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Hi Roelof,<br><br>
First, a contradiction is quite possible, since the two bulleted
statements were from different people. The first, I believe was Bruce
Tonkin, and the second was me. I was also the one quoted earlier starting
with "Board members are appointed because they share a
mindset..."<br><br>
I will let Bruce explain his comment if he wishes, but here is my
rationale.<br><br>
The Board currently has the ability to remove any Member or Liaison (with
the exception of the GAC Liaison). According to the Bylaws, they do not
need a reason to do so. To my knowledge, they have never taken such an
action (although there are rumours that the threat of doing so has caused
1 or 2 Board members to resign). So to date, we do not seem to take the
ability to remove Board members frivolously.<br><br>
I believe that an AC/SO should be able to remove their appointee if they
so choose. The Board member is not their "representative", but
is appointed because of a presumed shared set of values. If there is
evidence that this had changed, or perhaps that the person is simply not
doing the job (ie not showing up or never talking to the AC/SO), they
should have recourse (Larry Strickling used the term "lose
confidence in them" I think). Yes, it is possible that this could be
used as a pay-back for voting the "wrong" way, but I think it
highly unlikely. If a Board member from an AC/SO is going to vote against
the interests of their AC/SO, presumably they will talk to the AC/SO and
explain their rationale. I do agree that such a recall should require
something like a supermajority.<br><br>
I know of only one case in the history of ICANN where an AC/SO was *SO*
upset with their appointee that they *might* have recalled the person if
they had the ability. I just cannot see the capability being used
frivolously, and if it was, they would probably have a difficult time
re-filling the position.<br><br>
Any Board member, even without the threat of recall, may choose to act in
their community's interest even if they believe it is against the public
interest. I'm not sure how we can prevent that, and I would hope that the
majority of people we appoint will understand their mandate.<br><br>
The bullet said that the other AC/SOs should not be able to gang up on
someone else's Board member without their support, and remove him/her.
That would allow the silencing of a Board member by those who did not
like what they were saying.<br><br>
I to believe that the community (by large consensus) should be able to
remove NomCom appointees (who have no AC/SO) or the entire
Board.<br><br>
Alan<br><br>
At 25/02/2015 09:20 AM, Roelof Meijer wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">All,<br><br>
Regrettably, I had to leave yesterday’s call before the end.<br><br>
Reading the meeting notes that Brenda sent us, there seems to be a kind
of contradiction in the end part with:<br><br>
- Recall Board members if not acting in global public interest rather
than if not acting in segmented interest of a community. Consider
community capture (especially a segment of community).<br><br>
- We should not allow community removal of one Board member in particular
– must come from the concerned community.<br><br>
I<font face="Calibri"> think that giving (only) the concerned community
the possibility to recall a particular </font>board<font face="Calibri">
member, is asking for a situation in which a board member is recalled for
not adequately serving the interests of that particular community (while
very possibly adequately serving the public interest). Not where we want
to end up, as under those circumstances board members will be stimulated
to serve their community's interests primarily, instead of the public
interest.<br>
<br>
In my opinion, the power to recall the board (or part there of) can only
be effectively given to representatives of the community (as opposed to
the community as a whole), as discussed e.g. through a membership
structure, a permanent CCWG, delegates, supervisory board etc. The power
should be implemented through vote and the motion should require a
supermajority to pass.<br><br>
Best,<br><br>
Roelof<br>
</font><br>
From: Brenda Brewer
<<a href="mailto:brenda.brewer@icann.org">brenda.brewer@icann.org</a>
><br>
Date: woensdag 25 februari 2015 14:40<br>
To:
"<a href="mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org">
accountability-cross-community@icann.org</a>"
<<a href="mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org">
accountability-cross-community@icann.org</a>><br>
Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for CCWG ACCT
Session #14 24 February<br><br>
<img src="cid:image001.gif@01D03418.3BC26740" alt="[]"> <br>
Dear all, <br>
<br>
The notes, recordings and transcripts for the <b>CCWG ACCT Session
#14</b> call on 24 February will be available here:
<a href="https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=52889476">
https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=52889476</a><br>
<br><br>
<br>
<h2><b>Action Items</b></h2><br><br>
<br><br>
<b>ACTION ITEM: Becky Burr and Kavouss Arasteh to further discuss
offline<br>
ACTION ITEM: Jonathan Zuck to suggest how we could change format <br>
ACTION ITEM: Legal subteam to review and refine questions and determine
whether WS1/WS2<br>
</b><br><br>
<h2><b>Notes</b></h2><br><br>
<br><br>
<b>1</b>. Statement of interest to be uploaded/updated - contact staff if
help needed<br><br>
<b>2.</b> Activity report from Work Parties<br><br>
<b><i>WP 1 <br>
</i></b><br>
- WP1 has developed a draft work plan, has agreed on working methods, is
working with an aggressive deadline and plans to deliver WP output by
March 11. <br><br>
- Volunteers are developing templates for each power and mechanism.
