[CCWG-ACCT] Chris's summary of current thinking

Jordan Carter jordan at internetnz.net.nz
Wed Sep 2 22:47:12 UTC 2015


Thank you Bruce for sharing this.

Can someone advise if my bold interspersed summary comments (comparing this
material with the CCWG's proposal) are accurate?

On 3 September 2015 at 10:35, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin at melbourneit.com.au>
wrote:

> Hello All,
>
> Below are some notes relating to Chris's summary that reflects a DRAFT of
> current thinking.
>
> We will refine these and post the final points into the public comment
> forum, once we get feedback during this call.
>
> Regards,
> Bruce Tonkin
>
>
> CCWG-Accountability Proposal Delivery Framework
>
> 1.      Develop Fundamental Bylaws and Process for Modification
>
> a.      Bylaws areas:
>
>         i.      ICANN's Mission and Core Values.
>
>         ii.     Reviews imported from the Affirmation of Commitments,
> including modifications with community consensus.
>
>         iii.    The requirements for having community input and
> consultation on development of ICANN Budget, Strategic Plans, Operating
> Plans and Standard Bylaws.  This includes the IANA Functions Budget as well.
>
>         iv.     Commitment to fund IANA Functions housed within ICANN.
>
>         v.      IANA Functions Reviews called for within the CWG Report,
> with commitment to implement recommendations from those reviews.
>
>
*AN ABBREVIATED (SHORTER) SET OF FUNDAMENTAL BYLAWS*


>
> b.      Change process - When Board proposes changes to Fundamental Bylaws
> (including amendments, additions or deletions):
>
> i.      Incorporate into the Bylaws a requirement for community comment
> and input.
>
> ii.     Empower the community to support such a change through a
> demonstration of consensus in the community.  Consensus in this situation
> is demonstrated through meeting the specified threshold of numbers of SOs
> or ACs needed to support the proposed change.
>
> iii.    Once there is community consensus to support the change, the
> change is effective upon 3/4 of the Board voting in favour of the change.
>
>
*NO CO-DECISION ON CHANGES TO FUNDAMENTAL BYLAWS - REMAINS BOARD DECISION
FOLLOWING INFORMAL COMMUNITY CONSENSUS PROCESS*


>
> 2.      IRP Enhancements
>
> a.      Roll back modification of standard of review that was in place
> before 2013.
>
> b.      Commitment that revised standard of review, standing panel and
> procedural improvements will be part of next phase of work on IRP
> enhancements.
>
>
*[NOT MY AREA]*


>
> 3.      Expand Reconsideration Process and Define Clear Escalation Path
> For Accountability
>
> a.      Expand scope of reconsideration process to define as an initial
> step in seeking challenge against Board or staff action. Expansion could
> include:
>
> i.      Allowance of Reconsideration Process to be used in allegations
> that the Board acted in violation of the Articles of Incorporation or
> Bylaws.
>
> ii.     Increase from current process-driven bases to areas of more
> substantive concern, such as unfairness of a decision or inconsistency of
> logic.
>
> b.      Following Reconsideration Process, use IRP and build escalation
> through accountability mechanisms, resulting in development of full appeals
> process.
>
>
*[NOT MY AREA]*


>
>
> 4.      Establish new Multistakeholder Enforcement Mechanism (MEM):
>
> ===============================================================
>
> a.      Process for community to bring challenges against Board action
> that is alleged to be inconsistent with specified fundamental Bylaws.
>
> b.      Binding arbitration process that is enforceable in California
> Courts
>
> c.      ICANN funds MEM arbitrations.
>
> d.      The MEM shall not be available for challenges based upon the
> adoption of ICANN's annual budget or annual operating plan.
>
>
>
*ABOLISH COMMUNITY MECHANISM AS SINGLE MEMBER AND RELY ON AN ARBITRATION
PROCESS*


