[CCWG-ACCT] Summary words from engagement meeting

[Jordan Carter]

Thanks Desiree - copying to list for the record and to share your thoughts.
J

On 17 October 2015 at 12:19, Desiree Miloshevic <dmiloshevic at afilias.info>
wrote:

> Jordan
>
> Myself, like Malcolm has said, have come out of our Enforcement model
> breakout session thinking that in the end there is not a huge advantage of
> the Sole Membership model
> over the Single Designator Model.
>
> However, we should explore other opportunities. For example we have not
> discussed enough the indirect Enforcement - the spill of the board
> as that may end up being a faster and more efficient way than court
> proceedings, that would, in the end, keep deciding if something is
> a fiduciary duty or not regardless of potentially reserved membership
> statutory powers and regardless of what the board suggests.
>
> Desiree
> --
>
> On 17 Oct 2015, at 12:00, Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
>
> Here are my notes as outlined at the meeting, for the record:
>
> 1. We focused on IRP, because PTI would end up in an IRP.
>
>
> 2. IRP enforcement process is the same regardless of the model. If after
> arbitration award is granted, losing party objects, prevailing party must
> go to court for enforcement of arbitration award
>
>
> 3. In both models there is a legal person - the sole designator or member
> - that can be party to IRP if required.
>
>
> 4. In either model, fiduciary duties are important and have the effect of
> limiting the scope of what can be arbitrated in an IRP setting.
>
>
> 5.  In the member model the board is limited in asserting that its action
> was protected as a fiduciary business judgment as to community powers
> reserved to the sole member. (That is, the scope of issues properly subject
> to arbitration is therefore broader in member model.)
>
>
> 6. Preferences were split among those present between the two models.
>
>
> 7. My personal preference on this dimension angles slightly towards the
> member model, because it provides for stronger enforceability of the
> community powers through the IRP or generally - that is, as said, it does
> that by removing the possibility of ICANN arguing that enforcement of those
> powers conflicts with fiduciary duties and so cannot be arbitrated.
>
> --
> Jordan Carter
>
> Chief Executive
> *InternetNZ*
>
> +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
> Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
> Skype: jordancarter
> Web: www.internetnz.nz
>
> *A better world through a better Internet *
>
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>
>


-- 
Jordan Carter

Chief Executive
*InternetNZ*

+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz

*A better world through a better Internet *
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