[CCWG-ACCT] [icann-board] Where do we stand?

[Aikman-Scalese, Anne]

George.
Many thanks for the substantive dialogue started here.  In the interest of continuing dialogue with the Board as to these types of concerns, I would ask that you raise with the Board for a more formal (and hopefully written) Board response, the issues outlined in Mathieu’s e-mail to Chris Disspain of September 22, which is attached hereto.   (I am unaware of a formal Board response to these questions posed September 22.)   The content is pasted below for easy reference:

Chris,

Sorry for chiming in but I believe the point below deserves our full attention. It is indeed apparent in some contributions that the key concern about the single member model lies in a (at least perceived) lack of accountability of the SO and ACs.

The CCWG report was recommending to add SO/AC accountability to the list of topics reviewed on a regular basis under the Board's supervision. And work further in WS2. This did not seem to properly address the concerns.

Did the Board spend time considering what enhancements to SO/AC accountability systems would bring these bodies to a level of accountability which would be felt appropriate ? Or what the current (perceived, at least) accountability issues were ?

It would immensely valuable to our group if you or other Board members (or other stakeholders who shared that view) could provide additional details on this, because I believe this is absolutely central in the discussion regarding the single member model, but may not have been totally, explicitly stated so far.

Best,

Mathieu

From: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Erika Mann
Sent: Tuesday, October 13, 2015 10:57 AM
To: Ray Plzak
Cc: Icann-board ICANN; CCWG Accountability
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [icann-board] Where do we stand?

Very quick reply, point 6 I recommended twice and we debated various options how this could be done. I still think this is a good idea George. And I agree with Ray (see his comments below).
Erika

Sent from my iPhone

On 13 Oct 2015, at 19:38, Ray Plzak <plzakr at gmail.com<mailto:plzakr at gmail.com>> wrote:
George,

Regarding your assertion “CANN does have responsibility for more than just being a secretariat for the ACs and the SOs…”. I agree and think that it should be taken one further. ICANN should not be the secretariat for any SO or AC. There should be a distinct secretariat for the GNSO; which should also have its own executive board. It is in this particular area where most of the accountability issues have arisen. The ASO does not receive any secretariat services from ICANN, it takes care of its own. The ccNSO should also have its own secretariat and executive board. As for the ACs there should be a separate secretariat that provides support for all of them except the GAC which has its own secretariat. This singular secretariat for the ACs should have some sort of executive board composed of members selected by the ACs that use the service. This separation of secretariat function would then allow ICANN and its board to focus on areas of general concern for all of the SOs and ACs such as the global public interest. I realize these suggestions would require structural changes both in the corporate organization and in the affected SOs and ACs. Of course there would have to be a discussion of revenue generation and distribution.  This separation would enhance accountability as it would move decisions that are currently made by the ICANN board and staff to a point closer to SO and AC scrutiny and control.

Just food for thought,

Ray

From: icann-board-bounces at icann.org<mailto:icann-board-bounces at icann.org> [mailto:icann-board-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of George Sadowsky
Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 3:33 AM
To: CCWG Accountability; Icann-board ICANN
Subject: [icann-board] Where do we stand?

All,

Where indeed? I'd like to contribute some thoughts, with a view toward helping the process toward closure, if possible.

My goal is to try to find a way through the issues that appear to separate us, and to look for areas in which agreement might be able to be reached, and reasonably soon.  By "us" in the previous sentence, I mean all of the people who have been involved in the CCWG deliberations in any way whatsoever, including Board members in their individual capacity.

This is not an "us" versus "them" discussion; there are a lot of different opinions among this larger group of involved people, not to mention the larger ICANN community that has been rather silent but nevertheless observing.

This entire message represents only my own personal opinions and concerns.

I would like to make a contribution into resolving the apparent stumbling blocks that impede our progress on the accountability issue.  This is the purpose of this message.

I've now followed and occasionally contributed to this discussion for over two months.  It has been difficult following the various discussions on the list because of the multiple issues that are threaded and intermingled.  The descent of the discussion into opposing and apparently irreconcilable legal views has not assisted my understanding much and, perhaps naïvely, I had hoped for a clearer set of answers that would provide resolution on certain aspect.

With respect to clarity of legal opinions and options, I understand that sometimes what is allowed is based on precedent, and where there is no precedent, it may be impossible to say with certainty what is allowed and what is not.  Given the level of uncertainty that this introduces, I'd settle for 'relative certainty' if appropriately qualified.

I'd like to provide two lists: (1) those things that guide my own thinking regarding acceptable solutions, and (2) questions that I wish could be answered with short, definitive and useful responses and that might contribute to some convergence in thinking.

In my view, her are some of the issues that concern me in my attempt to think through the issues that we have been discussing:

1. ICANN does have responsibility for more than just being a secretariat for the ACs and the SOs, i.e. what I think of as the inner ICANN community.  I put this in the category of the global public interest.  It doesn't dominate our responsibilities, and in general it may only be a sliver of what we think about, but it exists.  The ACs and the SOs may also reflect and respond to their notion of the public interest, but they are by their nature sectoral, and I don't expect them to be totally neutral in their thoughts or actions.  They represent their constituencies.  Perhaps in theory, the varied stakeholders cover the complete spectrum of interests and balance each other out, but there is no guarantee of this.

The overriding responsibility for balance and interpretation for that sliver, even if it just a very very small part of what comes up at ICANN, is the Board's role and responsibility.  Any changes in structure that have the possibility of the ICANN inner community totally capturing the Board are therefore not acceptable.

2. I understand and accept that there needs to be an equilibration of power and authority in any change in ICANN's structure.  However, the change should result in a balance, and not in a reversal of what people believe is the current situation, i.e.that the Board has all of the power and the community has no recourse.   Such a reversal would be equally bad.

