[CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it

Kavouss Arasteh kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com
Mon Feb 22 13:01:16 UTC 2016


Dear jORGE
I sent already my reply
Regards
Kavouss

2016-02-22 12:44 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio at bakom.admin.ch>:

> Dear Kavouss
>
>
>
> Thanks for the clarification.
>
>
>
> Hence, do I understand correctly that the carve-out (exclusion of GAC as
> decisional participant) applies also if the Board decision to implement GAC
> Advice has been found by the IRP to be perfectly consistent with the Bylaws?
>
>
>
> Thanks for your guidance
>
>
>
> Regards
>
>
>
> Jorge
>
>
>
> *Von:* Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com]
> *Gesendet:* Montag, 22. Februar 2016 12:41
> *An:* Cancio Jorge BAKOM <Jorge.Cancio at bakom.admin.ch>
> *Cc:* Mueller, Milton L <milton at gatech.edu>; Steve Crocker <
> steve.crocker at icann.org>; accountability-cross-community at icann.org;
> Icann-board ICANN <icann-board at icann.org>
>
> *Betreff:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it
>
>
>
> Dear Jorge,
>
> You are right
>
> The carve out applies to all cases either in application of IRP or in the
> absence of IRP
>
> For the first Board's agreed with reduced threshold from 4 to 3 for
> Board's Spill
>
> For the second the Board wishes that the 4 SO/AC threshold applies .
>
> Some people in the community like me fully supportting the Board's views.
>
> Some others are against
>
> This is one of the issue that must be resolved tomorrow
>
> Regards
>
> Kavouss
>
>
>
> 2016-02-22 12:25 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio at bakom.admin.ch>:
>
> Dear all
>
>
>
> From this email by Milton it seems that some (as Milton) are understanding
> that the carve-out only would apply if the Board decision to implement GAC
> Advice is found (by the IRP I guess) to be inconsistent with the Bylaws.
>
>
>
> I have been away for one week, but I feel that the carve-out was meant to
> apply *generally* to situations where there is Board implementation of
> GAC Advice...
>
>
>
> Could someone kindly clarify the status?
>
>
>
> Best regards
>
>
>
> Jorge
>
>
>
> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
> Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [mailto:
> accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] Im Auftrag von Mueller,
> Milton L
> Gesendet: Sonntag, 21. Februar 2016 23:34
> An: Steve Crocker <steve.crocker at icann.org>; Accountability Community <
> accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
> Cc: Icann-board ICANN <icann-board at icann.org>
> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it
>
>
>
> Steve
>
> I think Andrew got the issue exactly right. I do not see how your answer
> even engages with his argument, which is that nearly all of the community
> has agreed that when board actions are challenged for being out of mission
> by following GAC advice, that the GAC should not be in a position to rule
> on that.
>
>
>
> Claiming that the GAC does not have "extraordinary power" does not answer
> Andrew's argument. Whether the GAC has extraordinary power or not, if it
> advises you (the board) to do something that the rest of the community
> thinks is outside of the bounds of the bylaws (which it has a demonstrated
> tendency to do) the GAC should not be a decisional member of the empowered
> community that decides whether we get to challenge that action.
>
>
>
> From that premise on, it is all arithmetic, as Andrew showed:
>
>
>
> > > This is a choice entirely within the GAC's power.  It must choose.
>
> > > If it chooses to be board-advisor-GAC, then it is in effect choosing
>
> > > that it prefers that mode of operation to being part of the wider
>
> > > Empowered Community mechanism.  In effect, a GAC choice can reduce
>
> > > the possible actors in the Empowered Community to four.  Otherwise,
>
> > > the GAC is in a position to insist on advice it gave being
>
> > > considered first by the board, and then that the GAC can also
>
> > > participate in the judgement of the Board's actions.  That's the
>
> > > very "two bites" problem that we were trying to solve.  I believe
>
> > > that in most organizations (including many governments), it would be
>
> > > regarded as surprising that a participant in the to-be-judged action
> also gets to be one of the judges.
>
>
>
> You have not refuted this, as I said before you have not even engaged with
> this.
>
> This increases my suspicion that the board's position is based on a
> political calculus, not on good governance or accountability criteria.
>
>
>
> Further, it is clear from the reaction you have gotten that the board is
> not proposing a "friendly amendment." In these rules of procedure, a
> friendly amendment has to be accepted by the group that proposed it, and
> clearly it is not.
>
>
>
> I am deeply disturbed by the board upsetting a consensual compromise, and
> a very difficult one, for the third time in this process. I wonder if you
> have any appreciation of the potential costs of this, particularly when it
> involves an issue as sensitive as the role of national governments in
> ICANN.
>
>
>
> Dr. Milton L. Mueller
>
> Professor, School of Public Policy
>
> Georgia Institute of Technology
>
>
>
>
>
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