[CCWG-ACCT] A path to Dublin and beyond

Thu Oct 8 16:54:12 UTC 2015

Greg
Thanks for quick reply.
Not only you are a good communicator but a competent text redactor .
Your argument to power an appointing community to remove a Director who apparently does not meet the expectation of that community but in the view if the rest of the community she or he fully meets their expectation counterbalance what you describe.
If that single community who is not happy of that Board and could submit valid arguments for its claim it could convince the rest of community to agree with the removal.
Regards
Cheer
Kavouss        

Sent from my iPhone

> On 8 Oct 2015, at 18:43, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> I'll answer the question "why do we re-elect board members when there is apparently skepticism and mistrust of the Board's behavior and conduct by some colleagues?"  It's useful to look at this very question in the context of the power to remove a board member.
> 
> I think it's safe to assume that a Board member is re-elected (or re-appointed) because the body that appoints that director believes that the director is doing a good job.  (After all, "we" don't collectively select board members, other than (arguably) through the NomCom process.)  It's entirely possible other parts of the community could disagree (and even possible that all the other parts of the community could disagree).
> 
> Now assume that the rest of the community (other than the appointing body) strongly wants to remove that director.
> 
> If we give the community the power to remove individual board members, any part of the community can initiate the director removal process, and two possible scenarios emerge. If unanimity is required, the appointing group will be able to block the removal, and the board member stays on.  If we do not require unanimity, then it is highly likely that the community will be able to remove that director over the objections of the appointing body (leaving that body to find another appointee more acceptable to the other SO/ACs).
> 
> On the other hand, if we only give the appointing body the power to remove individual board members, then the answer is quite easy: the board member stays on.
> 
> Just for fun, let's try the opposite hypothetical: the appointing body really wants to remove the director, but the rest of the community thinks the director is doing a decent job (or even a great job).  If we give the community the power to remove the board member, the board member will stay on (until the end of their term, at which point the appointing body finally gets to take action and the director leaves the board).  On the other hand, if the appointing body can remove that director, then that director is highly likely to be removed now, rather than at the end of their term.
> 
> Thoughts?
> 
> Greg
> 
>> On Thu, Oct 8, 2015 at 12:19 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com> wrote:
>> Dear All,
>> There seems to be a high degree of skeptism to and mistrust  by some colleagues in the Board,s behaviour and conduct . However this   Is a judgement that may not be shared by others.
>> If we all are of the same view then we do not modify the election procedure and why we re-,elect those who are eligible to re- election
>> Regards
>> Kavousd    
>> 
>> Sent from my iPhone
>> 
>>> On 8 Oct 2015, at 18:08, Kieren McCarthy <kieren at kierenmccarthy.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Serious question: why would you imagine that the Board would do anything but block future governance changes given what it has done this time and in numerous previous accountability reviews?
>>> 
>>> And related to that: if the Board blocked it, what mechanism would exist to force the changes? Why would we not end up in the exact same possible as now but five years down the road?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Kieren
>>> 
>>>> On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 1:33 PM Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco at netchoice.org> wrote:
>>>> Here are my own thoughts on a path to Dublin and beyond. 
>>>> 
>>>> I was thinking about Jonathan Zuck’s suggestion (link) that a change to Membership model could be done in Work Stream 2 — if we create lasting leverage for community to enact a change despite board resistance. 
>>>> 
>>>> Then I read Bruce Tonkin's recent post (link) describing why our present AC/SO participation falls short of representing the global M-S community, and suggesting this is why the board might not approve a move to Membership at this time. 
>>>> 
>>>> Their posts, along with responses on list, suggest a way we can deliver by Dublin on enforceable accountability enhancements, thereby giving us powers to impose reforms to the AC/SO model after the IANA transition. 
>>>> 
>>>> Consider this:
>>>> 
>>>> Let’s use the leverage of the IANA transition to get bylaws changes give the current AC/SO community the powers we require, with adequate enforceability.   Plus, we ensure those powers are enough to force a future change to ICANN governance structure and/or Membership, if the community comes to consensus around what that new ICANN governance structure look like. 
>>>> 
>>>> That would mean we focus CCWG on finishing details and bylaws language for these enforceable powers exercised by supermajority of ACs and SOs:
>>>> 
>>>> 1. Power to block a proposed Operating Plan/Strat Plan/Budget
>>>> 2. Power to approve changes to Fundamental Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation
>>>> 3. Power to block changes to regular bylaws.
>>>> 4. Power to appoint and remove individual board directors
>>>> 5. Power to recall the entire board of directors
>>>> 6. Mechanism for binding IRP where a panel decision is enforceable in any court recognizing international arbitration results — even if ICANN’s board refused to participate in the binding arbitration.  (assuming CCWG lawyers verify this works without activating a Membership model)
>>>> 
>>>> I think we are close enough to get consensus around the above powers before we leave Dublin.   And based on what we’ve heard recently, the board will support the powers described above. 
>>>> 
>>>> But there’s one more we have to add before losing the leverage of this IANA transition:
>>>> 
>>>> Let’s put into ICANN bylaws a method where the community can show consensus to undertake a review of ICANN's governance structure, either because the powers above aren’t working, or just because the community overwhelmingly wants to review governance.   The goal of the Governance Review is to recommend a new governance model that might even include moving to Membership.  To Bruce’s point, any proposal emerging from this Governance Review would include assurances that ACs and SOs are representative of global internet users and protected from capture. 
>>>> 
>>>> This same bylaw could describe a process for board acceptance of a consensus proposal emerging from the Governance Review:  it would take 2/3 board majority to object to the proposal on the grounds that it is not in the global public interest, triggering a board-community consultation.  After consultation, a new community proposal would take 3/4 board majority to object.   If the board objected a second time, we would have the power to recall that entire board, or to pursue binding arbitration. 
>>>> 
>>>> Again, these are my personal thoughts about a way forward that is based on what others have said recently.   
>>>> 
>>>> —Steve DelBianco
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>  
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