[CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile
Nigel Roberts
nigel at channelisles.net
Tue Sep 8 21:00:42 UTC 2015
No smart-ass needs to apologise for that.
Trust me, I know ;-)
> (Apologies if this comes across as a lecture or being smart-ass)
>
> Cheers,
>
> Roelof
>
>
>
>
> On 08-09-15 18:59, "accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org on
> behalf of Nigel Roberts" <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
> on behalf of nigel at channelisles.net> wrote:
>
>> Roelof
>>
>> You are a smart guy. You are open and ready to trust. These are
>> admirable qualities.
>>
>> But ICANN, as a collective entity, to those of us who were there at its
>> beginnings needs to continually prove it is worthy of trust.
>>
>> Because back then, it wasn't.
>>
>> And some of us remember.
>>
>>
>>
>> On 08/09/15 17:53, Roelof Meijer wrote:
>>> All,
>>>
>>> Below I pasted some quotes from this thread. And I cannot but wonder.
>>> What are we getting so wound up about? Did we really expected a ³yes,
>>> perfect, let¹s implement this straight away²?
>>> But what makes me wonder most is why, for heaven¹s sake, do we see the
>>> board as a unity of ill-doers?
>>>
>>> The board members that have participated in our work are individuals
>>> that I hold in high esteem. Quite a few of them tutored me when I
>>> entered this miraculous world of ICANN quite a few years ago.
>>> They gave me different angles and insights, pointed out different
>>> possible views and were open to discussion, disagreement and new ideas.
>>> And were tirelessly working to improve the way we work for the benefit
>>> of the global internet community. And most of them did not change a bit
>>> after they decided to help us all forward even more, make a personal
>>> sacrifice and join ICANN's board.
>>>
>>> In my opinion, there¹s no collective single opinion in any wrong
>>> direction in this board. There is however, a collective intellect and a
>>> level of individual integrity and selfishness that one does not easily
>>> find in executive structures. They deserve our respect. Which, no, does
>>> not mean that we cannot have different opinions.
>>>
>>> When Steve Crocker writes:
>>>
>>> /"We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability
>>> contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse
>>> the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we
>>> believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the
>>> proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the
>>> proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA
>>> requirements.²/
>>>
>>> he in my opinion sends a very clear message that we should happily
>>> receive, as he commits the board. Let¹s await the promised details of
>>> their ideas and keep engaged.
>>> Why should we want to send messages like the following, what do we hope
>>> to achieve? Frustrate the process to a halt?
>>> Read the quotes below, and note the interpretations of what was read or
>>> heard: as in ³while you say, Š. I seeŠ², ³when you say, Š you mean.."
>>>
>>> /"While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I
>>> //see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the
>>> //keystone of the CCWG proposal."/
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all
>>> the //bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check"/
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure does
>>> not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than for
>>> those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a
>>> very natural human reaction."/
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the
>>> priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the
>>> board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and
>>> out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last" /
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"When you say you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you have
>>> not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice."/
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"And I, for one, do not want the transition //badly enough that I would
>>> capitulate to the Board's effort to completely //distort the proposed
>>> process."/
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is
>>> precisely //why it must."/
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just
>>> //operationalization is impressive."/
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"not surrender and let the Board have complete control //without any
>>> possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again"/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Let¹s all sit back a bit and reflect. On ourselvesŠ
>>>
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>> Roelof Meijer
>>>
>>> SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE
>>> NETHERLANDS
>>> T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05
>>> roelof.meijer at sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer at sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl
>>> <http://www.sidn.nl/>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 07-09-15 20:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of
>>> Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of
>>> avri at acm.org <mailto:avri at acm.org>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the Board
>>> and I
>>> trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the
>>> best
>>> you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior
>>> motive of
>>> personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my
>>> trust
>>> of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a
>>> Board member would ever take a position just because it would help
>>> him
>>> get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board
>>> member
>>> would change her position due to a concern with being removed from
>>> the
>>> Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign
>> >from the
>>> Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and
>>> the
>>> Internet.
>>>
>>> My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective from
>>> the
>>> Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes
>>> to
>>> become empowered, at leas to a degree.
>>>
>>> While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue,
>>> I
>>> see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the
>>> keystone of the CCWG proposal.
>>>
>>> I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the
>>> all the
>>> bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I
>>> think
>>> this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to
>>> the
>>> current impasse.
>>>
>>> Some inset comments below.
>>>
>>> On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Avri,
>>>
>>> it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas
>>> where we work together we have consensus or rough
>>> consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of
>>> disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself
>>> whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?
>>>
>>> What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have
>>> an agreement:
>>> €Community empowerment (Agreeement)
>>>
>>>
>>> I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal. Maybe
>>> it is
>>> a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a
>>> lower
>>> extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by
>>> other,
>>> you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on
>>> some
>>> fundamental issues the community requires decision making
>>> empowerment.
>>> The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in
>>> any
>>> straightforward definition of the term..
>>>
>>> €Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications)
>>>
>>>
>>> Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture
>>> on
>>> the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do you
>>> fear us so?
