[CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it

Mon Feb 22 13:47:44 UTC 2016

Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com>
14:46 (Il y a 0 minute)
À *Thomas.Schneid.*, *Jordan*, Becky, jorge.cancio, Mathieu, accountability.,
León, Thomas
Dear Jorge,
WAIT FOR BECKIE'S REPLY.
The carve-out and its application is not clear at all
Kavouss

2016-02-22 14:46 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com>:

> Dear Jorge,
> WAIT FOR BECKIE'S REPLY.
>
>
> 2016-02-22 14:37 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com>:
>
>> Beckie
>> You are the architect of IRP
>> You are the artchitect of Carve-out
>> What you mentioned does need clarification
>> What you said is inconsistant with Rec.2
>> Please clarify which option of Rec.2 you referring?
>> TRegards
>> Kavouss
>>
>> 2016-02-22 14:13 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio at bakom.admin.ch>:
>>
>>> Dear Kavouss, dear Becky
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks so much!
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> From the responses I received, it seems that the carve-out applies
>>> generally whenever there is a Board decision to implement GAC Advice, even
>>> when that Board decision is deemed by the IRP to be perfectly consistent
>>> with ICANN Bylaws.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Hence, we should be clear that there is no relation between the
>>> carve-out and the consistency with the Bylaws, right? Reasons for bringing
>>> such a challenge can be purely based on different interests, right?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It is just a rule that excludes the GAC from (a decisional role in) any
>>> community decision where a Board decision to implement GAC Advice is at
>>> stake.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A further question: if such a Board decision is based both on a SO
>>> recommendation, an ALAC advice and a GAC Advice, the only entity to be
>>> excluded from a community process would be the GAC, right? But the other SO
>>> and AC would participate on both tracks, correct?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> As to the threshold question: it merely has to do with the Board recall,
>>> but does not affect any of the mentioned characteristics of the carve-out,
>>> correct?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks very much for any further guidance
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Jorge
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Von:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr at neustar.biz]
>>> *Gesendet:* Montag, 22. Februar 2016 14:00
>>> *An:* Cancio Jorge BAKOM <Jorge.Cancio at bakom.admin.ch>;
>>> kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com
>>> *Cc:* steve.crocker at icann.org; icann-board at icann.org;
>>> accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>>>
>>> *Betreff:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Jorge-
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The carve out would apply but you would need 4 SO/AC s to recall the
>>> Board.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Becky
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *J. Beckwith Burr*
>>> *Neustar, Inc.* / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer
>>> 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006
>>> *Office:* +1.202.533.2932  *Mobile:* +1.202.352.6367 */* *neustar.biz*
>>> <http://www.neustar.biz>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From: *"Jorge.Cancio at bakom.admin.ch" <Jorge.Cancio at bakom.admin.ch>
>>> *Date: *Monday, February 22, 2016 at 6:44 AM
>>> *To: *Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com>
>>> *Cc: *"steve.crocker at icann.org" <steve.crocker at icann.org>, "
>>> icann-board at icann.org" <icann-board at icann.org>, Accountability
>>> Community <accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>>> *Subject: *Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Dear Kavouss
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks for the clarification.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Hence, do I understand correctly that the carve-out (exclusion of GAC as
>>> decisional participant) applies also if the Board decision to implement GAC
>>> Advice has been found by the IRP to be perfectly consistent with the Bylaws?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks for your guidance
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Regards
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Jorge
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Von:* Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com
>>> <kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com>]
>>> *Gesendet:* Montag, 22. Februar 2016 12:41
>>> *An:* Cancio Jorge BAKOM <Jorge.Cancio at bakom.admin.ch>
>>> *Cc:* Mueller, Milton L <milton at gatech.edu>; Steve Crocker <
>>> steve.crocker at icann.org>; accountability-cross-community at icann.org;
>>> Icann-board ICANN <icann-board at icann.org>
>>> *Betreff:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Dear Jorge,
