<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Dear Jordan and colleagues. </div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">I also agree with Kavouss on the capture risk. In the scenario he has described I would expect that the non-voting GAC would wish to provide formal advice as a component of the community-wide consensus. </div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Ordinarily I would not expect the GAC to become heavily engaged in ICANN budget negotiations. However, maintaining overall financial stability relating to IANA operations and more broadly for the entire corporation is a global public interest objective. </div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Furthermore, there may well be specific budget lines of direct interest for governments such as travel support for GAC representatives from developing countries and small island states, and more substantial periodic items such as funding the convening of the biennial High Level Governmental Meetings. The GAC would need to react with formal advice if this funding provision were to come under pressure and be threatened with cut backs which would impair the global and economic diversity of participation by governments in the ICANN multi-stakeholder model. </div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Kind regards</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Mark </div><div class="gmail_extra"><br clear="all"><div><div class="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr">Mark Carvell</div><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">United Kingdom Representative on the GAC</div><br><div>Global Internet Governance Policy</div><div>Department for Culture, Media and Sport</div><div><a href="mailto:mark.carvell@culture.gov.uk" target="_blank">mark.carvell@culture.gov.uk</a></div><div>tel +44 (0) 20 7211 6062</div></div></div></div>
<br><div class="gmail_quote">On 30 September 2015 at 09:22, <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch" target="_blank">Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d">Kavouss makes a vital point here.
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d">Any decision-making process needs to be absolutely capture-proof and respect the diversity of the ICANN community.
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d">Hence, large supermajorities and/or consensus might be required for such important decisions. This means that those large
supermajorities have to be measured against the community as a whole (i.e. the seven SO/AC).<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d">Regards<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d">Jorge
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span lang="DE" style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Von:</span></b><span lang="DE" style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <a href="mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org" target="_blank">accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org</a> [mailto:<a href="mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org" target="_blank">accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org</a>]
<b>Im Auftrag von </b>Kavouss Arasteh<br>
<b>Gesendet:</b> Mittwoch, 30. September 2015 10:15<br>
<b>An:</b> Jordan Carter <<a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz" target="_blank">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a>><br>
<b>Cc:</b> Accountability Cross Community <<a href="mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org" target="_blank">accountability-cross-community@icann.org</a>><br>
<b>Betreff:</b> Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Dear All,<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">I also understood Fadi in LA expressing a concern on how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance
of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Let us take a scenario as follows<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">There is a potion to reject the Budget.<u></u><u></u></p>
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<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">Petition is agreed ( not voted ) in the petition SO <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Then it is discussed at Forum<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Then put it for voting<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">SAS,RSSAC and very likely GAC do not participate in voting <u></u>
<u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Very probably all 3 OCs participate in voting .<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">ALAC may or may not to do so <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"> if three OCs vote ,the super majority would be 2/3 thus out of 15 votes currently foreseen 10 is enough to reset or ,at extreme, veto the budget .<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Then out of 29 overall weighted /weighting votes 10 succeeded to veto the budget and start an unnecessary process of back and fort of the Budget for months
<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Is that a right process?<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">However, if we first establish a quorum for decision making with fairly high threshold ( 3/4 or 4/5 of the 7 SOs and ACs ) which means 5 SOs and ACs or 4 SOs and ACs are the minimum requirement of quorum to decide on the matter .<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Then we have to apply the super majority of votes which means 2/3 of 25 or 2/3 of 22 or 2/3 of 19 , depending on the SOs and ACs participating which becomes 17, 14 and 12 votes out of 29 votes are sufficient to reject the budget .This
would result in a real capture of the community by a small number of subset of that community.<u></u><u></u></p>
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<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">Consequently, should we replace the voting by consensus then we are better saved .<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">In view of the above the decision making process voting versus consensus building needs to be seriously re-examined
<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Kavouss <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">2015-09-30 9:40 GMT+02:00 Jordan Carter <<a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz" target="_blank">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a>>:<u></u><u></u></p>
<blockquote style="border:none;border-left:solid #cccccc 1.0pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0cm">
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<p class="MsoNormal">Tapani: The approach I have suggested could work for none, any or all of the statutory powers. If it is worth exploring we can explore it. There might be some statutory rights that should not be subject to this approach, as Ed has argued.<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">To address Kavouss' point: Kavouss, I agree with you this is unusual. I would not suggest this for any of the accountability powers we have suggested through the CCWG. I would only suggest it as a cast-iron, impossible-to-avoid, last-resort
for powers that AREN'T about accountability. Dissolving ICANN, to pick the example repeatedly raised by Board members in LA, isn't an accountability issue. So let's not treat it as one. <u></u><u></u></p>
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<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
