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<p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#365F91'>Alan,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#365F91'><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:70.9pt;text-indent:-18.0pt;
mso-list:l0 level1 lfo2'><![if !supportLists]><span lang=EN-US><span
style='mso-list:Ignore'>1.<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>
</span></span></span><![endif]><span dir=LTR></span><span lang=EN-US>If a group
went so wrong with their selection of a Director as to warrant his/her removal,
what makes you think the Alternate they selected at the same time would be
better? Or even still applicable given the obvious shift in priorities or
perspectives?</span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#365F91'>And what makes you think the replacement or the caretaker you
will select after the removal will be better???? This is a tricky question. To
make it more clear, what makes the US people think the Vice President they
elected together with the president would be a good choice to replace the
President in case of vacancy?????<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:52.9pt'><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:70.9pt;text-indent:-18.0pt;
mso-list:l0 level1 lfo2'><![if !supportLists]><span lang=EN-US><span
style='mso-list:Ignore'>2.<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>
</span></span></span><![endif]><span dir=LTR></span><span lang=EN-US>If I
understand correctly, you are proposing that a number of AC/SO could remove the
director appointed by a particular AC/SO. And they could do so even if the
appointing organization did not agree. If that is correct, it would allow
groups to gang-up on a director they did not like BECAUSE of that persons
views. </span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#365F91'>If 4 SO/ACs decide to recall a director, it must be because he
is not performing well for the benefit of the whole organization even if the
appointing party is not among them. But if this bothers you, I can add a
mention that the appointing body should be among the 4 SO/ACs necessary to
recall a board director.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#365F91'>If you think 4 SO/ACs will likely gang-up on a director they did
not like BECAUSE of that persons views, should we really trust them to appoint
directors at all??<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:70.9pt'><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:70.9pt'><span lang=EN-US>To be
specific, it would allow the rest of the community (or a large part of it) to
remove the At-Large Director even though At-:Large was happy with the person.
Is that your intent?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#365F91'>See the above comment.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoListParagraph><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:70.9pt;text-indent:-18.0pt;
mso-list:l0 level1 lfo2'><![if !supportLists]><span lang=EN-US><span
style='mso-list:Ignore'>3.<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>
</span></span></span><![endif]><span dir=LTR></span><span lang=EN-US>You say
that a Director could be removed as "punishment" over a particular
vote. If you think AC/SOs will likely do this, should we really trust them to
appoint directors at all??</span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#365F91'>See the above
comment.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#17365D'>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><b><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:
"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#17365D'>Tijani BEN JEMAA<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#17365D'>Executive Director<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#17365D'>Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations </span><span
lang=EN-US style='font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#17365D'>(<b>FMAI</b>)</span><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:13.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#17365D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#17365D'>Phone: + 216 41 649 605<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#17365D'>Mobile: + 216 98 330 114<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#17365D'>Fax: + 216 70 853 376<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#17365D'>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'> </span><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><br>
<br>
<span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<div>
<div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'>
<p class=MsoNormal><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>De :</span></b><span
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Alan Greenberg
[mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] <br>
<b>Envoyé :</b> mardi 14 juillet 2015 15:00<br>
<b>À :</b> tijani.benjemaa@planet.tn; '</span><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>Jordan Carter'<br>
<b>Cc :</b> 'Accountability Cross Community'<br>
<b>Objet :</b> Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models
being discussed<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class=MsoNormal>Tijani, without making a more general comment, I do have
several strong concerns with your proposal:<br>
<br>
1. If a group went so wrong with their selection of a Director as to warrant
his/her removal, what makes you think the Alternate they selected at the same
time would be better? Or even still applicable given the obvious shift in