Current gaps will be picked up. Editors will review content.<br><br>
- Triggered and non triggered categorization has been applied to items in
paper, resulting in an initial allocation between two Working parties.
WP1 is awaiting WP2 feedback to allocate tasks.<br><br>
- WP1 has structured mechanisms around powers and finds the
accountability mechanism template challenging in some ways: some
questions are more relevant to mechanisms and vice-versa. It envisions to
produce recommendations on how to improve it. It was commented that
questions would not have same relevance to both categorizations and will
be reviewed and addressed as progress is made. <br><br>
- It was observed that a mechanism gives structure to power and there is
need for a procedure and vehicle to support the power. Threshold
(consensus/full consensus) also comes into play. <br><br>
- The recommendation is to commence with the analysis of powers and to
attach them with mechanisms.<br><br>
- The WP1 walked the CCWG through proposed Bylaws additions on amending
ICANN Bylaws to incorporate AOC reviews. The text is merged with periodic
structural reviews text that currently exists in Bylaws. Edits to the AoC
review process were also suggested. Feedback to suggestions included:
should Bylaws give a prescriptive headcount? Stakeholder Groups being
subordinates to a structure, is it really necessary to include them? ; It
is important to reflect diversity and balance; While support for
selections made by SO/ACs, lack of diversity was flagged as a downside
and an aspect that could be preserved through selectors; Specifics may
change in the future. With the objective of stable Bylaws, consider high
level principles that can be included in the Bylaws instead, along with a
reference to an external document where specifics would be given. In this
approach a very high threshold on ability to change that document would
be added; A Bylaws categorization was proposed: 1) fundamental and
constitutional provisions (stable); 2 functional and operation (less
stable); 3) rules relations to elections etc; consider more lengthy
timelines.<br><br>
- No decision will be made on the call. <br><br>
---<br><br>
<b><i>WP2<br>
</i></b><br>
- WP2 has produced a revised scoping document to reflect changes and
results of WP 1 work on triggered and non-triggered. Scoping documents
for WP1 and WP2 are harmonized.<br><br>
- Close coordination with WP 1 is needed.<br><br>
- A work plan and working methods (based on WP1 modus operandi) has been
circulated. Standards of work will be discussed. <br><br>
- WP2 plans to have a document available by face-to-face meeting (17
March tentatively)<br><br>
---<br><br>
<b><i>ST-WP<br>
</i></b><br>
- ST-WP wrapped up presentation of stress test 18 (If GAC changes
operating procedures from consensus to majority voting). A contributor
suggested looking into the preliminary injunction (IRP) regarding
delegation of Persian and noted absence of GAC advice and a group of GAC
members invoking IRP. Objections were raised by another contributor i.e.