>>>
>>> €Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement)
>>>
>>>
>>> Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a
>>> direct
>>> say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation.
>>> Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the
>>> requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals.
>>>
>>>
>>> €Operational Plan (Agreement)
>>> €Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions)
>>>
>>>
>>> How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting
>>> was
>>> that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually
>>> based on
>>> fundamental disagreements.
>>>
>>> €Enforceability (Agreement)
>>>
>>>
>>> I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume
>>> that
>>> we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing
>>> could
>>> be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make
>>> going to
>>> court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not
>>> be
>>> necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG
>>> plan
>>> balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of
>>> the
>>> Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new
>>> participant
>>> in the checks and balances.
>>>
>>> €IRP (Agreement)
>>>
>>>
>>> Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called
>>> agreement.
>>>
>>> €Ombudsman (Agreement)
>>>
>>> We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model.
>>>
>>>
>>> Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other
>>> parts of the solution would work.
>>>
>>> For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further
>>> intensification of the dialogue within the community including
>>> CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from
>>> different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal
>>> advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the
>>> decision.
>>>
>>>
>>> The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here was
>>> that
>>> ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community
>>> been
>>> making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG
>>> process.
>>> Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have
>>> submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the
>>> implementation phase.
>>>
>>>
>>> This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a
>>> complicated transition in the final stage there are some
>>> remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to
>>> go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is
>>> good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its
>>> members and to the input from the broader community. The whole
>>> process is a very encouraging example which shows how the
>>> multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an
>>> important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New
>>> York.
>>>
>>>
>>> If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I
>>> would be
>>> able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM
>>> and
>>> the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To
>>> me,
>>> this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a
>>> century*
>>> or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of
>>> Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that.
>>>
>>> (*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little
>>> better)
>>>
>>>
>>> The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is
>>> simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the
>>> checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and
>>> the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my
>>> eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a
>>> number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects.
>>>
>>>
>>> Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that
>>> compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight. An
>>> organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger
>>> notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a
>>> good
>>> start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations
>>> sometimes
>>> get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that
>>> made
>>> the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by
>>> ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2
>>> recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the
>>> rainbow. As
>>> people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2
>>> recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting."
>>>
>>> You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested
>>> is the
>>> current model without any changes. And we have seen that this is a
>>> model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending
>>> exuberance of
>>> the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate
>>> oversight
>>> somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become free
>>> from
>>> government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the
>>> community,
>>> one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need the
>>> SMCM
>>> in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a
>>> transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a
>>> transition
>>> to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has
>>> accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is
>>> something
>>> that the CWG proposal requires.
>>>
>>> I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save
>>> enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why
>>> Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed
>>> mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in
>>> an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the
>>> well designed balance between governments and the
>>> non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there
>>> are other detailed questions.
>>>
>>>
>>> In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal
>>> footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want
>>> its
>>> structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in
>>> the
>>> ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major
>>> opportunity
>>> for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for
>>> action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate
>>> capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less
>>> chance
>>> there will be for capture and other shenanigans.
>>>
>>>
>>> The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too
>>> vague, too unbalanced, too confusing.
>>>
>>>
>>> I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined scope
>>> and
>>> functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the
>>> modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an
>>> implementation
>>> detail.
>>>
>>> It is not yet ready for adoption.
>>>
>>>
>>> We disagree on this.
>>>
>>> It needs a lot of more work.
>>>
>>>
>>> We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That fact
>>> of an
>>> SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to
>>> claim, but its implementation modalities may be.
>>>
>>> There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was
>>> presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and
>>> minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership
>>> Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus
>>> than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far
>>> away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against
>>> capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and
>>> security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful
>>> analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this
>>> in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.
>>>
>>>
>>> I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the
>>> weaknesses
>>> of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will
>>> help
>>> us with that.
>>>
>>>
>>> My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole
>>> membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the
>>> details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is
>>> obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now
>>> within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a
>>> long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now
>>> they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is
>>> unstoppable.
>>>
>>>
>>> Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in
>>> this
>>> system construction. Removing it requires going back to the
>>> beginning
>>> as it holds everything together.
>>>
>>> As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the
>>> community model has been implemented. As long as the Board remains
>>> unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed
>>> at
>>> ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board
>>> actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in
>>> it is
>>> redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress
>>> mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress
>>> mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR, IRP,
>>> ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this
>>> proposal. I
>>> have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine
>>> improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board
>>> configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN.
>>>
>>>
>>> My impression is that the majority in the community sees this
>>> indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will
>>> not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the
>>> IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we
>>> will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its
>>> various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a
>>> changing environment. I did call this ³WS 3² and ³ICANN 2020².
>>> And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed.
>>> but
>>> we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time,
>>> and
>>> leave the future to necessary tweaking.
>>>
>>> I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of
>>> taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for
>>> thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and
>>> then to
>>> WS3...
>>>
>>>
>>> More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in
>>> San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like
>>> stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And
>>> what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling
>>> step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do
>>> now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow
>>> the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the
>>> end of the story. It will go on.