This is what causes me to discount any model that can lead to capture.  The statutory powers of the member or designator appear to be powerful, and even if some are severely limited, I worry that these limitations can be overcome, and the Board will be disenfranchised.  This amounts to capture.  I know that there is disagreement about the nature an extent of such statutory powers and the extent to which they can be limited, temporarily or permanently and, among other things, this uncertainty translates for me into the possibility of capture.

3. Replacement of the entire Board, if it occurs, is a very serious event,  It will have significant repercussions not only within ICANN but internationally with respect to competing venues for so-called Internet governance.  For this reason, we need both a very high bar to it occurring, and we need to ensure that there are very good reasons for the action to be taken.

For example, if every AC ad SO in the inner community decided that the Board should be replaced, that would be a signal that something was seriously wrong, and the Board should be replaced.  However,if there were any significant part of the inner community that disagreed with replacing the Board, then initiating the action to replace would be seen as a dispute between parts of that community, taking the Board as hostage and employing a Draconian procedure to force a majority opinion on a minority of the community.   If this happens, it will turn ICANN into a battleground, and we won't have to worry about being taken seriously; we won't.  The bar should be high enough so that if this action is taken, fit should be quite clear that no significant part of the community is against it.

4. I agree with the implication of Cherine's argument that removal of any director should be based upon a public rationale, an appropriate due process, and should be the result of broader community action, rather than that of a single AC or SO.  The counter argument that I've heard is that other not-for-profit organizations can replace their directors if they want, so why can't we?

My response is that ICANN is not an ordinary not-forprofit.  On the contrary, the totality of our membership consists of stakeholder groups with different and often competing goals, and under the currently proposed plan the manipulation of Board representation therefore can reflect attempts at control through the Board.  Such a change of behavior would contradict current bylaws in ways that have been articulated by Cherine and others.  Most other not-for-profits are considerably more homogeneous and have shared goals, and the Board is generally not an arbiter of long run competing sectoral goals.

5. The models that we have been talking about are legal constructs, and we will need to respect their existence as frameworks for governance.  But we need to remember that are the means to the ends that we want to achieve.  I would rather prefer to define the goals precisely  --  both the powers given to the actors as well as the constraints on their activities, and then see which model fits best.

To do that, we need to understand well the differences between what the models offer, but first we need to agree upon the goals in terms of scope of authority, power and constraints.  Sometimes it seems we mix them up in ways that obscure and even retard progress. progress.

6. I watch in horror the multi-million dollar duel of lawyers that has been going on for some time and appears to have no end.  Why is it not possible to give them free rein to discuss the issue more dispassionately and come up with common positions with the possibility of deviations?  I fear that a need to win may be transforming this part of our discussion into a lose-lose scenario.  If so, the lawyers will still get rich, but ICANN, the community, and the whole world will lose.  Can't we lock them in a room and not let them out until we see the white smoke coming from the chimney?  (:-)



In order to assist in resolving our current difficulties, here are some issues that I believe are pertinent.  I raise them in the form of questions., for I believe that there is not a common precise understanding of them.  Is it possible to provide simple and direct answers to them that might be useful for establishing greater understanding of the differences that still exist and beginning to bridge them?  That would be helpful.

A.  It appears that the single designator model is very much the same as the single member mode, but with the only statutory power being to select or remove directors.   In general, is this correct?  In brief, what are the other differences?

 To establish any new structure the community still needs to address a range of open topics to ensure ICANN’s stability and freedom from capture:

  *   •   which SO and AC will participate in the decision-making mechanism (which SOs and ACs will opt-in)?  For dismissal of the entire Board, why should it not require active assent of all ACs and SOs?
  *   •   what will be the Decision basis among participating SOs and ACs by _____ % of all SOs and ACs??
  *   •   how will advice from those SOs and ACs opting-out of the decision-making mechanism (similar to GAC/Board advice?) be taken into consideration?
  *   •   how will  will  conflicts of interest and fiduciary or other responsibilities (such as public interest) will be factored into overall decision-making ?

B. In Buenos Aires, there was discussion and convergence (I thought) on an "empowered AC/SO" model.  Does this model offer any initial point for movement to convergence of opinion?

C. The Board proposal calls for each AC/SO to decide if they are for or against and issue instead of possibly dividing its "vote". Is this a show-stopper?

D. The Board proposal allows any AC/SO to weigh in on a particular issue (and decide to exercise or oppose the use of one of the powers. The CCWG proposal requires and AC/SO to decide ahead of time whether it will participate in future uses of the powers. Is this a show-stopper?

E. What would the community take as evidence in the short term that the Board is acting in good faith?  I'm concerned by what appears to be Board bashing on the list, wherein many things that any of us say or do are interpreted negatively and perhaps conspiratorially.  I realize that the great majority of people involved int he CCSG process do not have such attitudes, but predictably it only takes a very few individuals to sour and confuse a discussion and lessen its utility.

I'm sure that these questions reflect my limited and imperfect understanding of the situation, and perhaps some naïveté also, but there aren't many other ways to gain a productive understanding of it.


Comments welcome.

George



_______________________________________________
icann-board mailing list
icann-board at icann.org<mailto:icann-board at icann.org>
https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/icann-board

________________________________

This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. If the reader of this message or an attachment is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message or attachment to the intended recipient you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the sender. The information transmitted in this message and any attachments may be privileged, is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the intended recipients, and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510-2521.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/attachments/20151013/c836b1e3/attachment.html>
-------------- next part --------------
An embedded message was scrubbed...
From: Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill at afnic.fr>
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] MEM and enforceability
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 13:40:51 +0000
Size: 10070
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/attachments/20151013/c836b1e3/ReCCWG-ACCTMEMandenforceability.mht>