priorities or perspectives?<br>
<br>
2. If I understand correctly, you are proposing that a number of AC/SO could
remove the director appointed by a particular AC/SO. And they could do so even
if the appointing organization did not agree. If that is correct, it would
allow groups to gang-up on a director they did not like BECAUSE of that persons
views. To be specific, it would allow the rest of the community (or a large
part of it) to remove the At-Large Directo even though At-:Large was happy with
the person. Is that your intent?<br>
<br>
3. You say that a Director could be removed as "punishment" over a
particular vote. If you think AC/SOs will likely do this, should we really
trust them to appoint directors at all???<br>
<br>
Alan<br>
<br>
At 13/07/2015 06:25 PM, Tijani BEN JEMAA wrote:<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=MsoNormal>Hi Jordan,<br>
<br>
I am personally quite comfortable with the logic of the appointing body being
the removing body for individual directors (recognising there is work to be
done in respect of NomCom appointees).<br>
<br>
One of the concerns that comes up in thinking about this is probably well
represented by this hypothetical & fictional scenario:<br>
<br>
<i>The GNSO demands that the proceeds of the new gTLD programme be returned to
the registries pro rata depending on the number of registrations. The Board
does not agree, including the GNSO appointed directors on the Board. The GNSO
removes its directors and appoints different ones who say they will support
this proposal.<br>
<br>
</i>I think this scenario would never play out in practice.<br>
<br>
Why not?<br>
· two out of sixteen directors
would never be credibly enough to completely change the Board's position on a
matter involving significant resources and impact on the public.<br>
The GNSO can recall their dissident director even if they know the Board
decision will not change, just to punish him<br>
· the new directors would face
the same obligations the old directors faced to act in the public interest<br>
I don’t see how this obligation will prevent the scenario to happen since the
evaluation of the public Interest may be different from a party (or a person)
to another<br>
<br>
The removal of individual directors is possible in very many organisations and
it is only when they are dysfunctional that these sorts of games start being
played. <br>
To ensure that this will only happen when there is dysfunction, we need to put
the necessary and right rules, not permit to the appointing bodies to recall
there directors without convincing reason<br>
<br>
I think in any situation where an SO/AC or the NomCom was contemplating
removing a director, they'd be carefully considering what they could really
achieve. And they'd be unlikely to do it for reasons of rent-seeking or other
self-interested things.<br>
you are lucky to believe so even if nothing prevent it<br>
<br>
The whole rationale behind the power, in my view, is that it simply tightens
the link between directors and their appointing bodies. It isn't and should not
be a backdoor way to change directors from directors into mere avatars for the
specific interests of their appointing groups.<br>
<br>
George, I hope this is constructive.<br>
<br>
A last question...<br>
<br>
Do you have a concrete suggestion as to how you would see the exercise of such
a power being done by "a process that is broadly distributed in the
community" as an alternative for us to consider, and seek legal advice on?<br>
This is a proposals for exercising the power of recalling Board directors by a
process that is well distributed in the community consisting in recalling the
board directors (from 1 to 15) by the community and not a single SO or AC:<br>
· The decision is taken by at
least 4 SOs and/or ACs including at list 1 SO and 1 AC.<br>
· All the directors have the
same treatment (selected by their constituencies or by the nomcom)<br>
· The SOs and ACs and the
NomCom select the board directors and their interim simultaneously (the GNSO
selects 2 acting directors and 2 interim ones and the ALAC selects 1 acting
director and 1 interim one, etc.). <br>
· All acting directors sign
before taking their position as Board Director a commitment to step down in
case a community decision to recall them is taken <br>
· Those interim directors will
fully replace the removed directors if the number of recalled directors is less
than 8. In case the number reaches 8 or more, the resulting board (non recalled
directors plus the interim of the recalled ones) will act as a caretaker till
the selection of new directors to replace the recalled ones. <br>
· This is to replace the 2
powers: stilling the whole board and recalling individual board
directors. <br>
This has the merit to; <br>
· Fulfill the requirement of
having the power to remove the whole Board and to remove individual board
members<br>
· make the change smaller and
simpler by having a single mechanism to recall the board directors instead of 2<br>
· not having to find a way for
the nomcom to remove their appointed directors<br>
· avoid a period where ICANN
run without board in place<br>
· avoid the risk of having an
SO or AC recalling their selected director because of the SO or AC interest and
not the global public interest<br>
<br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<b>Tijani BEN JEMAA<br>
</b>Executive Director<br>
Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (<b>FMAI</b>)<br>
Phone: + 216 41 649 605<br>
Mobile: + 216 98 330 114<br>
Fax: + 216 70 853 376<br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<b>De :</b> accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [<a