>>>
>>>
>>> I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too much
>>> stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the
>>> best
>>> example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is
>>> preferable,
>>> but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond
>>> the
>>> stumbling phase.
>>>
>>> As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been
>>> patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.'
>>> For
>>> others it is much longer.
>>>
>>> But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait for
>>> transition until we are ready.
>>>
>>>
>>> And here is a final observation. To put it like Greg as a
>>> conflict as ³Board on Top² vs. ³Community on Top² is misleading.
>>> Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are
>>> selected by the community. Both are accountable to the
>>> community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all
>>> are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a
>>> better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with
>>> more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.
>>>
>>>
>>> The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is
>>> real
>>> mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the
>>> community
>>> does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of
>>> the
>>> community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed
>>> by the
>>> Board for the community. I think many of your comments are colored
>>> by a
>>> pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to
>>> capture
>>> and game.
>>>
>>> Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new
>>> perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the
>>> Board
>>> another part of the community while not representing the community.
>>> For
>>> a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to
>>> give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the
>>> community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can
>>> check
>>> and balance the Board's unilateral power.
>>>
>>> The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as
>>> the
>>> best solution for replacing NTIA oversight.
>>>
>>> avri
>>>
>>>
>>> Wolfgang
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>>> Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> im
>>> Auftrag von Avri Doria
>>> Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17
>>> An: accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>>> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last
>>> Mile
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just
>>> operationalization is impressive.
>>>
>>> I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean
>>> capture
>>> by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their
>>> perspective
>>> the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it
>>> gives the
>>> community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I
>>> think
>>> any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an
>>> analysis who
>>> who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an
>>> interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to
>>> share my
>>> power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power
>>> anlaysi, current, potential and likely.
>>>
>>> Additionally, I do not understand this statement:
>>>
>>> where the current proposal still warrants much detail that
>>> may not be
>>> achievable
>>>
>>> While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps
>>> much
>>> less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton,
>>> it is
>>> not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate
>>> level of
>>> detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone
>>> does not
>>> wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.
>>>
>>> I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where
>>> we, as
>>> a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition
>>> so badly
>>> that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete
>>> control
>>> without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever
>>> again.
>>> The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to
>>> community
>>> oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition
>>> should
>>> not go forward.
>>>
>>> We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.
>>>
>>>
>>> avri
>>>
>>> On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:
>>>
>>> Original
>>> link:
>>>
>>> https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile
>>>
>>>
>>> Working Together Through The Last Mile
>>>
>>>
>>> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>>> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>>> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>>> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>>> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>>> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#
>>>
>>> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#%
>>> 3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mi
>>> le#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-las
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>>> -the-last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-thr
>>> ough-the-last-mile#>>
>>>
>>> I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the
>>> CCWG
>>> briefing to the ICANN Board
>>>
>>> <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>,
>>> and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue
>>>
>>> <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>.
>>> All of our dialogues over the past months have been
>>> illuminating,
>>> challenging and in my opinion, an important and true
>>> testament to the
>>> multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA
>>> Stewardship Transition.
>>>
>>> */We support the important improvements for ICANN's
>>> accountability
>>> contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal.
>>> We endorse
>>> the goal of enforceability of these accountability
>>> mechanisms, and we
>>> believe that it is possible to implement the key elements
>>> of the
>>> proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements
>>> of the
>>> proposal within the community's timeline while meeting
>>> the NTIA requirements./*
>>>
>>> As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the
>>> Board
>>> wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in
>>> agreement on
>>> key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for
>>> example:
>>>
>>> * Fundamental bylaws.
>>> * Specific requirements for empowering the community
>>> into the bylaws
>>> adoption process.
>>> * IRP enhancements.
>>> * Board and director removal.
>>> * ICANN's mission and core values.
>>> * Strengthening requirements for empowering the
>>> community in the
>>> budget, operational and strategic planning process.
>>> * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments
>>> Reviews
>>> intoICANN bylaws.
>>> * Community ability to enforce the accountability
>>> mechanisms in the
>>> bylaws.
>>>
>>> We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized.
>>> With
>>> regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability,
>>> where the
>>> current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be
>>> achievable
>>> we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable
>>> way, as
>>> increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for
>>> example,
>>> capture or diminishing of checks and balances.
>>>
>>> Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles
>>> on which
>>> we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more
>>> detail on how
>>> these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be
>>> implemented within the community identified time frame for
>>> the
>>> transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not
>>> result in
>>> unintended consequences.
>>>
>>> During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It
>>> was a lot
>>> of information to digest in a call (notes around opening
>>> remarks
>>>
>>> <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem
>>> ber/005160.html>,
>>> notes
>>> around 10 points
>>>
>>> <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem
>>> ber/005161.html>
>>>
>>> <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem
>>> ber/005161.html%3E>),
>>> and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration.
>>> We are
>>> committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment
>>> process
>>> in the next few days, and we look forward to the working
>>> with the
>>> community on further details.
>>>
>>> It is critical that we work together to build enhanced
>>> accountability
>>> forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the
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