[CCWG-ACCT] ALAC Statement on proposed accountability models

Guru Acharya gurcharya at gmail.com
Sun Oct 18 16:39:57 UTC 2015


Seun,

What you call the "reality" of the transition is actually the chilling
effect that forces the community to err on the side of caution. You may
feel ALAC deserves accolades for projecting the wishes of the Board and
NTIA in the form of guesses about what they may accept or reject. On the
other hand, for me, this reality demonstrates a significant failure of the
multistakeholder process. It undermines the integrity of the entire process
if our ultimate objective is to merely project the desires of the Board and
NTIA.

Guru



On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 9:23 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com>
wrote:

> On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 4:23 PM, Guru Acharya <gurcharya at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>  In the CWG-Stewardship, he similarly fear mongered that the transition
>> will fail because NTIA would reject the Contract Co model. That time too
>> everybody else blinked.
>>
>
> Interesting you think the proposal that came out of CWG-Stewardship was as
> a result of formal intervention from Alan (ALAC), well if thats is at all
> valid, I guess maybe ALAC deserves accolades then. ;-). We may want to face
> reality or just continue in fantasy as we all got to that stage within the
> CWG where it was realistically agreed upon that Contract-Co was at best
> close to fantasy and then we worked to develop a compromise solution which
> by the way was not entirely the preferred solution of ALAC.
>
>
>>
>> I really hope the community doesn't blink this time.
>>
>
> Hopefully we will learn from CWG and maximize the CCWG time as much as
> possible going forward.
>
> Regards
>
>>
>> On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 8:11 PM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
>> > wrote:
>>
>>> Correct, the CCWG proposal is not dependant on a supermajorty of the
>>> Board supporting it, or in fact any Board support, since it is not one of
>>> the CCWG's chartering organizations.
>>>
>>> But that is not what I said. At the point when our recommended changes
>>> are to be implemented, the current Bylaws must be amended. Under the
>>> current Bylaws, the "Bylaws of ICANN may be altered, amended, or repealed
>>> and new Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws adopted only upon action by a
>>> two-thirds (2/3) vote of all members of the Board".
>>>
>>> Under their fiduciary duty, each Board member may only vote to adopt new
>>> Bylaws if he/she believes it is in the interest of ICANN and its mission
>>> and core values to do so. It was THAT action that I was referring to.
>>>
>>> Alan
>>>
>>>
>>> At 18/10/2015 09:53 AM, Chartier, Mike S wrote:
>>>
>>>> The CCWG proposal is not dependent on support "by a supermajority of
>>>> Board directors".
>>>> The requirement is that there is not a determination that it is not in
>>>> the global public interest by a 2/3 majority of the Board.
>>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [mailto:
>>>> accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Alan
>>>> Greenberg
>>>> Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2015 9:42 AM
>>>> To: CCWG Accountability
>>>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] ALAC Statement on proposed accountability models
>>>>
>>>> In its formal response to the CCWG-Accountability proposal issued in
>>>> August 2015, the ALAC said that it could support the model being proposed,
>>>> but preferred something far less complex and lighter-weight, and that we
>>>> saw no need for the level of enforceability that the proposal provided.
>>>> Moreover, the ALAC had specific concerns with the budget veto and the
>>>> apparent lack of participation of perhaps a majority of AC/SOs.
>>>>
>>>> In light of the reconsideration of a designator model by the CCWG,
>>>> along with the recommendations of the Saturday morning break-out sessions,
>>>> the ALAC felt that a revised statement was in order.
>>>> Accordingly we decided, by a unanimous vote of the 14 ALAC members
>>>> present (with 1 not present), to withdraw support for the Membership model.
>>>>
>>>> I want to make it clear that this is not a "red line" decision.
>>>> Should a Membership model become one that is generally advocated by the
>>>> CCWG, and supported by a supermajority of Board directors (who ultimately
>>>> MUST support any changes that they will be called upon to approve, else
>>>> they would be in violation of their fiduciary duty), then the ALAC reserves
>>>> its right to support such a model.
>>>>
>>>> Alan Greenberg
>>>> Chair, At-Large Advisory Committee
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>
>>
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>>
>
>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
>
>
> *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb:
> http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt
> email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng
> <seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng>*
>
> Bringing another down does not take you up - think about your action!
>
>
>
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