**Preliminary Comments on**

**Summary of Board Input**

The ICANN Board thanks the CCWG-Accountability for all of its work leading to the 2nd Draft Proposal and for the continuous dialogues and engagement throughout this significant process. This is an important discussion for the entire community as it reaches consensus.

With this submission, we provide supplementary and final comments to the CCWG-Accountability 2nd

Draft Proposal Public Comment forum including:

 Comments Matrix and Notes

 Proposed Approach for Community Enforceability

 Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Approach for Community Enforceability

As we have stated previously, the Board supports the improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the **key elements**

**Comments**

**Why only the key elements and not all elements**  of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements.

We also agree with the CCWG-Accountability that it is important, in light of the changing historical relationship with the United States, that there are mechanisms in place to ensure accountability with appropriate checks and balances for the organization. We also recognize that this process has an impact on the whole global community and unique identifier ecosystem.

**Specifically, the Board endorses elements of the 2nd Draft Proposal including:**

 Developing Fundamental Bylaws that hold special protections;

 Specific requirements for empowering the community into the (Standard) Bylaws adoption process;

 Enhancements to the Independent Review Process (IRP);

**Comments**

**See description in the Matrix**

 Board and Director Removal;

 ICANN’s mission and core values;

 empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning processes;

(Comments**;**

**There is some inconsistencies in the matrix to implement this element )**

 The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews into the ICANN Bylaws; and

 Enshrining in the **Fundamental( emphasis is added)** Bylaws the community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms.

We note the CCWG’s 2nd Draft Proposal recommends changing ICANN’s governance structure to a Sole Membership Model in order for the community to achieve enforceability of the accountability mechanisms listed above.

We support enforceability, but have serious concerns about switching the governance structure of the organization prior to transition.??

**Comments**

**What are the rational and valid arguments for these concerns**

**Clarification**

**Does it mean that the Board agrees to switch the governance structure of the organization after transition?** w

In particular, we are mindful of Assistant Secretary and NTIA Administrator Larry Strickling’s overarching criteria and his [remarks](http://www.ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2015/remarks-lawrence-e-strickling-assistant-secretary-commerce-communications-and-i) in Buenos Aires that the proposals must be simple, with no gaps and that complexity may add implementation delays.

**Comments**

**The understanding of the CCWG is not exactly similar to that of the Board regarding that statement**

**In this regard, there are aspects of the proposed structure that concern us, which include:**

 The proposed community enforceability structure introduces a significant and fundamental structural change from the current multistakeholder governance mechanism that the community has developed in a bottom-up consensus-based process over the past 17 years

**Comments   
A legally valid, operationally and functionally workable enhanced accountability does certainly require structural changes and thus such structural changes should not be interpreted as a negative point for these changes. Moreover, the proposed structural changes stem from a full-fledged a bottom-up consensus-based process**

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 Moving ICANN’s structure away from an open, multistakeholder governance mechanism to

the Sole Membership Model makes it more restrictive to a set of members, and potentially more prone to capture if not tested appropriately.

**Comments**

**It seems that the Board made an inappropriate judgement categorizing the CCWG as a CLOSED, multistakeholder governance mechanism**

**Moreover, what is the valid argument that brought the Board to such conclusions so as to categorize the CCWG proposal as top down, non inclusive process. These changes were subject to a full open democratic inclusive and button up process over several months of extensive discussions, debates exchanges of hundreds of messages and hours of virtual and face-to face- calls**

 The structural change to the Sole Membership Model may result in a **change in balance** **of power** in ways that cannot be predicted. The Member itself has no inherent checks, including **potential influence** by voting participants over others. We believe unnecessary complexity increases the possibility that we will collectively be unable to identify and mitigate all consequences of the new structure, including unknown risks caused by potential **shifts in the balance of power** between various stakeholder groups in the multistakeholder model.

 We are concerned with an increased **risk of budget paralysis and instability, where strategic** objections to **one part of** a budget could keep ICANN from moving to a budget that more appropriately supports its operations and efforts to maintain the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS.

**Comments**

**What are those risks of budget paralysis ,as CCWG peroposal do not contemplate such risks.**

We believe the Sole Membership Model as proposed has the potential for changes **in the balance of powers** between stakeholder groups in ICANN’s multistakeholder model. At any time, the balance of power and influence among any of the “groups” within ICANN can change based upon the willingness or ability to participate in the Sole Member, changing for example **the balance between governments and the private sector and civil society**. We believe that if the Sole Membership Model is the only proposed path forward, it may be prudent to delay the transition until the Sole Membership Model is

in place and ICANN has demonstrated its experience operating the model and ensuring that the model works in a stable manner.

Comments

Power sharing among SOs and ACs should not considered as producing any imbalance between governments and the private sector and civil society.

Under the community empowerment mechanism,all SO s and ACs have been given the right to participate , IF THEY SO WISHES in voting procedure to exercise their legitimate right to have active role in the six area of community power( Change of standard Bylaws, Change of Fundamental Bylaws, removal of the individual Director ( for those designating the Director,) removal of the entire Board, rejection of Budget and Strategic Plan How ICANN believes that one or some of the SOs and ACs ( in particular , GAC ) should be excluded in the exercising of their power in those areas mentioned above, taking into account that GAC ,mat this stage has not yet announced whether it wishes to permanently denounces in exercising its right or whether GAC wishes to decide on a case by case bais to exercise its right in a given situation, on a case by case basis .

ICANN is free to propose to NTIA to delay the transition until the Sole Membership Model is in place and ICANN has demonstrated its experience operating the model and ensuring that the model works in a stable manner.

We therefore suggest for consideration a different approach that achieves the community’s goal of enforceability (the **same objectives as contained in CCWG proposal?)** with a straightforward extension to our multistakeholder governance structure, which meets the NTIA criteria, while not opening up questions of stability, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

The Board has proposed for consideration a Multistakeholder Enforcement Mechanism (MEM) that we believe delivers on the objective of the community to create an enforcement mechanism. the **same objectives as contained in CCWG proposal?)** The matrix and details of the suggested MEM are offered as a contribution to the public comment process. Again, the Board wants to ensure community enforceability within the framework of the continuously evolving ICANN governance structure. This builds on our initial thinking on a CCWG-Accountability Proposal Delivery Framework shared here: [http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross](http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/005161.html)- [community/2015-September/005161.html](http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/005161.html).

The MEM is meant to be a suggestion for consideration to bring the significant amount of further and additional accountability **the community has identified**, while helping meet the NTIA criteria andusing the tested structure we have today. The Board is absolutely not espousing status quo. We hear, accept and support the CCWG’s goals of improving accountability and enforceability.

Comments

that the Board Proposal -- **due to lack of the legal rights that can attach to a member and a designator -- is closest to the current status quo** and would deliver the least robust and enforceable community powers of the three models.

The Board welcomes the opportunity for further dialogue with and between the CCWG-Accountability as it considers all the public comments it receives. We hope that engagement on specific ideas will be a helpful path towards building upon the CCWG’s work and to help reach consensus for a successful IANA Stewardship Transition and an ICANN with enhanced accountability. We remain very appreciative of the CCWG's valuable work.