outside CCWG mandate and references made to the South Africa
communiqué.<br><br>
ACTION ITEM: Becky Burr and Kavouss Arasteh to further discuss
offline<br><br>
- ST-WP walked the group through stress test 17 (ICANN adds a new
TLD in spite of SSR concerns). Feedback included: What is our definition
of success within context of stress tests?; Stress tests are going to be
measures of degrees -t say yes/no answers will be rare. <br><br>
- No decision will be made on the call. <br><br>
ACTION ITEM: Jonathan Zuck to suggest how we could change format
<br><br>
<br><br>
<b>3.</b> Legal Subteam Update<br><br>
- Questions have been suggested and the Subteam is awaiting questions
from WP1 and WP2.<br><br>
- Robin is working on framing questions into a letter that can be
delivered to law firm that will be selected. Background and context will
be included.<br><br>
- Call with final list of law firms will be held. Update on final
candidate that will be put forward for hiring by ICANN will be shared
asap. <br><br>
- Questions are divided into 3 categories: 1) corporate governance;
2)jurisdictional matters; 3) protection of ICANN, antitrust and other law
suits.<br><br>
- Given concerns about ccTLD delegation and redelegations remedies (e.g.
dispute resolution), feedback is needed.<br><br>
- Feedback included: formulate questions to be list of powers and ask for
mechanisms that can accomplish powers as opposed to putting mechanisms
up; frame questions using how to trigger response (as opposed to yes/no);
lawyers need to know what our requirements are so that can advise what
empowerment can be implemented. In context of jurisdictional: global
survey of jurisdiction can take ages and cost a fortune; changing
jurisdiction will make transition impossible: the group needs to decide
if these questions are for WS1; Keep jurisdictional issues open: are
there any arbitration or international panel can go to for jurisdictional
issues, is there a way to get step into resolution with something simpler
to begin with; Jurisdiction might be too complicated, keep it simple
(recall Board, Independent Appeals mechanism etc). <br><br>
ACTION ITEM: Legal subteam to review and refine questions and determine
whether WS1/WS2 <br><br>
<br><br>
<b>4. F2F meeting<br>
</b><br>
- Confirmed for 23-24 March 2015 at Hilton Istanbul Bomonti Hotel &
Conference Center.<br><br>
- Agenda will be circulated in time.<br><br>
- Discussing May F2F meeting in coordination with CWG-stewardship
leadership.<br><br>
<br><br>
<b>5. A.O.B</b> <br><br>
The CCWG discussed removal of individual Board members with a note that
architecture needs to be revisited if allowing for entire Board or
individual Board. Feedback includes:<br><br>
- Current Bylaws allow that Board can dismiss individual board members if
CoI. Individual removal might lead to unhealthy environment, create a
witch hunt. <br><br>
- Be careful to not penalize whole group if one group is
concerned.<br><br>
- Spilling of Board is a nuclear option and disruptive step. We are
seeking incremental, implementable ways to challenge Board decision. The
community does not have anybody that represents their interest. We need
ability to override and challenge decision.<br><br>
- Board members are appointed because they share a mindset – if not in
line with mindset, should be able to remove this Board member.
There is also the case of NomCom appointed members: ability to remove
them is needed. Significant consensus among SO/ACs would be needed
– the member would be removed for serious reasons. On the other hand,
removal of entire Board is a whole set of issues (interim etc).<br><br>
- A mechanism is needed for the three above: spilling entire board is not
disruptive as long as there is a defined method; spilling an individual
Board members is a SG/C decision, not a community decision to make.
Recall mechanism within process defined for NomCom would take a lot more
time. Vote of non-confidence on the Board or all the other need to be in
WS1.<br><br>
- Predictability and stability is important: recall of Board members will
undermine predictability/stability. Consider reducing term and don't
reelect.<br><br>
- Recall Board members if not acting in global public interest rather
than if not acting in segmented interest of a community. Consider
community capture (especially a segment of community).<br><br>
- We should not allow community removal of one Board member in particular
– must come from the concerned community.<br>
<br><br>
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