[CCWG-ACCT] proposed language for Mission statement on contract enforcement

[Eric Brunner-Williams]

Becky,

"shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers" 
-- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the 
corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the 
regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that 
actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... well 
... to court risk of repetition.

Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive 
service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next 
withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative nameserver for 
Egypt running after its data expires?

Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises delegated 
rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, does 
that authority revert to the delegating agency?

If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and 
authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of delegated 
name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and vastly 
narrower, than "services that use ..."

Eric

On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote:
>
> In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two 
> brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the 
> Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use the 
> Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry 
> or provide.  The following language (in blue) is proposed to address 
> this concern:
>
> ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as 
> reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way 
> limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate 
> services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content 
> that such services carry or provide.  In service of its Mission, ICANN 
> shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, 
> subject to established means of community input on those agreements 
> and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose 
> obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars.
>
> What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and balance 
>  (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, etc.) is 
> a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to 
> sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to 
> challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the 
> grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s 
> Mission.   This mechanism will need to be developed.
>
>
>
>
> J. Beckwith Burr
> Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer
>
>
>
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> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
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