[CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile
James M. Bladel
jbladel at godaddy.com
Tue Sep 8 17:31:37 UTC 2015
Disagree, Nigel. It¹s not about the past, but rather an effort to
future-proof the organization against individuals & groups we haven¹t
event met yet.
Thanks‹
J.
On 9/8/15, 11:59 , "accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org on
behalf of Nigel Roberts" <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
on behalf of nigel at channelisles.net> wrote:
>Roelof
>
>You are a smart guy. You are open and ready to trust. These are
>admirable qualities.
>
>But ICANN, as a collective entity, to those of us who were there at its
>beginnings needs to continually prove it is worthy of trust.
>
>Because back then, it wasn't.
>
>And some of us remember.
>
>
>
>On 08/09/15 17:53, Roelof Meijer wrote:
>> All,
>>
>> Below I pasted some quotes from this thread. And I cannot but wonder.
>> What are we getting so wound up about? Did we really expected a ³yes,
>> perfect, let¹s implement this straight away²?
>> But what makes me wonder most is why, for heaven¹s sake, do we see the
>> board as a unity of ill-doers?
>>
>> The board members that have participated in our work are individuals
>> that I hold in high esteem. Quite a few of them tutored me when I
>> entered this miraculous world of ICANN quite a few years ago.
>> They gave me different angles and insights, pointed out different
>> possible views and were open to discussion, disagreement and new ideas.
>> And were tirelessly working to improve the way we work for the benefit
>> of the global internet community. And most of them did not change a bit
>> after they decided to help us all forward even more, make a personal
>> sacrifice and join ICANN's board.
>>
>> In my opinion, there¹s no collective single opinion in any wrong
>> direction in this board. There is however, a collective intellect and a
>> level of individual integrity and selfishness that one does not easily
>> find in executive structures. They deserve our respect. Which, no, does
>> not mean that we cannot have different opinions.
>>
>> When Steve Crocker writes:
>>
>> /"We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability
>> contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse
>> the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we
>> believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the
>> proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the
>> proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA
>> requirements.²/
>>
>> he in my opinion sends a very clear message that we should happily
>> receive, as he commits the board. Let¹s await the promised details of
>> their ideas and keep engaged.
>> Why should we want to send messages like the following, what do we hope
>> to achieve? Frustrate the process to a halt?
>> Read the quotes below, and note the interpretations of what was read or
>> heard: as in ³while you say, Š. I seeŠ², ³when you say, Š you mean.."
>>
>> /"While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I
>> //see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the
>> //keystone of the CCWG proposal."/
>>
>> //
>>
>> /"I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all
>> the //bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check"/
>>
>> //
>>
>> /"It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure does
>> not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than for
>> those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a
>> very natural human reaction."/
>>
>> //
>>
>> /"for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the
>> priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the
>> board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and
>> out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last" /
>>
>> //
>>
>> /"When you say you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you have
>> not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice."/
>>
>> //
>>
>> /"And I, for one, do not want the transition //badly enough that I would
>> capitulate to the Board's effort to completely //distort the proposed
>> process."/
>>
>> //
>>
>> /"I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is
>> precisely //why it must."/
>>
>> //
>>
>> /"The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just
>> //operationalization is impressive."/
>>
>> //
>>
>> /"not surrender and let the Board have complete control //without any
>> possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again"/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Let¹s all sit back a bit and reflect. On ourselvesŠ
>>
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Roelof Meijer
>>
>> SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE
>> NETHERLANDS
>> T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05
>> roelof.meijer at sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer at sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl
>> <http://www.sidn.nl/>
>>
>>
>> On 07-09-15 20:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of
>> Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of
>> avri at acm.org <mailto:avri at acm.org>> wrote:
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the Board
>>and I
>> trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the
>>best
>> you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior
>>motive of
>> personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my
>>trust
>> of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a
>> Board member would ever take a position just because it would help
>>him
>> get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board
>>member
>> would change her position due to a concern with being removed from
>>the
>> Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign
>>from the
>> Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and
>>the
>> Internet.
>>
>> My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective from
>>the
>> Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes
>>to
>> become empowered, at leas to a degree.
>>
>> While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue,
>>I
>> see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the
>> keystone of the CCWG proposal.
>>
>> I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the
>>all the
>> bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I
>>think
>> this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to
>>the
>> current impasse.
>>
>> Some inset comments below.
>>
>> On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:
>>
>> Hi Avri,
>>
>> it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas
>> where we work together we have consensus or rough
>> consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of
>> disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself
>> whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?
