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Tijani, without making a more general comment, I do have several strong
concerns with your proposal:<br><br>
1. If a group went so wrong with their selection of a Director as to
warrant his/her removal, what makes you think the Alternate they selected
at the same time would be better? Or even still applicable given the
obvious shift in priorities or perspectives?<br><br>
2. If I understand correctly, you are proposing that a number of AC/SO
could remove the director appointed by a particular AC/SO. And they could
do so even if the appointing organization did not agree. If that is
correct, it would allow groups to gang-up on a director they did not like
BECAUSE of that persons views. To be specific, it would allow the rest of
the community (or a large part of it) to remove the At-Large Directo even
though At-:Large was happy with the person. Is that your intent?<br><br>
3. You say that a Director could be removed as "punishment"
over a particular vote. If you think AC/SOs will likely do this, should
we really trust them to appoint directors at all???<br><br>
Alan<br><br>
At 13/07/2015 06:25 PM, Tijani BEN JEMAA wrote:<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">Hi Jordan,<br>
<br>
I am personally quite comfortable with the logic of the appointing body
being the removing body for individual directors (recognising there is
work to be done in respect of NomCom appointees).<br>
<br>
One of the concerns that comes up in thinking about this is probably well
represented by this hypothetical & fictional scenario:<br>
<br>
<i>The GNSO demands that the proceeds of the new gTLD programme be
returned to the registries pro rata depending on the number of
registrations. The Board does not agree, including the GNSO appointed
directors on the Board. The GNSO removes its directors and appoints
different ones who say they will support this proposal.<br>
<br>
</i>I think this scenario would never play out in practice.<br>
<br>
Why not?<br>
· two out of sixteen
directors would never be credibly enough to completely change the Board's
position on a matter involving significant resources and impact on the
public.<br>
The GNSO can recall their dissident director even if they know the Board
decision will not change, just to punish him<br>
· the new directors
would face the same obligations the old directors faced to act in the
public interest<br>
I don’t see how this obligation will prevent the scenario to happen
since the evaluation of the public Interest may be different from a party
(or a person) to another<br>
<br>
The removal of individual directors is possible in very many
organisations and it is only when they are dysfunctional that these sorts
of games start being played. <br>
To ensure that this will only happen when there is dysfunction, we need
to put the necessary and right rules, not permit to the appointing bodies
to recall there directors without convincing reason<br>
<br>
I think in any situation where an SO/AC or the NomCom was contemplating
removing a director, they'd be carefully considering what they could
really achieve. And they'd be unlikely to do it for reasons of
rent-seeking or other self-interested things.<br>
you are lucky to believe so even if nothing prevent it<br><br>
The whole rationale behind the power, in my view, is that it simply
tightens the link between directors and their appointing bodies. It isn't
and should not be a backdoor way to change directors from directors into
mere avatars for the specific interests of their appointing groups.<br>
<br>
George, I hope this is constructive.<br>
<br>
A last question...<br>
<br>
Do you have a concrete suggestion as to how you would see the exercise of
such a power being done by "a process that is broadly distributed in
the community" as an alternative for us to consider, and seek legal
advice on?<br>
This is a proposals for exercising the power of recalling Board directors
by a process that is well distributed in the community consisting in
recalling the board directors (from 1 to 15) by the community and not a
single SO or AC:<br>
· The decision is taken
by at least 4 SOs and/or ACs including at list 1 SO and 1 AC.<br>
· All the directors have
the same treatment (selected by their constituencies or by the
nomcom)<br>
· The SOs and ACs and
the NomCom select the board directors and their interim simultaneously
(the GNSO selects 2 acting directors and 2 interim ones and the ALAC
selects 1 acting director and 1 interim one, etc.). <br>
· All acting directors
sign before taking their position as Board Director a commitment to step
down in case a community decision to recall them is taken <br>
· Those interim
directors will fully replace the removed directors if the number of
recalled directors is less than 8. In case the number reaches 8 or more,
the resulting board (non recalled directors plus the interim of the
recalled ones) will act as a caretaker till the selection of new
directors to replace the recalled ones. <br>
· This is to replace the
2 powers: stilling the whole board and recalling individual board
directors. <br>
This has the merit to; <br>
· Fulfill the
requirement of having the power to remove the whole Board and to remove
individual board members<br>
· make the change
smaller and simpler by having a single mechanism to recall the board
directors instead of 2<br>
· not having to find a
way for the nomcom to remove their appointed directors<br>
· avoid a period where
ICANN run without board in place<br>
· avoid the risk of
