[CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue

Mon Feb 29 15:51:40 UTC 2016

Dear Keith,
We ar not drafting Bylaws on 29.02.2016.
Moreover, we need to recognize the rights of the SO/AC to decide wquietly
and smoothly. I do not undersatnd such a hurry.
GAC will meeting in Marrakech and discuss the issue.
I do not know what they decide notr I wish to speak on their behalf
Pls wait and let the matter be resolved properly.
Kavouss

2016-02-29 16:33 GMT+01:00 Drazek, Keith <kdrazek at verisign.com>:

> Dear Kavouss,
>
>
>
> I don’t think anyone is trying to tell the GAC **how** to decide.
>
>
>
> Rather, it’s a question of timing….there is a recognition that a decision
> needs to be made prior to the drafting of the bylaws.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Keith
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [mailto:
> accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Kavouss
> Arasteh
> *Sent:* Monday, February 29, 2016 10:17 AM
> *To:* Mueller, Milton L
>
> *Cc:* accountability-cross-community at icann.org
> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue
>
>
>
> Dear All,
>
> It is not the responsibilty of CCWG to instruct the GAC on how it wishes
> to participate in the exerciose of the community power.
>
> We better leave the issue for those who are eligible and competent to
> decide .
>
> Regards
>
> Kavouss
>
>
>
> 2016-02-29 16:12 GMT+01:00 Mueller, Milton L <milton at gatech.edu>:
>
> This discussion is an example of the absurdity of making participation in
> the empowered community (EC) optional. You were all warned about this
> months ago. The boundaries of the EC need to be fixed and completely
> unambiguous. You must be either in or out. There should be no “oh, today I
> think I am part of it but tomorrow I may not be.” It should not be
> determined on a case-by-case basis.
>
>
>
> My understanding is that all 3 SOs are part of the empowered community, as
> is ALAC. My understanding is that GAC has not decided whether it is in or
> out. But once it does decide, it should be in or out, full stop, for all
> cases except the narrow carve out related to GAC advice.
>
>
>
> If the individual entities who are in the EC (ACs and SOs) do not support
> a vote to spill the board, reject an IANA review decision, etc. they are
> voting against it, full stop. They are not “unable to cast a vote.” So a
> lower threshold never means that there is a chance that one SO or AC can
> make the decision. The threshold only changes based on whether GAC is in or
> out.
>
>
>
> --MM
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [mailto:
> accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Martin
> Boyle
> *Sent:* Sunday, February 28, 2016 3:09 PM
>
> Kavouss makes a good point:  if views are so divided in the SO/ACs that
> many are not able to cast a vote, there is an indication that something is
> wrong.
>
>
>
> *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [
> mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
> <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Kavouss
> Arasteh
> *Sent:* 28 February 2016 17:32
> *To:* Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin at melbourneit.com.au>
> *Cc:* accountability-cross-community at icann.org
> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue
>
>
>
> Bruce
>
> Accruing to some established rule ,out if seven SO/AC, the minimum would
> be simple majority ( 4) bellow that the process does have no longer any
> legal validity
>
> Ksvouss
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
>
> On 28 Feb 2016, at 00:02, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin at melbourneit.com.au>
> wrote:
>
> Hello Keith,
>
>
>
> I assume there also needs to be some lower limit of participants that
> applies to the concept of “*preventing the need for unanimous support”.*
>
>
>
> Taking an extreme case,  what if only one SO or AC “chooses” to be part of
> the decisional process?   Every decision taken would be unanimous by
> default.
>
>
>
> How many participants of the 7 SOs and ACs makes a viable Empowered
> Community?  Should it be 2, 3, or 4.   I hope we get at least 4 out of 7
> for it  to genuinely represent a significant portion of the community.
>
>
>
> So rather than “If fewer than 5”, it could be “If at least 4”
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Bruce Tonkin
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [
> mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
> <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Drazek,
> Keith
> *Sent:* Sunday, 28 February 2016 7:04 AM
> *To:* accountability-cross-community at icann.org
> *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue
>
>
>
> Hi Thomas, Mathieu and Leon. I’m submitting the following on behalf of the
> undersigned members/participants from the GNSO:
>
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------
>
> Dear CCWG-Accountability Chairs,
>
>
>
> We are very concerned with the response of the Board to the request for
> clarification regarding the need to adjust the thresholds for the Empowered
> Community to exercise its powers if the number of decisional participants
> is less than 5 SOACs. Currently the text in Annex 1 and 2 regarding this
> possibility is ambiguous:
>
>
>
> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this
> assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be
> adjusted. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have
> more SOs or ACs.”
>
>
>
> In our view, there is no question that the thresholds *must* be adjusted
> if there are fewer than five decisional participants. We have acknowledged
> repeatedly and operated under the assumption that there should not be a
> requirement of unanimous support for the Empowered Community to exercise
> its powers. Yet, if there are less than five decisional participants,
> unless the thresholds are adjusted it would require unanimous support for
> the Empowered Community to:
>
>
>
> ·         Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget;
>
> ·         Recall the entire Board of Directors; and
>
> ·         Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA
> functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process.
>
>
>
> These powers are central to ensuring that ICANN remains accountable to the
> Empowered Community. This matter is too critical to the primary purpose of
> the CCWG-Accountability proposal to remain unclear. As the Board has noted
> in its own formal comments, “Leaving this issue for future consideration
> raises the potential for renegotiation of the community thresholds.  This
> potential for renegotiation adds a level of instability and a lack of
> predictability.”
>
>
>
> Although it has a superficial resemblance to the recent debate over
> thresholds in the GAC carve-out, we believe it is fundamentally different.
> There is a great distinction between an SO or AC *choosing* to not
> participate, and an SO or AC being *blocked* from participation in a
> specific instance, as was the case in the case of the GAC carve-out. We
> were willing to accept a unanimous threshold for Board recall in the unique
> circumstances of the GAC carve-out, where the GAC was blocked from
> participation, but we believe firmly that if any SO or AC *elects*,
> whether through a conscious decision or an inability to decide, to not
> participate, then the non-unanimity principle must be upheld.
>
>
>
> However, as we saw with the debate over the thresholds in the GAC
> carve-out, this could be a contentious issue. It is far better to resolve
> this matter now (and during the drafting of bylaws), prior to the official
> transfer of the proposal to NTIA, than to delay it when it could have
> significant negative ramifications on the transition through a failure to
> resolve it during the implementation phase.
>
>
>
> Therefore, we respectfully request that the current text in Annex 1 and
> Annex 2 be edited to replace “may” with “shall” and add an additional
> explanatory clause:
>
>
>
> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this
> assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support *shall* be
> adjusted *to prevent the need for unanimous support among the decisional
> Participants to exercise any of the seven Community powers*. Thresholds
> may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs.”
>
>
>
> Signed,
>
>
>
> Phil Corwin
>
> Steve DelBianco
>
> Keith Drazek
>
> James Gannon
>
> Robin Gross
>
> Ed Morris
>
> Brett Schaefer
>
> Greg Shatan
>
> Matthew Shears
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/attachments/20160229/b1527eb0/attachment-0001.html>