>>
>> What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have
>> an agreement:
>> €Community empowerment (Agreeement)
>>
>>
>> I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal. Maybe
>>it is
>> a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a
>>lower
>> extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by
>>other,
>> you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on
>>some
>> fundamental issues the community requires decision making
>>empowerment.
>> The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in
>>any
>> straightforward definition of the term..
>>
>> €Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications)
>>
>>
>> Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture
>>on
>> the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do you
>> fear us so?
>>
>> €Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement)
>>
>>
>> Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a
>>direct
>> say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation.
>> Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the
>> requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals.
>>
>>
>> €Operational Plan (Agreement)
>> €Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions)
>>
>>
>> How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting
>>was
>> that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually
>>based on
>> fundamental disagreements.
>>
>> €Enforceability (Agreement)
>>
>>
>> I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume
>>that
>> we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing
>>could
>> be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make
>>going to
>> court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not
>>be
>> necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG
>>plan
>> balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of
>>the
>> Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new
>>participant
>> in the checks and balances.
>>
>> €IRP (Agreement)
>>
>>
>> Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called
>>agreement.
>>
>> €Ombudsman (Agreement)
>>
>> We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model.
>>
>>
>> Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other
>> parts of the solution would work.
>>
>> For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further
>> intensification of the dialogue within the community including
>> CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from
>> different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal
>> advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the
>> decision.
>>
>>
>> The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here was
>>that
>> ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community
>>been
>> making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG
>>process.
>> Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have
>> submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the
>> implementation phase.
>>
>>
>> This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a
>> complicated transition in the final stage there are some
>> remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to
>> go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is
>> good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its
>> members and to the input from the broader community. The whole
>> process is a very encouraging example which shows how the
>> multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an
>> important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New
>> York.
>>
>>
>> If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I
>>would be
>> able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM
>>and
>> the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To
>>me,
>> this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a
>>century*
>> or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of
>> Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that.
>>
>> (*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little
>> better)
>>
>>
>> The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is
>> simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the
>> checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and
>> the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my
>> eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a
>> number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects.
>>
>>
>> Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that
>> compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight. An
>> organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger
>> notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a
>>good
>> start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations
>>sometimes
>> get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that
>>made
>> the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by
>> ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2
>> recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the
>>rainbow. As
>> people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2
>> recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting."
>>
>> You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested
>>is the
>> current model without any changes. And we have seen that this is a
>> model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending
>>exuberance of
>> the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate
>>oversight
>> somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become free
>>from
>> government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the
>>community,
>> one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need the
>>SMCM
>> in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a
>> transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a
>>transition
>> to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has
>> accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is
>>something
>> that the CWG proposal requires.
>>
>> I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save
>> enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why
>> Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed
>> mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in
>> an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the
>> well designed balance between governments and the
>> non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there
>> are other detailed questions.
>>
>>
>> In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal
>> footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want
>>its
>> structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in
>>the
>> ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major
>>opportunity
>> for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for
>> action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate
>> capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less
>>chance
>> there will be for capture and other shenanigans.
>>
>>
>> The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too
>> vague, too unbalanced, too confusing.
>>
>>
>> I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined scope
>>and
>> functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the
>> modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an
>>implementation
>> detail.
>>
>> It is not yet ready for adoption.
>>
>>
>> We disagree on this.
>>
>> It needs a lot of more work.
>>
>>
>> We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That fact
>>of an
>> SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to
>> claim, but its implementation modalities may be.
>>
>> There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was
>> presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and
>> minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership
>> Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus
>> than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far
>> away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against
>> capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and
>> security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful
>> analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this
>> in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.
>>
>>
>> I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the
>>weaknesses
>> of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will
>>help
>> us with that.
>>
>>
>> My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole
>> membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the
>> details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is
>> obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now
>> within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a
>> long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now
>> they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is
>> unstoppable.
>>
>>
>> Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in
>>this
>> system construction. Removing it requires going back to the
>>beginning
>> as it holds everything together.
>>
>> As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the
>> community model has been implemented. As long as the Board remains
>> unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed
>>at
>> ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board
>> actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in
>>it is
>> redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress
>> mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress
>> mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR, IRP,
>> ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this
>>proposal. I
>> have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine
>> improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board
>> configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN.
>>
>>
>> My impression is that the majority in the community sees this
>> indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will
>> not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the
>> IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we
>> will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its
>> various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a
>> changing environment. I did call this ³WS 3² and ³ICANN 2020².
>> And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.
>>
>>
>> Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed.
>>but
>> we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time,
>>and
>> leave the future to necessary tweaking.
