[CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem

[Rubens Kuhl]

> On Sep 29, 2015, at 9:15 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
> 
> Hi all
> 
> One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
> 
> "The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"

I don't see a problem per se to this... if dissolving ICANN is the best response for a scenario, why not ? 

> 
> There were some sub-themes to this concern:
> 
> - the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM

Which is a real issue, indeed. 

> - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions

Not an issue if the Single Member serves the best interest of the Internet as a whole and not the fiduciary interests of the corporation, if they go apart. 

> - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time

Also a real issue. 


> Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had. 
> 
> That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.

I'm not sure that the board agree with all five community powers, so my suggestion is not to take that for granted. Single director removal doesn't like an agreement for now, for instance. 

> 
> [The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
> 
> 
> So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
> 
> Here is a suggestion.
> 
> For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?
> 
> This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
> 
> This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
> 
> It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.

This sounds good to me.


Rubens




-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/attachments/20150929/1fdcca19/attachment.html>