having an SO or AC recalling their selected director because of the SO or
AC interest and not the global public interest<br>
<br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<b>Tijani BEN JEMAA<br>
</b>Executive Director<br>
Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (<b>FMAI</b>)<br>
Phone: + 216 41 649 605<br>
Mobile: + 216 98 330 114<br>
Fax: + 216 70 853 376<br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<b>De :</b> accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org
[<a href="mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org" eudora="autourl">
mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org</a>] <b>De la
part de</b> Jordan Carter<br>
<b>Envoyé :</b> dimanche 12 juillet 2015 04:40<br>
<b>Cc :</b> Accountability Cross Community<br>
<b>Objet :</b> Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models
being discussed<br>
<br>
Thank you George, interesting post - a couple of thoughts in line
below:<br>
<br>
On 11 July 2015 at 05:13, George Sadowsky
<<a href="mailto:george.sadowsky@gmail.com">
george.sadowsky@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
<br>
<snip> <br>
<dl>
<dd>Here's the question: Does the CCWG believe that the global public
interest is _always_ defined by "community" consensus or
"community" dictates? Yes or no? I believe that
the great majority of the time the two are consistent, but I believe that
there are cases in which they diverge. Is there any
disagreement among us that this could happen? In that case, what
should a Board member do? Which is the higher authority according
to the CCWG's thinking?<br><br>
</dl> <br>
I think there will always be occasions when there is a divergence between
interpretations of the global public interest on the part of different
stakeholders. The ICANN Board will remain charged, I think, with bringing
that global perspective to bear. But this decision is made easier by
ICANN's very limited role, and by the identify of interests in its
performance of that role between what the Internet and its users need,
and what core operational ICANN stakeholders want: completely reliable
operation of the IANA functions, and an open and accountable, bottom up,
consensus driven policy process - with the Board generally validating the
outcomes of consensus policy processes.<br>
<br>
To put it another way, the global public interest is always served by
ICANN focusing on doing its core operational jobs well. Beyond that, it
becomes very subjective, as you note.<br>
<br>
<snip> <br>
<dl><br>
<dd>This implies to me that the test for removal of a Director must rest
upon a process that is broadly distributed in the community and must
recognize the different organizations to which such a member is
accountable as an important factor in the process.<br><br>
<dd>What are the opinions of members of the CCWG on this point?<br><br>
</dl> <br>
I am personally quite comfortable with the logic of the appointing body
being the removing body for individual directors (recognising there is
work to be done in respect of NomCom appointees).<br>
)One of the concerns that comes up in thinking about this is probably
well represented by this hypothetical & fictional scenario:<br>
<br>
The GNSO demands that the proceeds of the new gTLD programme be returned
to the registries pro rata depending on the number of registrations. The
Board does not agree, including the GNSO appointed directors on the
Board. The GNSO removes its directors and appoints different ones who say
they will support this proposal.<br>
<br>
</i>I think this scenario would never play out in practice.<br>
<br>
Why not?
<ul>
<li>two out of sixteen directors would never be credibly enough to
completely change the Board's position on a matter involving significant
resources and impact on the public.
<li>the new directors would face the same obligations the old directors
faced to act in the public interest
</ul> <br>
The removal of individual directors is possible in very many
organisations and it is only when they are dysfunctional that these sorts
of games start being played. <br>
<br>
I think in any situation where an SO/AC or the NomCom was contemplating
removing a director, they'd be carefully considering what they could
really achieve. And they'd be unlikely to do it for reasons of
rent-seeking or other self-interested things.<br><br>
The whole rationale behind the power, in my view, is that it simply
tightens the link between directors and their appointing bodies. It isn't
and should not be a backdoor way to change directors from directors into
mere avatars for the specific interests of their appointing groups.<br>
<br>
George, I hope this is constructive.<br>
<br>
A last question...<br>
<br>
Do you have a concrete suggestion as to how you would see the exercise of
such a power being done by "a process that is broadly distributed in
the community" as an alternative for us to consider, and seek legal
advice on?<br>
The advice we've had so far suggests that it's simple to have the
appointment and removal function with the same group, but more
complicated (though not, if memory serves, impossible) for removers to be
different to appointers.<br>
<br>
<br>
cheers<br>
Jordan<br>
<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Jordan Carter<br><br>
Chief Executive <br>
InternetNZ</b><br><br>
04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)<br>
<a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a>
<br>
Skype: jordancarter<br><br>
A better world through a better Internet <br>
</i><br><br>
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