>>
>> I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of
>> taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for
>> thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and
>>then to
>> WS3...
>>
>>
>> More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in
>> San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like
>> stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And
>> what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling
>> step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do
>> now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow
>> the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the
>> end of the story. It will go on.
>>
>>
>> I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too much
>> stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the
>>best
>> example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is
>>preferable,
>> but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond
>>the
>> stumbling phase.
>>
>> As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been
>> patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.'
>>For
>> others it is much longer.
>>
>> But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait for
>> transition until we are ready.
>>
>>
>> And here is a final observation. To put it like Greg as a
>> conflict as ³Board on Top² vs. ³Community on Top² is misleading.
>> Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are
>> selected by the community. Both are accountable to the
>> community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all
>> are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a
>> better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with
>> more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.
>>
>>
>> The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is
>>real
>> mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the
>>community
>> does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of
>>the
>> community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed
>>by the
>> Board for the community. I think many of your comments are colored
>>by a
>> pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to
>>capture
>> and game.
>>
>> Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new
>> perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the
>>Board
>> another part of the community while not representing the community.
>> For
>> a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to
>> give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the
>> community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can
>>check
>> and balance the Board's unilateral power.
>>
>> The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as
>>the
>> best solution for replacing NTIA oversight.
>>
>> avri
>>
>>
>> Wolfgang
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>> Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> im
>> Auftrag von Avri Doria
>> Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17
>> An: accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last
>> Mile
>> Hi,
>>
>> The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just
>> operationalization is impressive.
>>
>> I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean
>> capture
>> by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their
>> perspective
>> the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it
>> gives the
>> community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I
>> think
>> any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an
>> analysis who
>> who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an
>> interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to
>>share my
>> power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power
>> anlaysi, current, potential and likely.
>>
>> Additionally, I do not understand this statement:
>>
>> where the current proposal still warrants much detail that
>> may not be
>> achievable
>>
>> While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps
>> much
>> less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton,
>> it is
>> not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate
>> level of
>> detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone
>> does not
>> wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.
>>
>> I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where
>> we, as
>> a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition
>> so badly
>> that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete
>> control
>> without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever
>> again.
>> The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to
>> community
>> oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition
>> should
>> not go forward.
>>
>> We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.
>>
>>
>> avri
>>
>> On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:
>>
>> Original
>> link:
>>
>>https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile
>>
>>
>> Working Together Through The Last Mile
>>
>>
>><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#
>>
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>>ough-the-last-mile#>>
>>
>> I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the
>>CCWG
>> briefing to the ICANN Board
>>
>><https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>,
>> and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue
>>
>><https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>.
>> All of our dialogues over the past months have been
>> illuminating,
>> challenging and in my opinion, an important and true
>> testament to the
>> multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA
>> Stewardship Transition.
>>
>> */We support the important improvements for ICANN's
>> accountability
>> contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal.
>> We endorse
>> the goal of enforceability of these accountability
>> mechanisms, and we
>> believe that it is possible to implement the key elements
>>of the
>> proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements
>> of the
>> proposal within the community's timeline while meeting
>> the NTIA requirements./*
>>
>> As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the
>> Board
>> wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in
>> agreement on
>> key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for
>>example:
>>
>> * Fundamental bylaws.
>> * Specific requirements for empowering the community
>> into the bylaws
>> adoption process.
>> * IRP enhancements.
>> * Board and director removal.
>> * ICANN's mission and core values.
>> * Strengthening requirements for empowering the
>> community in the
>> budget, operational and strategic planning process.
>> * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments
>> Reviews
>> intoICANN bylaws.
>> * Community ability to enforce the accountability
>> mechanisms in the
>> bylaws.
>>
>> We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized.
>>With
>> regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability,
>> where the
>> current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be
>> achievable
>> we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable
>>way, as
>> increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for
>> example,
>> capture or diminishing of checks and balances.
>>
>> Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles
>> on which
>> we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more
>> detail on how
>> these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be
>> implemented within the community identified time frame for
>>the
>> transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not
>> result in
>> unintended consequences.
>>
>> During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It
>> was a lot
>> of information to digest in a call (notes around opening
>>remarks
>>
>><http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem
>>ber/005160.html>,
>> notes
>> around 10 points
>>
>><http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem
>>ber/005161.html>
>>
>><http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem
>>ber/005161.html%3E>),
>> and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration.
>> We are
>> committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment
>> process
>> in the next few days, and we look forward to the working
>> with the
>> community on further details.
>>
>> It is critical that we work together to build enhanced
>> accountability
>> forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the
>> impressive work already done by the community and complete
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