stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global
> > stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to
> > act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions
> > based on what is best for ICANN, the ICANN community, and the global
> > public interest".  (Emphasis added)
> >
> >
> >
> > While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN
> and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any
> way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on
> anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it
> cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN
> community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite
> evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at
> significant variance from those of the community members comprising the
> CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public
> interest than the community from which it is drawn.
> >
> >
> >
> > Given that it is ICANN's outside Counsel that has raised this charge,
> which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your
> caution to "be careful" should be directed elsewhere.
> >
> >
> >
> > Finally, on the matter of the "global public interest", points #2 & 3 of
> the CCWG Charter states:
> >
> > 2.            If the Board believes it is not in the global public
> interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working
> Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG
> Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination
> that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG
> Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board.
> >
> > 3.            The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the
> initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method
> (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will
> occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and
> efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
> >
> >
> >
> > I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board's concerns
> regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief
> that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any
> statement that they did - much less a formal invoking of the dialogue
> process provide for in the Charter.
> >
> >
> >
> > If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it
> would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start
> the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and
> non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the
> global public interest in their memoranda.
> >
> >
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > Philip
> >
> >
> >
> > Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
> >
> > Virtualaw LLC
> >
> > 1155 F Street, NW
> >
> > Suite 1050
> >
> > Washington, DC 20004
> >
> > 202-559-8597/Direct
> >
> > 202-559-8750/Fax
> >
> > 202-255-6172/cell
> >
> >
> >
> > Twitter: @VlawDC
> >
> >
> >
> > "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang"
> > [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter at medienkomm.uni-halle.de]
> > Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM
> > To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya
> > Cc: CCWG Accountability
> > Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
> >
> >
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> >
> >
> >
> > this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is
> only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet
> community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in
> previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both
> for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader
> Internet world. Be careful!
> >
> >
> >
> > Wolfgang
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
> >
> > Von:
> > accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org<mailto:accountability
> > -cross-community-bounces at icann.org> im Auftrag von Phil Corwin
> >
> > Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15
> >
> > An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya
> >
> > Cc: CCWG Accountability
> >
> > Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
> >
> > I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is
> insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very
> low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of
> attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with
> greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online.
> >
> >
> >
> > However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity
> then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally
> non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board
> is equally disqualified from being the steward.
> >
> >
> >
> > Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
> >
> > Virtualaw LLC
> >
> > 1155 F Street, NW
> >
> > Suite 1050
> >
> > Washington, DC 20004
> >
> > 202-559-8597/Direct
> >
> > 202-559-8750/Fax
> >
> > 202-255-6172/cell
> >
> >
> >
> > Twitter: @VlawDC
> >
> >
> >
> > "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
> >
> >
> >
> > From:
> > accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org<mailto:accountability
> > -cross-community-bounces at icann.org>
> > [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of
> > Paul Rosenzweig
> >
> > Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM
> >
> > To: Guru Acharya
> >
> > Cc: CCWG Accountability
> >
> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Exactly.  The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational
> particularity..  Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different
> Board members in the next round of elections....
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> > Sent from myMail app for Android
> >
> > Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya
> <gurcharya at gmail..com<mailto:gurcharya at gmail.com<mailto:
> gurcharya at gmail.com%3cmailto:gurcharya at gmail.com>>>:
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > I strongly agree with Jordan.
> >
> >
> >
> > I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'.
> >
> >
> >
> > According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the
> steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become
> a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the
> steward of IANA and not ICANN the community.
> >
> >
> >
> > I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering
> uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same
> entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is
> untested and very very unsafe'.
> >
> >
> >
> > In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that
> >
> > 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN
> should be made the steward.
> >
> > 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN
> > should be made the steward
> >
> > 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is
> > very very safe
> >
> > 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model
> >
> >
> >
> > In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is
> > arguing that
> >
> > 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the
> > transition
> >
> > 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to
> > become the members of ICANN
> >
> > 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership
> organisation is very very unsafe.
> >
> > 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model
> >
> >
> >
> > I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am
> strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2.
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman at lrrlaw.com
> <//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman at lrrlaw.com<mailto:
> AAikman at lrrlaw.com%3c//
> e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman at lrrlaw.com>>> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > @ Jordan - well stated.   Postponing truly effective accountability
> measures developed using the Multistakeholder process  in favor of  "a
> review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a
> years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in
> and of themselves - very ineffective.
> >
> >
> >
> > Anne
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > [https://af.mail.my.com/cgi-bin/readmsg?id=14441065090000080418;0;0;1&
> > mode=attachment&bs=16497&bl=3767&ct=image%2fgif&cn=image001.gif&cte=ba
> > se64]
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > AAikman at lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman at lrrl
> > aw.com<mailto:AAikman at lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailt
> > o%3aAAikman at lrrlaw.com>> |
> > www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/<http://www.LRRLaw.com%3chttp:/ww
> > w.lrrlaw.com/>>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > From:
> > accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose
> > /?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces at icann.o
> > rg<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org%3c//e-aj.my
> > .com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbou
> > nces at icann..org>>
> > [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org<//e-aj.my.com
> > /compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces
> > @icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org%3c
> > //e-aj..my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommu
> > nity%2dbounces at icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter
> >
> > Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM
> >
> > To: Steve Crocker
> >
> > Cc: Accountability Cross Community
> >
> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Steve, all
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an
> important one.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have
> already been established by Board resolution.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the
> community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based
> around membership.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In
> effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal
> development process with its own definition of what the community requires,
> and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the
> multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim
> to uphold.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its
> decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of
> debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate
> -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that
> is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and
> requirements-based conversation.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach.
> The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups
> who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet
> policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone
> by "the people who matter".
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in
> Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge
> between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived
> at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension;
> few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of
> view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the
> conflicting perspectives and aims here.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I
> and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response
> indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself
> mystified.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Cheers
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Jordan
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker at icann.org<//
> e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker at icann.org<mailto:
> steve.crocker at icann.org%3c//
> e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker at icann..org>>> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > CCWG,
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the
> public comments received on its second draft report.  Following the Los
> Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on
> California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was
> in the second draft report.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model
> still apply to a Designator model.  The Designator model still introduces a
> new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure
> we have been using.  We understand that many believe it is possible to
> constrain these powers in order to provide established protections,
> accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require
> more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock
> multistakeholder balance.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full
> multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will
> join now or later.  Moreover, the same community accountability issues
> present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the
> Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key
> factors seems like a good path forward.  This can be enshrined in a new
> fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance
> structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the
> five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal
> if/when necessary.  Let's focus on finalizing the details on these
> consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Steve Crocker
> >
> >
> >
> > for the ICANN Board of Directors
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> >
> > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
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> > o%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity at icann.org>>
> >
> > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> >
> >
> > Jordan Carter
> >
> >
> >
> > Chief Executive
> >
> > InternetNZ
> >
> >
> >
> > +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
> >
> > Email:
> > jordan at internetnz.net.nz<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan
> > @internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz%3c//e-aj.my.com/com
> > pose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan at internetnz.net.nz>>
> >
> > Skype: jordancarter
> >
> >
> >
> > Web:
> > www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz%3c
> > http:/www.internetnz.nz>>
> >
> >
> >
> > A better world through a better Internet
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ________________________________
> >
> >
> >
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> >
> > _______________________________________________
> >
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