href="mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org">
mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org</a>] <b>De la part de</b>
Jordan Carter<br>
<b>Envoyé :</b> dimanche 12 juillet 2015 04:40<br>
<b>Cc :</b> Accountability Cross Community<br>
<b>Objet :</b> Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being
discussed<br>
<br>
Thank you George, interesting post - a couple of thoughts in line below:<br>
<br>
On 11 July 2015 at 05:13, George Sadowsky <<a
href="mailto:george.sadowsky@gmail.com"> george.sadowsky@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
<br>
<snip> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:
12.0pt;margin-left:36.0pt'>Here's the question: Does the CCWG believe that the
global public interest is _always_ defined by "community" consensus
or "community" dictates? Yes or no? I believe that the
great majority of the time the two are consistent, but I believe that there are
cases in which they diverge. Is there any disagreement among us
that this could happen? In that case, what should a Board member
do? Which is the higher authority according to the CCWG's thinking?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'> <br>
I think there will always be occasions when there is a divergence between
interpretations of the global public interest on the part of different
stakeholders. The ICANN Board will remain charged, I think, with bringing that
global perspective to bear. But this decision is made easier by ICANN's very
limited role, and by the identify of interests in its performance of that role
between what the Internet and its users need, and what core operational ICANN
stakeholders want: completely reliable operation of the IANA functions, and an
open and accountable, bottom up, consensus driven policy process - with the
Board generally validating the outcomes of consensus policy processes.<br>
<br>
To put it another way, the global public interest is always served by ICANN
focusing on doing its core operational jobs well. Beyond that, it becomes very
subjective, as you note.<br>
<br>
<snip> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:
12.0pt;margin-left:36.0pt'>This implies to me that the test for removal of a
Director must rest upon a process that is broadly distributed in the community
and must recognize the different organizations to which such a member is
accountable as an important factor in the process.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:
12.0pt;margin-left:36.0pt'>What are the opinions of members of the CCWG on this
point?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=MsoNormal> <br>
I am personally quite comfortable with the logic of the appointing body being
the removing body for individual directors (recognising there is work to be
done in respect of NomCom appointees).<br>
)One of the concerns that comes up in thinking about this is probably well
represented by this hypothetical & fictional scenario:<br>
<br>
The GNSO demands that the proceeds of the new gTLD programme be returned to the
registries pro rata depending on the number of registrations. The Board does
not agree, including the GNSO appointed directors on the Board. The GNSO
removes its directors and appoints different ones who say they will support
this proposal.<br>
<br>
I think this scenario would never play out in practice.<br>
<br>
Why not? <o:p></o:p></p>
<ul type=disc>
<li class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1'>two out of sixteen directors would never be
credibly enough to completely change the Board's position on a matter
involving significant resources and impact on the public. <o:p></o:p></li>
<li class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1'>the new directors would face the same obligations
the old directors faced to act in the public interest <o:p></o:p></li>
</ul>
<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'> <br>
The removal of individual directors is possible in very many organisations and
it is only when they are dysfunctional that these sorts of games start being
played. <br>
<br>
I think in any situation where an SO/AC or the NomCom was contemplating
removing a director, they'd be carefully considering what they could really achieve.
And they'd be unlikely to do it for reasons of rent-seeking or other
self-interested things.<br>
<br>
The whole rationale behind the power, in my view, is that it simply tightens
the link between directors and their appointing bodies. It isn't and should not
be a backdoor way to change directors from directors into mere avatars for the
specific interests of their appointing groups.<br>
<br>
George, I hope this is constructive.<br>
<br>
A last question...<br>
<br>
Do you have a concrete suggestion as to how you would see the exercise of such
a power being done by "a process that is broadly distributed in the
community" as an alternative for us to consider, and seek legal advice on?<br>
The advice we've had so far suggests that it's simple to have the appointment
and removal function with the same group, but more complicated (though not, if
memory serves, impossible) for removers to be different to appointers.<br>
<br>
<br>
cheers<br>
Jordan<br>
<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Jordan Carter<br>
<br>
Chief Executive <br>
InternetNZ<br>
<br>
04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)<br>
<a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a> <br>
Skype: jordancarter<br>
<br>
A better world through a better Internet <br>
<br>
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