>
> 5.      Community Involvement in Development of Standard Bylaws Changes,
> Budgets, Operating Plans and Strategic Plans
>
> a.      Incorporate into the Bylaws a requirement for community comment
> and input on each of these areas.
>
> b.      Empower the community to raise timely consensus-based issues or
> concerns on a proposed Board action ("Community Concerns").  Consensus in
> this situation is demonstrated through meeting the specified threshold of
> numbers of SOs or ACs needed to support the raising of an issue or concern.
>
> c.      ICANN commits to working with the community to resolve areas of
> Community Concerns, through a consultation process.
>
> d.      Provide a consultation process (borrowing from the GAC/Board
> consultation requirement), if the Board intends to take action that is
> inconsistent with the Community Concerns, to work to resolve the
> inconsistencies where possible, or if not possible, then a 2/3 Board
> threshold needed for Board to act against the general Community Concerns.
>
>
*ABOLITION OF COMMUNITY BUDGET / PLAN VETO POWER*


> 6.      Board Removal/Recall
> ===========================
>
> a.      Institute pre-service letters to require the resignation of each
> director upon the occurrence of specific events:
>
>         i.      Serious violation of governance standard, including
> statutory causes for removal (such as fraud).
>
>         ii.     Refusal to abide by the processes set forth to enable new
> community empowerment areas.
>
>         iii.    Failure to abide by outcome of Multistakeholder
> Enforcement Mechanism (defined in #5 below).
>
>
> b.      Process for invoking the resignation requirement. Any removal of a
> director is a very serious action, which must include a special community
> rationale and justification for removal of any individual directors and a
> special process for removals that would impact a significant number of
> voting directors.  The process should allow for Board members to have an
> opportunity to defend against allegations that could support removal, and
> also include the potential for the imposition of sanctions less severe than
> removal.
>
>
*UNCLEAR - MAY PROPOSE REMOVAL OF COMMUNITY POWER TO RECALL DIRECTORS OR
BOARD. *

*PROPOSES LIMITED GROUNDS (NOT VALID IN A MEMBERSHIP-BASED MODEL).*

*[CCWG PROPOSAL DOES GIVE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND ALLEGATIONS.]*


> 7.      Incorporate Affirmation of Commitments Reviews into Bylaws
>
> a.      Consider proper edits to WHOIS review.
>
> b.      Commitment to work with community on guidelines for reviews:
>
>         i.      Review team size and composition.
>
>         ii.     Budget.
>
>         iii.    Access to experts.
>
>         iv.     Access to ICANN documentation.
>
>         v.      Expectations on process for adoption and implementation of
> reviews.
>
>         vi.     Optimization and standardization of review team processes.
>
>
*UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS SEEKS TO REWRITE CCWG PROPOSAL (ASIDE FROM KNOWN
WHOIS ITEM) OR SOMETHING ELSE. *


>
> 8.      Implement All ICG Contingencies
>
> a.      Confirm CSC is included in enhancements.
>
> b.      Work with ccNSO and GNSO to confirm ability to address
> performance-related issues is appropriately documented.
>

*PREVIOUS POINTS RENDER ICG CONTINGENCIES UNMET (IN THIS AUTHOR'S OPINION)*


>
> 9.      Institutionalize in Bylaws the current practice of Board/GAC
> consultation requirement used only over consensus advice
>
>
*SUPPORTS CCWG PROPOSAL?*


>
> 10.     Identify and commit to a process for defining continuous
> improvement work how the Board will consider those recommendations
>
> a.      Bylaws requirement that continuous improvement ideas must be
> supported by a high threshold of the community and to uphold the following
> criteria consistent with the lines of the NTIA Criteria, which are:
>
>         i.      Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;
>
>         ii.     Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the
> Internet DNS;
>
>         iii.    Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and
> partners of the IANA services;
>
>         iv.     Maintain the openness of the Internet; and
>
>         v.      Not result in ICANN becoming a government-led or an
> inter-governmental organization.
>
> b.      Utilize existing mechanisms as home for some of the other
> identified areas of continuous improvement, including ATRT3.
>

*MAY BE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF WS1.*

thanks
Jordan


>
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-- 
Jordan Carter

Chief Executive
*InternetNZ*

+64-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz

*A better world through a better Internet *
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