<div dir="ltr"><div>Alan,Leon </div><div>Tks</div><div>Still I am not sure the workability of empowering the community to exercise their rights on an accountability which is dependant on another accountability . I suspect that the very objectives of what we have discussed for months may not be acheived.</div><div>Let ius hear from others .Anyhow thank you again and thanks Malcolm. Bruce, Chris ,,,, and other contributing to find a more simpler way how to create a member mofdel without a real need to UA which I confess would be legally complex to establish and to implement</div><div>Let us also asking LEON TO SEEK ADVICE FROM OUR LEGAL ADVISER.</div><div>Regards</div><div>Kavouss </div><div><br></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">2015-05-24 19:36 GMT+02:00 Alan Greenberg <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca" target="_blank">alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca</a>></span>:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
Kavouss, <br><br>
We obviously have no specific rules for "ICANN Members" since
that position does not currently exist. For all other appointments, we
can recall on a person by person basis and I would expect that to not
change if we enact specific rules for ICANN Members. Of course, that is
just my expectation and cannot control the outcome, but I am not sure why
we would do all or nothing.<br><br>
I do note that elsewhere in our rules, we require people appointed to
represent us to, where possible and practical, to consult the ALAC on
their position on a given topic, and to follow such advice if
given.<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br><br>
Alan</font></span><div><div class="h5"><br><br>
At 24/05/2015 01:27 PM, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Alan<br>
Tks for explanation<br>
You did not address my last point, in case of decision making , say 5
appointees by majority and disagreement of community for the decision
made followed by dismissal, all 5 would be dismissed or only those who
voted for that contested decision?<br>
Tks<br>
Kavouss
<br><br>
<br>
Sent from my iPhone<br><br>
On 24 May 2015, at 17:47, Alan Greenberg
<<a href="mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca" target="_blank">alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca</a>
> wrote:<br><br>
<blockquote type="cite">Two points:<br><br>
1. The SO/AC could well delegate multiple people. That is why we have
suggested a weight of 5 for SO/ACs. In the case of the ALAC, it could
well be one person per region (perhaps the five members of the ALAC
Leadership Team (ALT) which is regionally balanced).<br><br>
2. I cannot speak to other groups, but the ALAC has specific and very
clear rules for removing its Chair, any member of the ALT, or in fact any
appointee to any position. See
<a href="http://tinyurl.com/ALAC-RoP-2013-04" target="_blank">
http://tinyurl.com/ALAC-RoP-2013-04</a>, sections 20 and 22. If we were
to go the way of specific people being ICANN Members, we would likely add
explicit provisions for this appointment as well.<br><br>
Alan<br><br>
At 24/05/2015 09:19 AM, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Dear Malcolm<br>
Tks again<br>
I hope/ wish it would as simple as you mentioned,<br>
However, it is dangerous to delegate all such authority to one
person.<br>
In case of more than one , how decision will be made . In case of
majority , would the community be able to dismiss all even the minority
one?<br>
In the interval between meeting how community will act?<br>
Kavouss <br><br>
Sent from my iPhone<br><br>
> On 24 May 2015, at 12:17, Malcolm Hutty
<<a href="mailto:malcolm@linx.net" target="_blank">malcolm@linx.net</a>>
wrote:<br>
> <br>
> <br>
>> On 24/05/2015 09:29, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:<br>
>> Dear Malcolm<br>
>> What are those terns and conditions as well as applicable
rules?<br>
> <br>
> The SOACs make their own rules. Unless a SOAC creates a rule to
the<br>
> contrary, a chair can be dismissed at will be a SOAC. This makes
them<br>
> completely accountable to the SOAC.<br>
> <br>
> That said, I think worrying about the misuse of the power of
membership<br>
> is misplaced.<br>
> <br>
> As I understand it, the only powers that members have are<br>
> i) to go to court alleging that ICANN has not followed its own
Bylaws; and<br>
> ii) to inspect a few formal documents that the company is required
to<br>
> have by law.<br>
> <br>
> Is there anything else of which I'm unaware?<br>
> <br>
> I can't see any reason to worry about excessive or inappropriate use
of<br>
> such powers. Courts are familiar with frivolous litigation, and
prepared<br>
> to suppress and sanction it - nor could we immunise ICANN against
being<br>
> sued by anybody in the world on other grounds, even if we
tried.<br>
> <br>
> If this is not a worry, and if there are no other relevant powers
of<br>
> which I'm unaware, there is an even simpler option that perhaps
we<br>
> should consider: that the members of ICANN can be anybody in the
world<br>
> who applies to become a member.<br>
> <br>
> This would resolve one of the problems with having part of
"the<br>
> community" as members: that they may decline to go to court
when they<br>
> ought to.<br>
> <br>
> Personally, I think that Chris' scenario of a member going to court
to<br>
> try to force ICANN to act in a way the Board deems to be outside
ICANN's<br>
> powers is pretty fanciful. Such a lawsuit would be doomed to
failure: no<br>
> court will order a corporation to act in a particular way merely
because<br>
> a member asks it, even if the corporation had erred in believing
itself<br>
> precluded from acting in that way.<br>
> <br>
> But a much more realistic scenario is that of a member going to
court to<br>
> restrain the ICANN from acting in a way the Board consider
within<br>
> ICANN's powers, but that the member considers outside scope. A
court<br>
> could rule on whether a given action is outside a corporation's
powers,<br>
> and if it finds that it is, order the corporation to desist.<br>
> <br>
> However, there is a problem: if the Board is acting outside
ICANN's<br>
> scope, quite likely this will not be a rogue Board acting in
defiance of<br>
> the community, but rather a Board acting with the full support of
the<br>
> SOACs: a "rogue community" asking ICANN to act outside its
proper scope.<br>
> Who then is to restrain them?<br>
> <br>
> Having a broad membership would address this problem. So I ask
this<br>
> group, what (if any) problems might be caused by such an
option?<br>
> <br>
> Malcolm.<br>
> <br>
> -- <br>
>
Malcolm Hutty | tel: <a href="tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523" target="_blank" value="+442076453523">+44 20 7645 3523</a><br>
> Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs
blog<br>
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http://publicaffairs.linx.net/</a><br>
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