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<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">To put it another way: <b>some</b> of the powers of a Member in the law of California [or under any other law, should ICANN's jurisdiction change at some point] are clearly about accountability. <u></u><u></u></p>
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<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><b>Some</b> of them aren't. <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">The ones that <u>aren't</u> about accountability, the ones that pose some kind of risk to stability or that just aren't relevant, we can make impossible to use. We can make them even more impossible to use by including the Board as a participant
for any decision to use them.<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
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<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
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<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">All food for thought.<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">best<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Jordan<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">On 30 September 2015 at 19:36, Tapani Tarvainen <<a href="mailto:ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info" target="_blank">ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info</a>> wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
<blockquote style="border:none;border-left:solid #cccccc 1.0pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0cm">
<p class="MsoNormal">This is worrysome. While I can understand the concern about<br>
things like dissolving the company, what's the issue with<br>
document inspection?<br>
<br>
After all, transparency is one of the key elements of trust,<br>
and trust is ultimately what will sustain or kill ICANN.<br>
<br>
Perhaps some of the lawyers among us could explain what<br>
bad could result from document inspection power of the member?<br>
<br>
--<br>
Tapani Tarvainen<u></u><u></u></p>
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<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
On Sep 29 20:48, Rudolph Daniel (<a href="mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com" target="_blank">rudi.daniel@gmail.com</a>) wrote:<br>
<br>
> "the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document<br>
> inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to<br>
> action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all."<br>
><br>
> Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my take on<br>
> it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have<br>
> inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to<br>
> exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that<br>
> can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress<br>
> tested.<br>
><br>
> Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the<br>
> legal minds..<br>
> RD<br>
> On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <<a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz" target="_blank">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a>> wrote:<br>
><br>
> > Hi all<br>
> ><br>
> > One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a<br>
> > concern that basically goes like this:<br>
> ><br>
> > "The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers<br>
> > it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"<br>
> ><br>
> > There were some sub-themes to this concern:<br>
> ><br>
> > - the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for<br>
> > the CMSM<br>
> > - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its<br>
> > decisions<br>
> > - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time<br>
> ><br>
> ><br>
> > Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second<br>
> > Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising<br>
> > any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.<br>
> ><br>
> > That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce<br>
> > the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to<br>
> > member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such<br>
> > high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be<br>
> > actioned at all.<br>
> ><br>
> > [The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this,<br>
> > but that's what it was driving at.]<br>
> ><br>
> ><br>
> > So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following<br>
> > its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability<br>
> > requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the<br>
> > community to have these other powers.<br>
> ><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal">> > *Here is a suggestion.*<br>
> ><br>
> > *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond<br>
> > those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of<br>
> > the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*<br>
> ><br>
> > This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.<br>
> ><br>
> > This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.<br>
> ><br>
> > It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't<br>
> > be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is<br>
> > able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the<br>
> > possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be<br>
> > solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it,<br>
> > "multistakeholder" way.<br>
> ><br>
> > I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about<br>
> > this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in<br>
> > law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am<br>
> > Not A Lawyer.<br>
> ><br>
> ><br>
> > cheers<br>
> > Jordan<br>
> ><br>
> > --<br>
> > Jordan Carter<br>
> ><br>
> > Chief Executive<br>
> > *InternetNZ*<br>
> ><br>
> > <a href="tel:%2B64-4-495-2118" target="_blank">+64-4-495-2118</a> (office) | <a href="tel:%2B64-21-442-649" target="_blank">
+64-21-442-649</a> (mob)<br>
> > Email: <a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz" target="_blank">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a><br>
> > Skype: jordancarter<br>
> > Web: <a href="http://www.internetnz.nz" target="_blank">www.internetnz.nz</a><br>
> ><br>
> > *A better world through a better Internet *<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
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</blockquote>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
<br clear="all">
<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">-- <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Jordan Carter<br>
<br>
Chief Executive <br>
<b>InternetNZ</b><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
<a href="tel:%2B64-4-495-2118" target="_blank">+64-4-495-2118</a> (office) | <a href="tel:%2B64-21-442-649" target="_blank">
+64-21-442-649</a> (mob)<br>
Email: <a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz" target="_blank"><span style="color:#1155cc">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</span></a> <br>
Skype: jordancarter<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">Web: <a href="http://www.internetnz.nz" target="_blank">www.internetnz.nz</a> <u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
<i>A better world through a better Internet </i><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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</div>
</div>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12.0pt"><br>
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</blockquote>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
</div>
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