<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 1/28/15 8:50 AM, Drazek, Keith
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:504F95D0035A264EBB1BFAABAA772B9549703DE8@BRN1WNEXMBX01.vcorp.ad.vrsn.com"
type="cite">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif""><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"">If
a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no
fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me
understand how they are impacted and why they would care about
the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community.
I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA
functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of
greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the
IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently
being addressed via the CWG Transition.</span></p>
</blockquote>
<br>
It is not so very long ago that a (previous) Executive and
(previous) Board made changes requested by delegees of iso3166 code
points conditional upon a form of agreement. The policy pursued by
that Executive and that Board were not subject to substantive
community review (notice and comment) prior to being implemented,
with the accountability issue I hope many, not just the directly
concerned, still recall.<br>
<br>
Additionally, the interests of parties (of any type) need not
encompass the union of all interests of all parties in the
mechanisms and policies relating to accountability.<br>
<br>
The pursuit of the narrow self-interest of a hypothetical ccTLD, or
gTLD, delegee or contractual party, through its operator, should
not, by itself, remove a party pursuing its narrow self-interest
from what ever may eventually be a body of "members". Were it so,
the removed would be at least some of those the USG observed in the
AOC which constitute "
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html;
charset=windows-1252">
a group of participants that engage in <abbr title="Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers">ICANN</abbr>'s
processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally."<br>
<br>
However, given the general awareness that the continued function of
the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners is of fundamental
importance, and the limited interest _as_delegees_or_contractees_ in
issues other than the continued function of the Root Zone Management
(RZM) partners, it seems unnecessary to encumber the problem of
accountability-via-membership (already quite difficult if not
intractable, in my opinion) with notions that delegees and
contractees, as delegees or contractees, contribute an interest
absent but for their status as "members", whether represented en
toto, or as self-organized aggregates, or by lottery.<br>
<br>
In simple terms, why registries-as-members at all? Does anyone
believe only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the
Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone
Management? <br>
<br>
I think that the function of the Board is general oversight of the
registries, arising from its technical coordination of unique
endpoint identifiers delegated authority, and contractual oversight
arising from its delegated contracting authority, so the assumption
that registries have a necessary place in a hypothetical membership
model is one that should be examined carefully for self-interest and
self-dealing, as well as for necessity and utility.<br>
<br>
Eric Brunner-Williams<br>
Eugene, Oregon<br>
</body>
</html>