<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Alan</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Quick question: does early GAC engagement in PDPs, i.e. joint GAC-GNSO working which will start to happen soon, help here in heading off conflict with the priorities of contracted parties ?</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Mark</div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On 20 March 2015 at 20:22, Alan Greenberg <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca" target="_blank">alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">This is NOT an issue related to the IANA transition, but in my mind is a serious accountability issue.<br>
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The issue is not a new one, but has recently been raised again in the context of the GNSO WG on Policy and Implementation. One of the outcomes of that WG (should it be approved) is that ALL issues that impact stakeholders, regardless of when the issue arises in the policy-implementation continuum, must be referred to the GNSO and subject to a MS decision-making process. At the present, some stakeholders believe that some similar decisions have been made unilaterally by staff or the Board.<br>
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The potential accountability issue is whether the GNSO is capable of addressing issues where the Public Interest may be at odds with the desired of the Contracted Parties, and if not, how do we fix it.<br>
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The problem is that contracted parties have a very strong vested interest to attempt to ensure outcomes that support their needs and can invest significant resources in ensuring satisfactory outcomes. That is a completely natural position for them to take. Those who are defending the public interest tend to have few such resources. This can impact WG outcomes. Moreover, ultimately, contracted parties, working together, have an effective veto within the GNSO (although clearly not one they would prefer to use).<br>
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Past situations have resulted in either watered-down results which did not come anywhere near meeting the public interest needs in the view of non-contracted parties, or have resulted in deadlock.<br>
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Although no one is advocating the Board taking unilateral decisions in such cases, it DOES have the ability to decide that the Public Interest is of paramount import in any specific case.<br>
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Please note that this is not an accusation against specific contracted parties or their representatives. But it does reflect a scenario that MIGHT arise and where ICANN must be able to take decisions that are in the public interest.<br>
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This is very closely related to the issue that we are always reminded of - ICANN Directors must look at the Public Interest EVEN IF a decision is counter to the wishes of the AC/SO that appointed them. How do we ensure that the Policy Processes below the Board are as accountable?<br>
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Alan<br>
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</blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr">Mark Carvell<div>Global Internet Governance Policy</div><div>Department for Culture, Media and Sport</div><div><a href="mailto:mark.carvell@culture.gov.uk" target="_blank">mark.carvell@culture.gov.uk</a></div><div>tel +44 (0) 20 7211 6062</div></div></div>
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