>>>
>>> You are right
>>>
>>> The carve out applies to all cases either in application of IRP or in
>>> the absence of IRP
>>>
>>> For the first Board's agreed with reduced threshold from 4 to 3 for
>>> Board's Spill
>>>
>>> For the second the Board wishes that the 4 SO/AC threshold applies .
>>>
>>> Some people in the community like me fully supportting the Board's views.
>>>
>>> Some others are against
>>>
>>> This is one of the issue that must be resolved tomorrow
>>>
>>> Regards
>>>
>>> Kavouss
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2016-02-22 12:25 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio at bakom.admin.ch>:
>>>
>>> Dear all
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> From this email by Milton it seems that some (as Milton) are
>>> understanding that the carve-out only would apply if the Board decision to
>>> implement GAC Advice is found (by the IRP I guess) to be inconsistent with
>>> the Bylaws.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I have been away for one week, but I feel that the carve-out was meant
>>> to apply *generally* to situations where there is Board implementation
>>> of GAC Advice...
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Could someone kindly clarify the status?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best regards
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Jorge
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>>> Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [mailto:
>>> accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] Im Auftrag von
>>> Mueller, Milton L
>>> Gesendet: Sonntag, 21. Februar 2016 23:34
>>> An: Steve Crocker <steve.crocker at icann.org>; Accountability Community <
>>> accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>>> Cc: Icann-board ICANN <icann-board at icann.org>
>>> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Steve
>>>
>>> I think Andrew got the issue exactly right. I do not see how your answer
>>> even engages with his argument, which is that nearly all of the community
>>> has agreed that when board actions are challenged for being out of mission
>>> by following GAC advice, that the GAC should not be in a position to rule
>>> on that.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Claiming that the GAC does not have "extraordinary power" does not
>>> answer Andrew's argument. Whether the GAC has extraordinary power or not,
>>> if it advises you (the board) to do something that the rest of the
>>> community thinks is outside of the bounds of the bylaws (which it has a
>>> demonstrated tendency to do) the GAC should not be a decisional member of
>>> the empowered community that decides whether we get to challenge that
>>> action.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> From that premise on, it is all arithmetic, as Andrew showed:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > > This is a choice entirely within the GAC's power.  It must choose.
>>>
>>> > > If it chooses to be board-advisor-GAC, then it is in effect choosing
>>>
>>> > > that it prefers that mode of operation to being part of the wider
>>>
>>> > > Empowered Community mechanism.  In effect, a GAC choice can reduce
>>>
>>> > > the possible actors in the Empowered Community to four.  Otherwise,
>>>
>>> > > the GAC is in a position to insist on advice it gave being
>>>
>>> > > considered first by the board, and then that the GAC can also
>>>
>>> > > participate in the judgement of the Board's actions.  That's the
>>>
>>> > > very "two bites" problem that we were trying to solve.  I believe
>>>
>>> > > that in most organizations (including many governments), it would be
>>>
>>> > > regarded as surprising that a participant in the to-be-judged action
>>> also gets to be one of the judges.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You have not refuted this, as I said before you have not even engaged
>>> with this.
>>>
>>> This increases my suspicion that the board's position is based on a
>>> political calculus, not on good governance or accountability criteria.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Further, it is clear from the reaction you have gotten that the board is
>>> not proposing a "friendly amendment." In these rules of procedure, a
>>> friendly amendment has to be accepted by the group that proposed it, and
>>> clearly it is not.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I am deeply disturbed by the board upsetting a consensual compromise,
>>> and a very difficult one, for the third time in this process. I wonder if
>>> you have any appreciation of the potential costs of this, particularly when
>>> it involves an issue as sensitive as the role of national governments in
>>> ICANN.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Dr. Milton L. Mueller
>>>
>>> Professor, School of Public Policy
>>>
>>> Georgia Institute of Technology
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>>
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>>
>>
>
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