<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<font face="Verdana">Bruce,<br>
<br>
You below statement casts the Board's resistance to the CCWG in a
completely new light and which, at least for the present
discussion, I will judge as being a rather more favourable light.
<br>
<br>
What I understand you to be basically saying - and please correct
me if I am wrong - is that you can agree that the Board should be
under the oversight of the global public, or the global Internet
community, and that, if the right structure can be provided for
it, it is obviously the global Internet community which should
hold the final and unassailable legitimacy and power, and not the
Board. Whereby a membership organisation is fine with you.
However, the real problem here is that the so called group(s) or
the community which are/is represented in the current CCWG's
oversight or accountability model are simply not representative
enough of the global Internet community. You are so very right.
But the problem I see here is that this is just not the right
moment to raise this most important of issues in the oversight
transition process. This should have been more or less the first
issue that should have been dealt with by this process.<br>
<br>
See<a
href="https://comments.ianacg.org/pdf/submission/submission19.pdf">
the contribution of the Just Net Coalition</a> where our primary
contention is that the process is flawed precisely because it
seems to lunge towards sorting out the details to the most
meticulous levels before addressing the issues that are rather
higher in logical and political hierarchy, as the issue of
representativity of the Internet community, or as the NTIA
announcement called it, the global multistakeholder community,
obviously is. <br>
<br>
Even now, instead of employing this rather well-founded argument,
that the current community structure is simply not representative
enough, to propose that therefore we should keep the Board un-
supervised or inadequately supervised, which almost everyone has
recognised as 'the' central problem in the transition, we should
be looking in full earnest into the issue of<i><b> what kind of
membership structure will be representative enough to have a
legitimate claim to the kind of oversight over the Board that
the CCWG proposal presents. </b></i><br>
<br>
Should we not first be addressing this key question, rather than
any other? This indeed was among the two key questions that were
the ones that should have been sorted out at the very start (other
being jurisdiction), before getting quickly into details of
specific models. Even at this stage, the current exercise of
arriving at the best model for public ('internet community' if you
like) oversight over one of the most important global technical
infrastructures being of such outstanding and sustained global
importance, we still must do what we must do... Rather than submit
to the circular logic of since we do not have a community
structure that is representative enough, we cannot have any
effective oversight over the Board, which now becomes more or less
a sovereign power in this area, .....<br>
<br>
Indeed, Just Net Coalition h<a
href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/icg-forum/msg00009.html">ad
recommended a membership based model</a> which will include all
registrants from across the world... If that makes for too
unwieldy a number, we can have some means of regional elections,
with one person or legal entity given just one vote however many
domains it may have registered, to have a viable number of
representatives of the Internet community to exercise oversight
over the board (although I still find this model defective bec it
doesnt include those who use the Internet but havent registered a
domain name).<br>
<br>
But of course this is just one possibility and there could be
numerous others that can tend towards better addressing the
problem of lack of representativity of the current structures. We
also know that whatever we get finally may still not be perfect
but the test here would be how well we try, within the limits of
practicality. <br>
<br>
So that it may not be alleged that in taking on from Bruce's
emails I have moved to entirely different territories of some kind
of personal political priorities, I must repeat that all that I am
doing here is to address the issue posited by Bruce as follows,
which I really find genuine.<br>
<br>
</font>
<blockquote><font face="Verdana">"</font>For ICANN to move to a
membership model I think it needs a membership structure that more
broadly reflects the size and diversity of that "Internet
community".
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
I just dont see how it can be just left as an excuse, however
reasonable, for Board to not to accept community oversight... The
problem has to be approached from the opposite direction... By
actually coming up with a "membership structure that more broadly
reflects the size and diversity of that "Internet community".<br>
<br>
Not to do so would be a complete dereliction of the duty of the
CCWG, and is likely to attract the allegation that the group being
constituted largely by the 'defectively' representative current
community structure, and therefore having a vest interest in it, for
this reason chose not to look beyond towards a really representative
structure .<br>
<br>
The CCWG group should remember that it was constituted to represent
and serve the interests of the global Internet community and not
that of the currently, and defectively, constituted ICANN plus
community structure.<br>
<br>
The real thing to do in devising the right oversight over ICANN
always was to find or devise that structure which can be considered
sufficiently representative of the Internet community and therefore
legitimate, and inter alia therefore avoid responses like this from
the Board that sorry you yourself are not legitimate enough to be
trusted with the kind of power you seek. <br>
<br>
This was/ is the time and opportunity to devise some kind of really
globally representative structure outside the states based
structures, and thus meet the requirements of participatory
democracy, and alternative models of global governance that are
still democratic, and interact with the current states based ones. <br>
<br>
Regards, parminder <br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On Saturday 03 October 2015 12:39 PM,
Bruce Tonkin wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:263EE96C7DADD44CB3D5A07DBD41D0E88F552F66@bne3-0001mitmbx.corp.mit"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Hello All,
I have given the topic of membership some thought over the last 6 months.
As has already been noted, the Articles of Incorporation does contemplate that one day ICANN may have members.
Member organisations are quite common structures for ccTLD managers (e.g the manager of .au - auDA has about 150 members) , RIR structures (APNIC has 4,500 members) , and other I* bodies like the Internet Society (65,000 members) and World Wide Web Consortium (404 members).
ICANN owes a fiduciary duty to the Internet community as a whole.
For ICANN to move to a membership model I think it needs a membership structure that more broadly reflects the size and diversity of that "Internet community".
The Structure of the SOs and ACs is an attempt to at least have a structure that "could" involve a large proportion of the Internet community.
Using the GNSO as an example, it has as part of its structure:
- gTLD registries, gTLD registrars, business users, intellectual property interests, internet service and connectivity providers, non-commercial users, and not-for-profit operational concerns interests.
>From my perspective ICANN would be ready to move to a membership model when each of the parts of the Internet community has a statistically relevant participation in ICANN. The gTLD registrars stakeholder group for example have 89 members of about 1000 registrars, and those registrars represent a majority of the domain name registrations. I am less clear on whether the representation is appropriately in proportion across the 5 geographic regions. When I look at other areas though - I see limited participation from different parts of the world, and a limited proportion of the business, non-commercial entities and individuals involved in any way.
The current ICANN model was established to reduce capture from any particular segment - e.g. just commercial gTLD registry or registrar interests, or predominately US based intellectual property interests etc.
Each SO appoints two directors, ALAC appoints one director, the technical community has three liaisons (IETF, SSAC, RSSAC) and the public sector has one liaison (GAC). Other than that we formed a nominating committee comprising all of the above to find 8 directors that provide some cultural and geographic diversity to the Board. The nominating committee operates using consensus amongst all the representations from the SOs and ACs. This model attempts to balance people on the Board with specific technical names and numbers expertise, with people that bring a broad range of experience from different cultural and geographic backgrounds. This voting model was established over 16 years with a few changes along the way to substitute for the broader membership based body that many would like to see. I interpreted the NTIA announcement that it was ready to transition its stewardship as support for this governance model.
So I don't think ICANN has sufficient participation to move to a full membership mode such that each of the parts of the Internet community has a statistically relevant participation in ICANN.
Regards,
Bruce Tonkin
_______________________________________________
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org">Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community</a>
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body>
</html>