<p dir="ltr">Sent from my Asus Zenfone2<br>
Kindly excuse brevity and typos.<br>
On 3 Oct 2015 21:33, "Steve DelBianco" <<a href="mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org">sdelbianco@netchoice.org</a>> wrote:<br>
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> 6. Mechanism for binding IRP where a panel decision is enforceable in any court recognizing international arbitration results — even if ICANN’s board refused to participate in the binding arbitration. (assuming CCWG lawyers verify this works without activating a Membership model)<br>
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<p dir="ltr">SO: Will be good to know if this is now confirmed to be Yes or No.</p>
<p dir="ltr">> I think we are close enough to get consensus around the above powers before we leave Dublin. And based on what we’ve heard recently, the board will support the powers described above. <br>
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> But there’s one more we have to add before losing the leverage of this IANA transition:<br>
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> Let’s put into ICANN bylaws a method where the community can show consensus to undertake a review of ICANN's governance structure, either because the powers above aren’t working, or just because the community overwhelmingly wants to review governance. The goal of the Governance Review is to recommend a new governance model that might even include moving to Membership. <br>
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SO: +1 on this, we could even set the current SM outcome of the CCWG(or SD model) as the blueprint trigger governance model to be implemented(after review by governance committee) once the community consensus for governance review is achieved. There may not be need to start the process of determining what type of structure will be required during that time since a lot has been done already in this process.</p>
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To Bruce’s point, any proposal emerging from this Governance Review would include assurances that ACs and SOs are representative of global internet users and protected from capture. <br>
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SO: The more we improve on community inclusiveness, I believe this should not be a problem<br></p>
<p dir="ltr">> This same bylaw could describe a process for board acceptance of a consensus proposal emerging from the Governance Review: it would take 2/3 board majority to object to the proposal on the grounds that it is not in the global public interest, triggering a board-community consultation. After consultation, a new community proposal would take 3/4 board majority to object. If the board objected a second time, we would have the power to recall that entire board, or to pursue binding arbitration. <br>
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<p dir="ltr">SO: Perhaps the trigger for constituting a governance review committee/group should come before this stage. It should also require a high threshold from board to object (3/4). That said, I think the current work of the CCWG needs to be the main source of reference for the governance committee as that process needs to be more efficient and timely done. There will be no need to start redesigning a model, so it will be a good thing that board knows the model coming into implementation once governance review committee is triggered.</p>
<p dir="ltr">That on its own should make board think twice whenever it considers how to react to consensus view of the community.<br></p>
<p dir="ltr">> Again, these are my personal thoughts about a way forward that is based on what others have said recently. <br>
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SO:</p>
<p dir="ltr">Quite helpful.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Thanks!<br></p>
<p dir="ltr">> —Steve DelBianco<br>
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